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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-90-004

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Army's Role in 1990's Viewed

HK2501101590 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 1 Jan 90, p 1

[Editorial: "Under the Powerful Leadership of the Party, Strive for New Victories in the 1990's With Full Confidence"]

[Text] With the booming sound of the New Year's bell, we bid farewell to the unforgettable 80's and march into the great 90's. We take this exciting moment to salute and offer New Year's greetings to all the soldiers in the People's Republic Armed Forces, old comrades who have left or retired from the military, family members of revolutionary martyrs, family members of the Armed Forces, veterans who are now working in other fields, and people who care about the buildup of national defense.

The 1980's have just left us. During that time our country attained great success in reform and the open policy. It galloped forward on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. During the last 10 years our Armed Forces made historical progress by being revolutionized, modernized, and institutionalized. During these 10 years, we had many obstacles and setbacks, tests and challenges, risks and burdens. But, because we depended on the brilliant leadership of the Party Central Committee, and because people of all nationalities united and worked with the military, we managed to overcome these difficulties, and accomplished one victory after another. Our Republic has grown to be more mature and is standing majestically in the Orient. Our well-seasoned People's Army, with its great strength, has protected our national safety and become an important force in keeping world peace.

These were 10 years of struggle and 10 years of development. We are proud of what our military has achieved during the 1980's. Under the management of Comrade Deng Xiaoping, we have established the idea and principle of the building-up of our Army: to modernize and institutionalize a revolutionary army with Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, we have found new direction for the Army during this historical period. In accordance with changes in the international situation, and a shift in emphasis in the party and the nation's work goals, we have carried out strategic changes in the guiding structure of the Army. We have clarified the military strategy for this new period. We have accomplished the formidable task of structural reform, streamlining, reorganization, and reduction of manpower by 1 million. Military leaders of all levels persisted in following revolutionary principles and made obvious progress in giving the military a younger, better-trained, and more professional look. We followed and extended our superb tradition. We reformed and created. We formulated the "Outline of the Military Infrastructure." We issued and carried out three rules about the duties of a cadre, and the regulations of military service. We implemented a new military system of ranks. We also made it clear that

our goal was to have fighting capability and our focus was on military training. Our policy was to strengthen the overall structure of our Armed Forces. We made great achievements in military training, political work, logistical support, national defense technology, and campus construction. We also succeeded in building up and training the militia, in learning the sciences, training dual-purpose personnel, and bringing the Army and people together to build socialist civilization. Our Army consciously followed along with national economic construction. They participated enthusiastically in building socialism, particularly in the construction of important projects. They were courageous in rescue efforts. Their deeds were like music expressing love for the people. Our Army victoriously fought a defensive and offensive battle, and protected the safety of our national border. "The beloved of the new generation" created "the spirit of Laoshan" and "the spirit of Nansha." They composed for the Army, up-to-date and powerful notes for the "five revolutionary essences" and for the symphony of socialist spiritual culture.

The 1980's were an unusual time, but 1989 was even more unforgettable. Our Army strongly and thoroughly enforced the policy decided upon by the party Central and the Military Commission. We proceeded to instill everyone with knowledge of their situational duties. We aggressively fortified our effort in ideological and political work, so that our cadres and soldiers could remain ideologically, politically, and operationally on a par with the Central Committee. Last year, our hard-working cadres and soldiers reinforced the defense of our national borders, on land and along the coastline. Last year, the troops sent by our Army to Lhasa imposed marshal law, put down disturbances, and promoted unity among different nationalities. Last year, between spring and summer, the most dangerous storm in the history of our Republic occurred. Our Army sailed through the trial with a passing grade. The troops enforcing martial law in the capital had to deal with an extremely complicated situation. Yet they stood firm. Carrying the bright banner, they obeyed orders and maintained strict discipline. They defended the socialist republic with their lives and blood. They stopped the upheaval and put down the counter-revolutionary riot. Their place in history will never be obliterated. Last year was also the year when leading members in the Central Military Commission were reorganized. Comrade Deng Xiaoping, respected and loved by the Army, resigned his duty as chairman of the Commission. Comrade Jiang Zemin became the chairman of the new Central Military Commission, and Commander-in-chief of our national Armed Forces. Near the end of the year, we had a conference on political work in the military. Based on 1987's "Revolution concerning political work of the armed forces of the new age," we discussed "Problems concerning enforcing and improving Armed Forces' political work in the new situation," and one more important document was drafted. The document guarantees that our Army will keep up its political standards.

The glorious achievement of the 1980's is now history, and the happy future of the 1990's is waiting for us to explore. In the 90's 10 years remain for us to make the final sprint towards the 21st century—a crucial time for our country to execute the overall strategy of socialist modernization. It is also a critical period for us to see whether the Chinese race is in ascendance or decline. Are we going to accomplish more in building socialism and modernization? Are we going to fulfill our goal to quadruple our national economy and enable our average income to afford us a comfortable living? Will we make more encouraging progress in revolutionizing, modernizing, and institutionalizing our military with Chinese characteristics? All these will be decided upon by whether we can work effectively in the coming 10 years. It is now the very first spring of the 1990's. We should feel strongly about our political duty and historical mission, and march sturdily towards the New Year. The whole Army should seriously follow the spirit of the 4th and the 5th Plenary Sessions of the 13th CPC Central Committee, and thoroughly carry out the set of policies, principles, and duties decided upon by the 1989 Extended Conference of the Military Commission. In this New Year we should further reinforce the political construction of the Army, and elevate the overall combat effectiveness of our troops.

New situations develop rapidly inside and outside the country. This requires a higher standard for the political development of our Army. When we move towards more administration and reorganization, there will be new problems for our troops. We still have the difficult task of eliminating the thoughts and influences of bourgeois liberalism. The struggles between infiltration and counter-infiltration, subversion and counter-subversion, "peaceful evolution" and "counter-peaceful evolution" are intense and complicated. We need to continue the development of the construction and reform of the troops. Our task to educate and train people is an arduous one, and we will run into many obstacles and conflicts. To meet all these demands we must concentrate, and work harder to push forward and strengthen political construction; our Army shall never fail politically.

In order to strengthen political development, we must build a good ideological foundation. The whole Army should have a thorough education in upholding the four basic principles and opposing bourgeois liberalism. We must stir up enthusiasm for the study of Marxist-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Zedong. We must wholeheartedly and firmly develop the Learn-from-Lai-Feng movement. We shall further strengthen, and expand the scope of the troops' socialist ideology and culture. At the same time, we'd better improve the organization of our party structure. We shall improve the organization of party commissions at all levels by meeting the requirement: "Be studious, unified, honest, and realistic." When we evaluate, choose, or assign our cadres, we must first look into their political qualifications, to make sure the guns are held by those who are

politically dependable. We need to improve our minds and behavior. We should be practical and realistic; no more hypocrisy or superficiality. We will keep on strengthening our political structure to guarantee that the party has absolute control over the Army, that the entire Army is consolidated, and that the Army is always politically qualified.

The basic principle of military buildup is to maintain standards of combat effectiveness and improve the quality of the troops. In this New Year we must work harder in strategic training. We must make sure that we have the personnel ready, the time for training allotted, and the content of training guaranteed. We should work hard to raise the quality of training. We should keep to our principle of self-reliance, and improve our weapons and equipment. We should promote the building and the upkeep of our logistics. Because our country is in a difficult situation, we ought to take the initiative to share our worries with our party and country. We should strive to build our military frugally. We must increase income and decrease expenditures. We will make sure that the Army's ability to fight gets better, but we must insist on administering the Army with strict discipline and rules. We follow the "Outline of the Construction of Military Infrastructure" to strengthen the administration of the troops, keep up discipline, build a strong foundation, and make the standard of institutionalization higher. We believe if we vigorously enforce political construction and at the same time work hard to complete the jobs mentioned above, our military will make great improvements during this New Year in all areas.

In reviewing the past 10 years, there are two important lessons that we should pay attention to. The first one is that no matter what the situation is, we should insist on "one center and two basic points." This vital conclusion comes from the rich experiences our party has gone through during the 1980's. We must stand firm to uphold the four basic principles, which are the foundation of our country; and we must travel on the road of reform and openness towards national might. We shall never forget the focal point of our duty. We need to pay attention to the two points and grasp them with both hands. The second point is that we still have to strive hard; not only in the 1980's, but also in the 1990's. The condition of China and the great goal of our country determines that the people of our generation and several generations after us must work harder, sweat more, contribute more, and sacrifice more. Continual hard work contributes to progress. Socialist modernization comes from labor. Only if we keep on struggling can we hope to gradually catch up with the standard of developed countries, only then can we hope to make the dreams of several generations come true.

Our party and our country are facing a most important historical period. No matter how the international situation changes, we must not hesitate to uphold Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. We will not change our mind about socialism. All our military comrades

must have a clear understanding of the historical responsibility they bear. With Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission to provide leadership, we shall boost our spirit and work diligently. Our Army will turn into a great steel wall that will protect and build our motherland; and make a contribution to the party, the people, and the socialist motherland that will be worthy of the 1990's.

Southern Navy, Air Force Units Profiled

HK1701034590 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE in Chinese 1045 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Report by staff reporter Li Chun (2621 2504): "Patrolling in the Airspace of the South China Sea"—ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE headline]

[Text] Haikou, 12 January (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—Nanhai is the largest of China's coastal waters. Above this sea area, which stretches for some 3.6 million square meters, an air unit, which people call "tiger of the southern sky," is patrolling. In the command room of this unit, unit commander Admiral Shi Yunsheng was interviewed by this reporter.

The admiral believes that with the growing importance of the Pacific as a strategic position when the world's economic region is gradually shifting to the Far East, with the discovery of large reserves of oil and gas in the South China Sea, and with the establishment of Hainan Province as the largest special economic zone of China and the opening up of some cities on the coast of Hainan, there has been a new demand for safeguarding the security of the airspace above Nanhai. Therefore, the mission of the air unit of the Nanhai Fleet has become particularly important.

By way of introduction, Shi Yunsheng said: The air unit of the Nanhai Navy was set up in 1958. Afterwards, as this unit grew, it served in reconnaissance raids, checked aggression and turmoil, and stopped the enemy's landing. It gained merits in fighting the US aircraft-carrier based fighters. Especially in the Battle of Xisha, upon receiving orders, various types of aircraft, which aided and screened the island landings in coordination with the battle at sea where the fleet of warships were arrayed, succeeded in restoring the islands of Jinying, Shanhu and Ganquan. In the defense battle against Vietnam and the Battle of Nansha in the following years, it also successfully completed its military missions.

Evolving over 30 years from a unit possessing a single type of aircraft, this unit, for its air defense mission, now possesses home-made supersonic fighter planes, bombers, transport planes, and reconnaissance planes. It also functions as a military unit on land responsible for such duties as communications, radar detection, battle preparations, and repairs. Weapons have evolved from cannons to missiles. Thus a tight three-dimensional defense cordon has been stretched across the air. Its capacity to react quickly and to launch sudden attacks,

and its mobility, protective and safeguarding capacity have been improved greatly.

Admiral Shi, aged 50, enlisted in 1956. He served as a pilot, regiment commander, division commander, and as vice commander of the air unit of the North Sea Navy. Six years ago, he was transferred to the South Sea Navy as commander of its air unit. Being a special pilot, he stressed the importance of military training and of strengthening military exercises under modern military conditions.

He said: Half of the officers and men in the unit belong to Grade One who can run and fight under any weather. It is expected that the whole unit will become Grade One next year. Officers in charge of the air unit are all young and strong. They can pilot planes and give commands at the command tower. All pilots have received ultra-low altitude training, which is very advanced by international standards.

Shi Yunsheng also said: Since the reform and opening up, the air unit of the Hainan Fleet has, in addition to shouldering normal duties, also actively participated in the development of the special economic zone. It has improved development of Hainan Province and has speeded up reform and opening up by ensuring safe landings and takeoffs of civil flights and ordinary aircraft in Haikou and Sanya Airports, by helping local departments in conducting aerial investigations, actively engaging themselves in salvage operations and stopping disasters, and by protecting deep-sea fishing and ocean-cruising.

As for the future development of the air unit of the Nanhai Fleet, Shi Yunsheng said: Following the upgrade of weapons, the unit will increase training in ultra-high and ultra-low altitude flying in the complicated airspace, deep-sea flying, and combination training. Judging from the environment of Nanhai, we will mainly develop the air unit and the unit on board warships for their long-range combat effectiveness so as to effectively control and protect the airspace of China's Nanhai, ensure the reform and opening up of the special economic zone, and safeguard the territory and territorial waters of Xisha and Nansha.

Honorary Title Conferred on Missile Battalion

HK1701080790 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 13 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by reporters Wang Zhichen (3769 1087 5256) and Cheng Zhong (4453 0112): "Commander and Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army Air Force Sign Order Conferring Honorary Title on Missile Battalion for Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People"]

[Text] A surface-to-air missile battalion of the Air Force under the Jinan Military Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Nanchun village of Changdao County, Shandong, where the battalion is

stationed, have scored marked results in building the unit itself and the "two civilizations" of Nanchun through unfolding activities in building socialist spiritual civilization through army-people efforts. The PLA Air Force Commander Wang Hai and Political Commissar Zhu Guang recently initialled an order to confer the honorary title of "Model Battalion in Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People" to this unit; while Yantai City party committee and government made the decision to confer the honorary title of "Model Village in Supporting the Army." The naming ceremony was held in the county seat of Penglai County on 10 January.

This surface-to-air missile battalion is stationed on a small island in the Bo Hai. Over the past 5 years, cadres and servicemen have helped the village build a "home for young people," a "women's home," and a "cultural study room." At the same time, they supported the fishing village to develop production, and completed five projects, including a cold-storage factory, a marten-breeding farm, and a water dam. The officers and men have on 16 occasions risked their lives to rescue fishing boats and aquatic produce in danger, and prevented economic loss to the masses in terms of a million yuan or so. The cadres and masses of Nanchun have shown great concern for and enthusiastically supported army building. With the in-depth development of jointly building the two civilizations, the unit's military and political qualities have markedly improved, and they have been awarded a class two collective commendation.

Network Assists Research, Defense Experiments

*OW1901134290 Beijing Television Service
in Mandarin 1100 GMT 16 Jan 90*

[From the "National News Hookup" program]

[Text] [Video begins with a medium shot of a red streamer bearing the Chinese characters "The Logistics Work Conference of the State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense," and then cuts to show medium to closeup shots of workers attending to a communications satellite. Shots follow of a trailer towing a solid fuel rocket booster, a rocket in an upright position, and an antisubmarine helicopter being spotted down on the deck of a Daijiang-class submarine support ship. It then cuts to show a semi-trailer carrying the motors and body of a rocket, a radar, a satellite dish, soldiers digging and planting vegetables, and some livestock and poultry]

The State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense informed this reporter today that China has established a comprehensive network for conducting scientific research and experiments in the field of national defense. Overall, the network is capable of providing effective assistance in carrying out tests on missiles, nuclear weapons, conventional arms, and various types of artificial satellites, and in launching

satellites. Experimental launching facilities and observation posts are scattered throughout China's 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, although most are located in the Gobi desert and in other mountainous and grassy areas where conditions are extremely harsh. Undertaking a major experiment in those areas usually requires simultaneous assistance from land, sea, and air transport units. National and military departments concerned coordinate their efforts in such operations, and command centers work systematically to organize all aspects of the logistics work involved into a well-coordinated effort.

New bases combining facilities for defense research and everyday living have sprung up in many areas of China. In addition to post offices, public security bureaus, and cultural, educational, and banking institutions, these bases boast all types of service centers to meet daily needs. This has ensured success in the nation's defense research programs.

Weapons Industry Reports Research, Production

*OW2301113390 Beijing Television Service
in Mandarin 1100 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[From the "National News Hookup" program]

[Text] [Video shows arrays of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and missiles in arsenal shops, cutting to shots of open fields showing tanks, artillery guns, and missile carriers] China's weapons industry has built relatively integrated systems of scientific research and production, making considerable contributions to national defense construction and socialist construction. The past decade of reform and opening to the outside world was a period noted for fairly fast progress and relatively remarkable results in weapons science research. A new generation of main weapons and equipment appeared in our Armed Forces, showing a relatively large improvement in maneuverability and combat efficiency. Over 1,400 scientific and technology research projects on weapons have won prizes awarded by authorities at and above the ministerial level, including 261 prizes awarded by the state.

[Video shows arrays of trucks, motorcycles, and buses in workshops] The weapons industry has turned out a variety of civilian products. These are sophisticated products that have certain characteristics and can fill the gap in our country or substitute for imported products. The industry can produce more than 700 kinds of civilian products in 18 different categories. Last year, civilian products accounted for 60 percent of the total output value, showing a sixfold increase compared with the 1979 record. Export transactions concluded by the weapons industry during the past 10 years totaled more than \$10 billion.

Defense Technology Firms Urged To Expand

*HK2401010290 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English
24 Jan 90 p 2*

[Untitled article by Yu An]

[Text] China's national defence science and technology information industry has been urged to better serve the construction of the national economy, CHINA DAILY learned yesterday.

In the future, military enterprises will make full use of their technical forces and advanced equipment and technology to manufacture more high-technology civil products, instead of competing with other firms in the low or medium level civilian goods market.

However, this is under the condition that research and production of military products will be given first priority, said Jin Zhude, a division chief of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry of National Defence.

Under peace conditions, more military technology and information, which are still secret at the moment, will be transferred to serve the national economy and help to develop more goods for civilian use, Jin said a joint meeting of the China National Defence Science and Technology Information Society and the United Association of China National Defence Science and Technology Information Stations.

Jin is also chairman of the two organizations.

In the fourth quarter of last year, secrets involving 2,336 items of military science and technology results were lifted by the commission in order to make them available to civil production.

The science and technology results are mainly involved in the nuclear, aviation and space industries.

To promote the move, Jin said that they should from now on draft a plan for the development of national defence science and technology information industry in the next five years.

Jin said that they should not only build up a complete national defence science and technology information system, but also make possible measures to put more military information in civil use.

U.S. Reluctance To Withdraw From Europe Viewed

*HK2901042890 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO
in Chinese 29 Jan 90 p 3*

["Evening Talk" by Yang Chu (5017 2612): "Americans Play the Part of a Tortoise in the Year of the Horse"]

[Text] Representing Speed

This is the Year of the Horse. The horse represents speed. In the era before airplanes, tanks, armored carriers and helicopters, the cavalry was the cream of the army. In the contemporary world of today, most countries, including China, have dropped such a service as the cavalry. The U.S. armored cavalry division has still retained its name, but without horses and with only tanks and armored carriers.

Something Strange

The Americans are fond of horses. The cowboys in the West are horse-riding heroes. Americans pay attention to efficiency in doing things, with the speed like that of a horse. But there is now a strange thing. They worry about the Soviet Army withdrawing from East Europe too soon. They do not like the Russian horse leaving too fast on its return trip!

The United States has posted troops in Europe because of the threat posed by the Soviet Army. If the Russians want to go, why are they on the contrary not happy?

Let Out the Secret

"If the Russians agree to secretly withdraw, we would have great difficulty persuading the West European people to let the U.S. troops remain," said an official of NATO headquarters.

This revealed their secret.

Up to now, the Soviet Union has withdrawn more than 38,000 troops from East Europe and has promised that all Soviet troops abroad would be withdrawn in 10 years, or by the year 2000.

Pressure From Eastern Europe

The East European countries carrying out democratic reforms have called for the quickest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops, or a pace like that of a steed.

Czechoslovakia has told Moscow that it wants all Soviet troops withdrawn from within its border by the end of this year. Hungary has also demanded the completion of a Soviet troop withdrawal by 1991 at the latest.

The Polish Government has not made a similar demand. But Walesa, of the Polish Solidarity Trade Union, expressed the desire of the people: The Soviet troops stationed in Poland must go home within the year.

The Most Important Reason

The Americans do not hope for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe within the Year of the Horse in the Chinese calendar in accordance with the demand of the East European countries. At the Vienna talks on conventional arms, they suggested the respective reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe to 275,000. The Americans want to play the part of a tortoise moving slowly in the Year of the Horse!

The most important reason is that the United States worries about the instability of Gorbachev's position. With the hardliners assuming power, the situation would again become tense. It would then be too late for the U.S. Army to get across the Atlantic to return to Europe.

It seems that many people in the world, including the Americans, are putting their stakes on Gorbachev. Is he a steed worthy of the name, or a sick horse with no lasting strength?

JAPAN

'Sources' Say Reduction of U.S. Forces Possible

OW2701025990 Tokyo KYODO in English 0222 GMT
27 Jan 90

[Text] Washington, January 26 (KYODO)—U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney may propose a reduction of U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea and Japan when he visits the two countries in mid-February, sources said Friday. Cheney may ask officials of the two countries to open talks on the troop cutback, the sources said. The size of the troop reduction is not known but sources said it would be minor.

The Department of Defense also is considering a scaling down or closing of the Clark Air Base in the Philippines, sources said. Cheney is to visit South Korea February 14-15 and the Philippines February 16-17 before visiting Japan, probably on February 19 or 20, sources said. The United States maintains about 44,000 troops in South Korea, which include 31,000 Army staff. About 100 Air Force aircraft are stationed there, Japan's Defense Agency says. In Japan, there are some 50,000 U.S. troops, which include 23,000 Marines in Okinawa. The U.S. Air Force stations 220 aircraft in Japan, the agency says.

Official on Impact of U.S. ROK Base Closings

OW3001031190 Tokyo KYODO in English
0251 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, January 30 (KYODO)—Government spokeswoman Mayumi Moriyama said Tuesday the U.S. closure of three military bases in South Korea will not weaken the defense of Japan or the region.

"I think the United States will continue to maintain the appropriate level of military presence in the Asia-Pacific region," Chief Cabinet Secretary Moriyama told a news conference. "I don't think this will have an immediate impact on Japan, but we won't know until the changes take place," she said.

The South Korean Defense Ministry announced Monday the U.S. will withdraw 2,000 noncombatant personnel from South Korea by July 1992, and close three of five Air Force bases. The U.S. currently has 40,000 troops stationed in South Korea. South Korean authorities said the reduction would not affect the country's combat readiness.

The U.S. is also considering a reorganization of U.S. Forces in Asia because of decreasing East-West tensions, as well as domestic pressure to cut defense spending, according to U.S. sources. Options under consideration include transferring some troops in South Korea to Japan, and a partial withdrawal of Marines stationed in Japan, the sources said.

Spokesman Expects U.S. To Keep Troops in Asia

OW3001123390 Tokyo KYODO in English
1213 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, January 30 (KYODO)—Japan expects the United States to retain its forward deployment strategy in the Asia-Pacific region despite defense cuts announced by Washington, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday.

"It is our understanding that the U.S. military commitment to the Asia and Pacific region is going to remain unchanged," said spokesman Taizo Watanabe in a meeting with foreign correspondents.

Watanabe was reacting to U.S. announcements of a 2.6 percent defense budget cut for fiscal 1991 and a scale-down in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, as well as reports of a possible cutback of military forces stationed in Japan.

Watanabe said Japan places its faith in repeated declarations by top U.S. officials that the United States intends "to maintain a strong forward deployment preparedness."

He echoed remarks made earlier in the day by Defense Agency Director General Juro Matsumoto that Japan has received no notification from the U.S. concerning reported plans for a partial cut in U.S. forces based in Okinawa and Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture.

"We have never heard of any plan on the part of the United States to withdraw its troops from any bases in Japan," he said.

U.S. military officials in Okinawa, however, estimated a savings of 100 million dollars if two U.S. air squadrons on the southern island were disbanded and another reduced in size. The officials also announced the cancellation of plans to shift a squadron of aircraft to Okinawa from the Philippines and will disband it instead.

Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama commented Tuesday morning that he will take up the matter of possible reductions in Japan during U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's upcoming visit to Tokyo, reportedly set for February 19-20.

Watanabe said that in view of the existing military situation surrounding Japan, there is no need for either a scale-down in the U.S. military presence in Japan or a curtailment of Japan's military buildup. Japan continues to assure its national security through close defense ties with the U.S. and through its own efforts "to maintain and develop self-defense capability," he said.

Denying that Japan is out of step with the East-West trend toward detente, Watanabe said, "The situation in Europe is one thing and the situation in the Asia and Pacific region is another."

He specifically cited what he said was a qualitative buildup in Soviet military forces in the region and said, "We have no plans of changing our current preparedness."

Asked how Japan would react to a change in the U.S. naval presence in the Philippines, Watanabe would only say that Japan is "very much concerned about the U.S. military commitment to the Asia and Pacific region as a whole."

"We have been reassured again and again that their position is not changed... So we are not worried," he said.

Defense Chief Rejects Military Budget Cuts

OW3001080290 Tokyo KYODO in English
0743 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, January 30 (KYODO)—Defense Agency Director General Juro Matsumoto on Tuesday rejected the need for Japanese defense cuts following the announcement Monday of U.S. reductions in military spending. But the defense chief characterized the 2.6 percent U.S. defense budget cut as a "turning point" in the process of detente and disarmament.

Matsumoto, speaking at a press conference, also said he had received no notice of any U.S. plans to withdraw some of its forces stationed in southern Japan.

The U.S. is studying plans for a partial withdrawal of troops based in Okinawa and Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, reliable sources said late last week.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney announced in Washington on Monday the closure of three minor air bases in South Korea but said he was not aware of any planned cuts in Japan.

U.S. military officials in Okinawa announced Tuesday the cancellation of the planned shift of a squadron from U.S. bases in the Philippines, saying the unit would be disbanded instead.

The reported disbanding of two other squadrons and reductions in another now in Okinawa will cut costs by an estimated 100 million dollars.

In rejecting any Japanese defense cuts, Matsumoto said U.S. military strength was the result of a long history of U.S. buildup. Japan, he said, had just reached the 4 trillion yen level in its 1990 defense budget. "It's not like the U.S. cutback," he said.

Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, commenting the same day, said he would take up the matter of possible reductions in U.S. forces here in talks with Cheney next month. The defense secretary is expected to arrive for a two-day visit to Japan on February 19.

Dates for an expected meeting between Nakayama and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have yet to be announced, but talks are likely sometime after February

20, when Nakayama visits New York to participate in a United Nations session on narcotics.

NORTH KOREA

Paper Denounces 'Heinous' U.S. 'Peace Strategy'

SK2601110390 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1019 GMT 26 Jan 90

["Deceptive 'Peace Strategy' of U.S. Imperialism"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, January 26 (KCNA)—The heinous nature of the "peace strategy" of U.S. imperialism lies in its attempt not only to conceal its moves of aggression and war with the veil of "peace" but also to achieve by cunning method its aggressive aim which it could not attain with strength.

While having dealings on "disarmament" and "cooperation" under the cloak of "peace" and "detente", the U.S. imperialists are today actually expanding armament, hastening preparations for a nuclear war and committing aggression and intervention more viciously behind their curtain.

So says NODONG SINMUN today in a signed article titled "Deceptive 'Peace Strategy' of U.S. Imperialism".

Noting that the tactics of political, ideological and cultural disintegration of socialist countries from within craftily sought by the U.S. imperialists are the main point of their "peace strategy", the article says:

The U.S. imperialists set it as the core of their global strategy to contain and stifle the socialist forces, the fortress of peace and progress. They leave no stone unturned in their bid to attain this purpose not only with "supremacy of strength" and "nuclear superiority" but with a peace stratagem.

The U.S. imperialists try to destroy the socialist countries from within by decrying the superiority of socialism and breathing the idea of "liberalization" into them.

With a peace stratagem they also attempt to disorganize and destroy the non-aligned movement, a righteous international movement representing the demand of the era of chajusong and aspiration of the people, and detach the non-aligned countries and Third World countries from the road of independence against imperialism.

Under the mask of "mediator" and "guarantor", the U.S. imperialists are expanding disputes and rendering them acute to use them in their armed intervention, while shouting themselves hoarse that the disputes should be settled in a peaceful way through dialogue and negotiation.

While talking about "relaxation" of tension in some areas, they are aggravating it in other areas and, while crying for "improvement of relations" with big powers,

they threaten and blackmail small countries. This is a strategy to destroy the anti-imperialist, independent forces one by one by concentrating strength on some areas and, especially, conquer and destroy small but revolutionary countries by directing the sharp edge of attack to them.

Thus the U.S. imperialists are now trying to gratify their aggressive desire by crafty ruse under the veil of "peace", pursuing "peace strategy" together with the policy of strength.

The present situation, the article stresses, urgently demands that all the peace-loving people of the world heighten vigilance against the U.S. imperialists' deceptive "peace strategy" as well as their reckless policy of strength and struggle with concerted efforts to check and frustrate it.

U.S. Response to Denuclearization Proposal Urged

SK2801101790 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0922 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang, January 28 (KCNA)—The United States must never shun the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula but come out at an early date to the negotiating table for tripartite talks to resolve it, says NODONG SINMUN today in a signed article.

Condemning the wrong behavior of the United States in ignoring the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, the article says the U.S. authorities even fail to give a clear answer to the proposal for tripartite negotiations among the DPRK, the United States and South Korea made by the DPRK at the end of last year to discuss and solve this question.

Turning its back on the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, the United States resorts to a preposterous false propaganda that we are developing nuclear weapons, in an effort to justify its unjust stand and find a new excuse to refuse to withdraw its nuclear forces from South Korea, the paper says, and goes on:

The question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula can be resolved only when there are practical responses among the parties concerned. Hence, whether denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is realized in accordance with the ardent desire of the Korean people and the world's peace-loving people or not depends on how the United States responds to it.

If the United States come out to the negotiating table for tripartite talks in response to our sincere efforts and commit itself to halting the introduction of new nuclear weapons into South Korea, withdrawing all the nuclear weapons already deployed there and cancelling all the operational plans concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula can be resolved easily.

The article stresses:

If the United States truly wants nuclear disarmament and world peace, there is no need for it to keep many pieces of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. If these nuclear weapons of the United States are aimed at other socialist countries, it should withdraw them from South Korea since it has already signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union.

To all intents and purposes, the United States has no reason to keep hold on South Korea as its nuclear base.

Moreover, since the Soviet Union has repeatedly manifested its intention to guarantee together with other powers in the region the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula in case a nuclear-free zone is established in the area, the United States must take a similar step of guarantee at an early date.

Moscow Cited on U.S. Troop Issue in Korea

SK3001112990 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 2100 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow radio on 27 January carried a commentary exposing the conspiracy which the U.S. imperialists and South Korean puppet clique had hatched at a military huddle in Hawaii.

The radio mentioned the statement of U.S. and South Korean representatives at the so-called working-level defense consultative meeting held in Hawaii which said that the U.S. forces should continue to stay in South Korea, and it condemned this as being complete ignorance of an ever more frequently rising demand—the demand for the complete withdrawal of some 40,000 U.S. troops from South Korea.

The radio said that, we can say that the South Korean social circles had previously put forth such a demand, and today even American public figures are putting forth the same demand. The radio cited examples.

Noting the strong opposition to the reduction of the U.S. Forces from South Korea which was voiced at the meeting on the pretext of the threat of southward invasion, the radio disclosed the erroneousness of the pretext as follows: Recently, the DPRK has not provided any motive to make people doubt its unchangeable policy on easing tension on the Korean peninsula. Instead, the DPRK's peace-oriented proposals for alleviating confrontation, which have been highly assessed in some Asian countries, are well-known facts.

Citing many peace-oriented DPRK proposals, the radio went on to add: Words are not enough to appeal for easing tension and removing distrust and doubt. The DPRK's unilateral reduction of its troops by 30,000 is evidence. The question of the withdrawal from South Korea of the U.S. Forces along with nuclear weapons is an issue whose time had come a long time ago. The U.S. military presence in South Korea is a major obstacle to

the reunification of Korea. The U.S. military presence in South Korea is not helpful for strengthening the security of Asia either.

SOUTH KOREA

U.S. Fighter Aircraft Purchase Plan Assessed

SK2701094290 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN
in Korean 26 Jan 90 p 3

[Untitled article by Yi Yong-ho, reporter of the Political Department, from the column "Reporter's Memo"]

[Text] Now that the government has already decided to purchase U.S. McDonnell Douglas's FA-18's as our next generation fighter aircraft, it may be meaningless to raise a new issue with this purchase plan now.

However, this FX plan is an enormous undertaking for which the people have to pay nearly 70,000 won per capita, and since the U.S. Congress is likely to pressure the U.S. Administration not to fulfill its promise for the "technological transfer," I can hardly rid myself of the apprehension that something is going wrong.

On 5 January, U.S. Senator John McCain came to Seoul and said, "Unless we have the guarantee that the ROK will not hand over the technology to a third country, the United States cannot sell FA-18's."

The seller, not the buyer, braved it out.

In fact, the United States should obtain Congressional approval to sell this fighter aircraft. Meanwhile, the ROK, the purchaser, does not have to get the approval of the National Assembly despite the fact that the people's taxes are to be used in such an astronomical figure for this plan. I am not going to advocate that the FX plan is unnecessary.

As everyone knows, despite the reforms in East Europe, North Korea has not abandoned its desire to overthrow the South through revolution, keeping itself closed.

Moreover, North Korea is reported to possess as many as 40 MIG-29's, which are superior to our main force aircraft at present.

Therefore, the question is not "why should we purchase" the FA-18's, but "why should we purchase 120" of these aircraft.

I am not saying it is too many. The number of the aircraft should at least be examined by the National Assembly, to decrease it if it is too many in view of our security situation or to increase it otherwise.

The FX plan is a plan to be implemented from 1993 to 1998.

There is a possibility that the disarmament issue will be discussed between the North and the South in the foreseeable future in the 1990's.

Some people are of the opinion that the decision on this purchase plan was made too soon, since it will be implemented a few years later, when a disarmament negotiation may be held between the North and the South.

Touching on this question, the government officials say, "The FX plan can compel North Korea to abandon the arms race thereby inducing it to North-South disarmament negotiations."

This is not improbable.

However, some say that this could alert North Korea toward the acceleration of the arms race by both sides.

Although the government decided that the next generation aircraft will be FA-18, it has not yet signed a contract with McDonnell Douglas.

Therefore, the government should obtain a guarantee for the "technological transfer" before signing a contract.

For this, the government should not wage a lone struggle. The National Assembly and the people should also make efforts. We should not let the seller brave it out.

Closures, Pull Out of U.S. Forces Reported

Defense Ministry on Base Closures

SK3001032490 Seoul YONHAP in English
0233 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, January 30 (YONHAP)—Three U.S. air bases in South Korea will be closed and some 2,000 non-combatant personnel will be pulled out between October this year and July 1992 as part of a global U.S. effort to reduce its military bases overseas.

The Korean Defense Ministry announced Monday that three American air bases—Suwon, Taegu and Kwangju—will be closed and their squadrons reassigned to the two other U.S. air bases in Korea.

"Normal operations of the U.S. Air Force in Korea will be realigned, with emphasis placed on Osan and Kunsan air bases," the announcement said.

It said the closed bases will be reactivated in emergencies or for Korea-U.S. combined operations.

The United States will withdraw its RF-4C reconnaissance planes and Korea will take over the flights with its own new RF-4Cs.

An undisclosed number of air force "administrative officials" will be pulled out of Korea and the bases turned over to the Korean Air Force.

A highly placed government source, elaborating on the reduction plan, said the three bases will be closed between October this year and July 1992 and troop levels reduced by about 2,000 non-combatants.

The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said operations at Suwon Air Base will be transferred to Osan Air Base, the RF-4Cs at Taegu Air Base will be flown out of Korea and personnel at Kwangju Air Base will be redeployed.

"The functional integration and realignment of the U.S. Air Force in South Korea is part of a U.S. plan to reduce its 126 overseas bases due to an increasing financial deficit and lessening tension between East and West," the source said.

"The detail and exact timing of closing the three air bases will be decided while U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is in Seoul on Feb. 14-17," the source said.

A reduction of U.S. ground troops in Korea will also be discussed and the result of the talks revealed in a report the Bush administration is to submit to U.S. Congress by April 1.

United States maintains 15,000 air force personnel in Korea out of a total 43,000 military personnel. The reduction will be the first since a withdrawal of 6,000 troops in late 1978 by the administration of President Jimmy Carter.

The redeployment by the U.S. force is regarded as an important change in strategy toward the Far East, including the Korean peninsula, but won't mean any decline in fighting strength.

Defense Ministry officials said the U.S. Air Force will be reinforced with F-16 fighters that are equipped with the latest navigational gear as part of improving its defensive combat capability. At present, it has 60 F/A-16s based in Korea.

Defense Minister on Bases, F-16s

SK3001063690 Seoul YONHAP in English
0607 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, January 30 (YONHAP)—The United States will station an additional squadron of F-16 jet fighters at Osan Air Base later this year to compensate for its withdrawal from three other air bases in South Korea, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said Tuesday.

"The combat capability of the U.S. Air Force in South Korea will be increased as a squadron of 24 F-16s will be deployed to Osan Air Base between July and September this year, following the functional realignment of the five U.S. Air Bases in Korea," Yi told reporters.

The defense minister was apparently seeking to reassure the public that the balance of air power on the Korean peninsula will not be adversely affected by the U.S. Government's announcement Monday that it is pulling out of its air bases at Taegu, Suwon and Kwangju as part of its cutbacks in overseas military bases.

He also said South Korea will purchase nine RF-4C strategic reconnaissance planes to take over from the

U.S. Air Force after its reconnaissance squadron of 18 RF-4Cs is redeployed out of Taegu Air Base as officially announced. The Korean Air Force has nine RF-4Cs already.

Touching on the possible withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, Yi said, "There is no agreement between the two countries so far on the issue, but a shared position is that a limited number of administrative and support personnel will be pulled out of Korea on a gradual basis even if the U.S. ground forces are reduced."

He said there will be no withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and the U.S. Administration is not considering it at present since North Korea has taken no step to ease tension on the peninsula.

His remarks hint at a possible discussion of moving U.S. combat forces from South Korea if there is a change in the situation on the peninsula, according to military experts.

The United States maintains 43,000 forces in South Korea and the Pentagon announcement Monday said 2,000 non-combatants will be deployed out of Korea because of the closure of the three air bases.

Yi said that while U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is in Seoul from Feb. 14 he will discuss a wide range of defense matters, including reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea, their functional coordination, the change in structure, their role, sharing of military costs and relocation of the 8th U.S. Army Headquarters out of downtown Seoul.

"Korea will present a plan to increase its share of the defense burden so that the United States can give a commitment not to withdraw its forces from the nation unilaterally," Yi added.

Troop Withdrawals 'Inevitable'

SK3001033390 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean
0200 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] A government official, in connection with the integration and closure of some U.S. Air Force bases in Korea, said today that this is a matter separate from the discussion of the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, which had been conducted between Korea and the United States. The official said that specifics on the reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea would be disclosed when U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney visits Korea on 14 February.

In particular, the official noted that intensive discussions on the question of sharing defense burdens with the U.S. forces in Korea also took place during the ROK-U.S. working-level meeting held in Hawaii on 18 January.

The official added that positive consideration of the withdrawal of a part of the U.S. ground troops from Korea is inevitable, if pressure for defense burden sharing grows to an unendurable degree.

Meanwhile, it has been learned that Korea and the United States are presently considering the reduction of 4,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops—a portion of a natural increase—or the merger or reduction of noncombatants of the 2d U.S. division and other U.S. Army units.

YONHAP Analyzes Base Closings

SK3001091890 Seoul YONHAP in English
0845 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Untitled article by Pak Chong-chan]

[Text] Seoul, January 30 (YONHAP)—It was announced Monday [29 Jan] that the United States will close three air bases in South Korea as part of a global effort to reduce Pentagon spending without severely jeopardizing the overall military balance on the Korean peninsula.

The pullout, which will be implemented between October this year and July 1992, apparently heralds the start of an inevitable phaseout of U.S. military presence from Korea as a result of the new detente between East and West.

This did not come as a complete surprise.

Few people took U.S. President George Bush at his word when he reaffirmed during a visit to Seoul last year that U.S. troops "will remain in the Republic of Korea as long as they are needed, and as long as we believe it is in the interest of peace to keep them here."

It was little cause for wonder when the United States included Korea on the list of countries where its military presence will be reduced, although it had been predicted that a withdrawal of ground forces would precede a change in the U.S. Air Force, which is a strong deterrent against North Korean attack.

The gist of the "functional realignment" of the U.S. Air Force in Korea is to streamline operations by concentrating most of the functions of the five air bases into two major installations, transferring the role of U.S. RF-4C strategic reconnaissance flights to the South Korean Air Force as well as redeploying some 2,000 non-combatants from the closed air bases out of Korea.

The step is a practical military budget reduction as it will eliminate the cost of running three bases and the withdrawal of the reconnaissance squadron will reduce maintenance costs.

Despite the closure of the air bases, there will be little change in the overall air defense capability in Korea since steps to counter the reduction are being taken, according to military experts here.

Of the three air bases, the function of Suwon Air Base has already been integrated into nearby Osan Airbase, one of the core U.S. Asia-Pacific Air Force Installations, and Kwangju Air Base has only administrative officers stationed there.

The Korean Air Force has nine RF-4Cs at Taegu Air Base and Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun disclosed Tuesday that Korea will purchase an additional nine RF-4Cs to make up for the departing 18 aircraft in the reconnaissance squadron.

Some analysts even say the transfer of the reconnaissance role will accelerate the independence of South Korea's gathering of intelligence on North Korea, for which it largely relies on the U.S. Air Force.

Yi also said a new F-16 squadron will be deployed at Osan Air Base later this year as a follow-up to the reduction.

In short, the U.S. plan is designed to keep the current military balance by transferring part of its past function to Korea and to demonstrate its will to reduce its military presence in the Far East, which might impress the Soviet Union and North Korea.

On the part of South Korea, the reduction will result in an increased cost to defend its airspace.

South Korean leaders, however, apparently took the closing in their stride, opting to increase military spending supported by Korea's growing economic power.

There are confusing reports on the level of reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Korea to be taken up during U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's visit to Seoul from Feb. 14.

Nobody doubts that the reduction announced on Monday is the first phase of an overall reduction and will be followed by a cutback of ground forces whether it is "symbolic" or "substantive."

A military source said Tuesday, "the South Korean and U.S. authorities will seek a way to reduce U.S. ground forces to a level that will not undermine the combined defense capabilities, including a pullout of non-combatants."

The source said the reduction will take into consideration North Korea's repeated propaganda that the American Forces in South Korea are an obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue.

The implication is that the reduction will expose North Korea's brazen propaganda and could induce Pyongyang to disperse its military concentration in the areas bordering on the South, perhaps developing into disarmament talks.

In addition, the reduction will calm demands for a withdrawal of U.S. Forces by Korea's radical students and progressives, though it could cause concern among older Koreans.

Official on U.S. Troop Reductions

SK3001074090 Seoul YONHAP in English
0715 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, January 30 (YONHAP)—Discussions with the United States on withdrawing U.S. ground forces from South Korea will continue regardless of the pullout of the U.S. Air Force from three air bases in Korea, a highly placed government official said Tuesday.

"The U.S. steps to close three air bases and consultations on the partial reduction of U.S. troops in Korea are of a different character," said the official, who declined to be named. "The issue of U.S. troop cuts will continue to be discussed through channels already established between the two countries."

The official's remarks are seen as a signal that U.S. ground forces stationed in Korea may be partially reduced.

The official also said a reduction of U.S. troop strength is closely linked with the maintenance of the Korea-U.S. combined defense capability as well as defense burden sharing.

"The Korean Government will positively consider proposals, if made, for the partial reduction of U.S. forces unless they affect the combined defense capability," he said.

The official said no decisions have so far been made on a troop withdrawal and the issue will be deeply discussed by the two countries when U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney visits Seoul on Feb 14.

According to Korean officials, the two nations are now considering either pulling out 4,000 to 5,000 troops from the 2nd Infantry Division or reducing non-combatant personnel in the Infantry Division and other units.

They also predict, based on these considerations and the Nunn-Warner Amendment that asked the U.S. Administration to submit to congress a concrete plan for the readjustment of U.S. Forces in Korea by April 1, that 2,000 to 3,000 servicemen may be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula by the end of this year.

The two countries announced earlier Tuesday that the U.S. Air Force will close Suwon, Taegu and Kwangju Air Bases in Korea between October this year and July 1992 under a U.S. Government plan to reduce its overseas military presence.

The United States will move the forces stationed at the three bases to Osan and Kunsan air bases except for some 2,000 non-combatants, who will leave Korea, and about 20 RF-4C aircraft used for tactical reconnaissance for the Pacific forces that will be redeployed from Taegu to Okinawa in Japan.

The announcement touched a raw nerve in South Korea, where security is given top priority but public opinion

has recently been split over the presence of 43,000 U.S. troops stationed here under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.

A rag-tag band of radical students, dissidents and liberal groups demand the total removal of the U.S. Forces on the grounds that they hamper reunification of the Korean peninsula, divided into the capitalist South and the communist North at the end of World War II in 1945.

The division originated when U.S. troops advanced up the Korean peninsula until the 38th parallel and Soviet troops occupied the Northern half, liberating Korea from Japanese rule.

Opinion polls show that most Koreans want U.S. forces to remain and U.S. officials promise troops will be stationed here as long as a majority of Koreans wish.

Some Koreans are increasingly critical of apparent U.S. pressure on the Korean Government to pay more for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea and to support the combined defense capability, arguing that the U.S. presence not only deters North Korean aggression but, more importantly, that the United States has a strategic interest in Northeast Asia.

DJP Warns North on Base Removal

SK3001070090 Seoul YONHAP in English
0629 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, January 30 (YONHAP)—South Korea's ruling party has warned North Korea not to misinterpret the U.S. decision to pull out of three air bases here as a chance to invade South Korea.

Urging the government to promptly ease the people's anxiety by filling the vacuum of power with Korean forces, Democratic Justice Party Spokesman Pak Hui-tae said in a statement Tuesday [30 Jan] that the party hopes Pyongyang does not misjudge that the time for an invasion is at hand.

Pak said, "The decision will by no means be beneficial to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula if it was made without full discussion with the Korean Government."

He said the party hopes the decision was not the result of an "easygoing and rash" judgement of the situation here.

Calling North Korea the most bellicose nation in the world, Pak said the U.S. forces here have performed a peacekeeping role by suppressing Pyongyang's impulse to invade.

Further on Plan To Pull Out U.S. Forces

Hasty Withdrawal 'Unrealistic'

SK3101020490 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 31 Jan 90 p 8

[Editorial: "U.S. Forces Reduction"]

[Text] It was announced that the United States will close three air force bases in Korea. Gradual phase-out of the U.S. forces here has existed as a perpetual possibility. Sooner or later they have to leave Korea. But its beginning is coming rather too early.

The three air bases in Suwon, Taegu and Kwangju are part of five existing installations here, the other two being Osan and Kunsan air bases. The announcement made by the Defense Ministry earlier this week was endorsed by U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, who proposed to close or cut operations at 69 U.S. military bases, including 14 overseas in anticipation of major troop cuts over the next five years. Foreign bases would be closed in Italy, Turkey, Greece, South Korea, England and West Germany, with reduced forces at naval stations in Bermuda and the Philippines.

Details are lacking as to the timing and scale of the curtailment. Pullout from air bases in Korea is expected to start late this year and be completed by 1992, affecting about 2,000 noncombatant support personnel. The main functions and overall qualitative strength of the American military presence in Korea would be maintained, sources say.

Washington is prompted by two considerations—financial and diplomatic. The Pentagon is under heavy pressure from Congress to slash its annual budget. Defense officials believe that over 200,000 troops could be cut from the 2.1 million armed forces over the next several years on the grounds of cost cutting and East-West detente. Cheney suggested that global and regional trends toward arms control enable adjustment of some of the overseas facilities.

The Korean Peninsula is still an exception to the trend toward relaxation of tension and disarmament. Under these bleak conditions, premature force reduction on our side beyond a symbolic level would be highly risky. The vital decision on phasing out U.S. troops here must take time and be made with maximum caution, calculating all the risks involved. It also ought to be agreed on through close consultation between the two staunch military allies.

The military balance between the south and the north of Korea is still in favor of Pyongyang at a ratio of 7 to 10. Seoul and Washington should adhere to the irrefutable estimation that the inter-Korea power balance will become even around the turn of the century, and continued stationing of U.S. forces as a deterrent to war is necessary until that time.

Any plan to reduce the size of U.S. ground forces in Korea in haste is unrealistic for the time being. Washington should not use further withdrawal of its troops here as a leverage to unduly increase Seoul's share of the cost of maintaining them. It is time that our preparedness be stepped up for the shifting joint defense arrangement.

Termed 'Symbolic Gesture'

SK3101024290 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
31 Jan 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Reduction of U.S. Troops Here"]

[Text] The much-talked-about possibility of U.S. troop reduction in Korea has become a reality. Seoul and Washington have announced the abolition of three U.S. air bases here that will lead to a cut of 2,000 administrative and support personnel during the period from October this year to July, 1992.

Both the U.S. and Korean defense authorities argued that the measure would affect little military capability here, saying that the U.S. Air Force will be rather reinforced with the ROK Air Force acquiring some of the same type of departing U.S. tactical reconnaissance aircraft and introducing more F-16 fighters equipped with sophisticated navigational electronic systems. From this point of view, the reduction plan appears to be rather a symbolic measure.

The U.S. Government has a good reason to cut the level of its military presence in Korea under the overall realignment of U.S. military forces and installations overseas, including those in Korea. Under the plan, bases in Kwangju, Taegu and Suwon will be closed, with the two other bases in Osan and Kunsan remaining.

Besides the question of budget constraints, Washington may well take advantage of the increasing East-West detente and the recent Bush-Gorbachev summit at Malta, in which they declared an end to the Cold War era. And the military realignment measure noticeably follows a Soviet announcement on the phaseout of its forces in the Far East.

In a related development, the United States and North Korea have made frequent contacts with each other, giving birth to speculation that some serious negotiations are under way. U.S. sources have indicated some progress is being made for the relaxation of tension and Pyongyang has unusually shown what were described as conciliatory gestures towards the United States.

From a negative dimension, we are worried about adverse effects of the projected redeployment of the American forces here under the present circumstances that the Pyongyang regime shows no sign of changing its bellicose strategy toward the South. Aside from apprehension over the breaking of the balance of military

power in the Korean peninsula, the U.S. troop cut may induce an armed adventure from the North in the worst case.

On the other hand, we would rather hold an upbeat view that the reduction program will provide Pyongyang with a momentum to change its dogmatic course—accommodation of democratic change, easing of its isolationist policy and renunciation of its long-standing strategy to communize the whole of Korea either through a popular revolution or military invasion.

The troop-cut plan is to partly answer Pyongyang's repeated calls, propagandistic as they are, for mutual reductions of armed forces in the South and North and for withdrawal of the American troops in the ROK. Notwithstanding, it needs to be noted that there is no clear sign allowing revocation of the Seoul-Washington agreement that American troops will be maintained as long as North Korean threats to the South remain.

The Communist regime in the North, furthermore, can change its mind at any time and may resort to force with its potential combat capability, while the United States and the South will have difficulties in reinstating their strength, once they are curtailed or withdrawn. The same goes for the U.S.-Soviet relationship: Once Gorbachev has failed in his perestroika policy or if he is replaced by a conservative Communist, what was achieved during the detente period will be demolished in a moment.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has assured that there will be no significant troop reduction in Korea but his pledge is short of dispelling the apprehensions of the Korean people, considering that the announced phaseout can be seen as no more than a prelude to an overall and long-range military disengagement program of the United States.

The U.S. military realignment program toward Korea must be promoted through close consultations between the two allies under the Mutual Defense Treaty, reaffirming that Korea's security is essential to that of the United States and Asia. There should be no dealings between Washington and Pyongyang over the head of the South. At the same time, non-military problems such as anti-American feelings here and trade friction must not affect the U.S. formulation of the realignment strategy.

Should 'Alleviate Tension'

SK3101074690 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
31 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial: "The Meaning of the U.S. Decision to Close Three U.S. Air Force Bases in South Korea. We Want the Decision to Become a Step for Alleviating Tension"]

[Text] A country maintains its military armaments, including military personnel, weapons, and equipment, within the scope of its economic capability to cope with a threat from the outside and to guarantee its national

security. Accordingly, the country cannot but reduce its armaments when the threat from a foreign country or foreign forces has been markedly reduced or when it faces a difficult economic situation in maintaining its armaments.

The U.S. Government's decision to withdraw some military personnel and reconnaissance planes from three U.S. Air Force bases in South Korea can be regarded as a step to reduce its defense budget and consequently to reduce its military bases overseas in the wake of the recent moves for detente between the East and West. Presenting to the U.S. Congress the draft of the national defense budget for the fiscal year 1991, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney announced a plan to close some overseas U.S. military bases, indicating that this plan is "a first-stage step for the reduction of the defense budget in the wake of the recent changes in the Soviet Union and other East European countries."

In fact, when he was inaugurated as President, Reagan vowed to rebuild "the powerful United States" and spent \$2 trillion for the defense budget, the largest in peace time, during his 8-years of office. As a result, the U.S. military capability has become stronger. However, such huge amounts of military expenditures became the main cause of the deficits which by 1989 amounted to \$170 billion in addition to the trade deficit of \$130 billion, which has driven the U.S. economy into a crisis.

President Bush, the successor to President Reagan, did not increase the defense budget for the fiscal year 1990 over the previous year. In the fiscal year 1991 he appropriated \$303 billion for defense expenditures. Taking inflation into account, this figure shows a decrease of 2 percent over the previous year. However, as reported by THE NEW YORK TIMES, if the expenditures for the Strategic Defense Initiative, which has increased by 20 percent, and other expenditures for the development of the controversial B-2 stealth bombers are added to the defense budget for the fiscal year 1991, we can say that there will be no basic change in the national defense policy during the fiscal year except for the realignment of military bases in the United States and overseas.

The plan for the realignment of U.S. Air Force bases in South Korea that the U.S. Government has announced this time is to consolidate the base in Kwangju, where only administrative military personnel stay, and the bases in Taegu and Suwon to the bases in Osan and Kunsan and to withdraw tactical reconnaissance aircraft from South Korea. The plan also envisages the South Korean army purchasing these tactical reconnaissance planes from the United States and directly performing the reconnaissance mission. The U.S. Government says that the U.S. plan announced this time, therefore, will not have great effect on the military situation on the Korean peninsula.

We are not satisfied with such a plan to reduce the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. However, we think that

the plan is of great significance because it is a first step to alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula.

PHILIPPINES

Military Submits 'Shopping List' of Equipment

HK2501042790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 25 Jan 90 p 9

[Untitled article by Fe B. Zamora]

[Text] A "shopping list" of \$29.4 million worth of modern war equipment has been submitted to the U.S. by the Armed Forces to upgrade its capability, according to Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos.

Ramos said the "shopping list" is being checked against the U.S. inventory of available war items which will be procured under the RP [Republic of the Philippines] U.S. Foreign Sales Program.

"There is an agreement on what is being ordered and what should be delivered," he said. "This is a give and take thing."

Ramos did not give details on what items the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] requested from the U.S. but said the thrust is "to upgrade the capability of the AFP".

The AFP has "saved" a total of \$29.4 million from the unexpected FMS [expansion unknown] from the past years, said Ramos.

The AFP is expecting by June this year the first batch of MD-500 helicopter gunships purchased under the RP-U.S. military assistance program.

Under the RP-U.S. bases agreement, the AFP was also the recipient of \$85 million in annual military sales from 1985 to 1989 with the renewed base talks in 1988, the U.S. granted another \$200 million package each for 1990 and 1991.

The defense chief said the Philippine government has proposed to the U.S. congress the conversion of the money into grants "so we can buy additional equipment."

However, he said the U.S. congress still has to act on the proposal.

The new equipment will be in line with the AFP efforts towards modernization. "We do not buy equipment for specific targets," Ramos also said.

Manglapus Welcomes Closure of U.S. Bases

HK3001072390 Hong Kong AFP in English 0710 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Manila, January 30 (AFP)—Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus said Tuesday [30 January] the Philippines welcomes U.S. moves to close down bases overseas

but added that it would not affect negotiations on the future of U.S. bases in this country.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney on Monday [29 January] proposed closing 12 U.S. bases overseas as well as reducing activities at a U.S. naval communications facility at San Miguel in the Philippines as part of efforts at cutting spending.

The sprawling Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base, both north of here, were not included in the proposals which must be approved by the U.S. Congress.

"From the American point of view, I understand this is an economic move. Apparently, these are also justified by positive developments in Eastern Europe," Mr Manglapus told reporters.

"There is no direct relation (with the closure and) the existence of the bases. It is a fiscal matter," he said.

"We have always maintained that we have to be prepared in the future because technological developments might permit the U.S. to reduce some of its facilities abroad."

The Philippines is due to begin talks with Washington early this year on the fate of Clark and Subic, whose lease expires in 1991. Mr Manglapus is to head the Philippine panel.

The negotiations have been threatened by Philippine complaints that Washington has not met requirements of an earlier agreement giving Manila 481 million dollars in annual compensation for hosting the bases.

Asked if the planned closures would pressure his panel in any negotiations, Mr Manglapus said: "I don't see that these are of any real consequence to the issue at hand which is the continuation or not of these facilities."

No Significant U.S. Forces Cuts Said in Asia

HK3001095790 Hong Kong AFP in English 0938 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Manila, January 30 (AFP)—Washington has told Manila that Soviet policy in Asia has not changed enough to warrant significant reductions of U.S. military forces in the region, Philippine President Corazon Aquino said Tuesday [30 January].

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, who is scheduled to visit Manila next month, informed the Philippine government of Washington's plans in a letter to Philippine Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, Mrs Aquino said in a statement.

This former U.S. colony hosts the largest U.S. overseas military bases at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, whose current lease runs out in September 1991.

Mrs Aquino said Mr Cheney told Mr Ramos that following the political changes in Eastern Europe, Washington hoped that "similar political changes in Asia could prove equally promising, but such changes have not yet occurred."

"More relevantly, we have seen no changes in Soviet forces or other historical-political relationships that would allow significant reductions in the U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region at this time," Mr Cheney was quoted as saying.

A Soviet Embassy official in Manila, Alexander Losyukov, said two weeks ago that Moscow "has made a number of reductions in its military forces in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, including the activity of the Soviet Pacific fleet."

He did not elaborate.

Mr Cheney on Monday [29 January] proposed closing 12 U.S. bases overseas as well as reducing activities at one of its smaller facilities in the Philippines, a naval communications facility in San Miguel north of here, as part of efforts to cut spending.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus welcomed the proposals, which must be approved by the U.S. Congress.

But he said the announcement has "no direct relation" to the scheduled exploratory talks on Clark and Subic, scheduled to start here in March or April.

"From the American point of view, I understand this is an economic move. Apparently, these are also justified by positive developments in Eastern Europe," Mr Manglapus told reporters.

"We have always maintained that we have to be prepared in the future because technological developments might permit the U.S. to reduce some of its facilities abroad," he said.

Meanwhile, Stephen Bosworth, a former U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and current president of the U.S.-Japan Foundation, warned Tuesday that "major countries should not act precipitately or hastily" in pulling out military facilities.

"I would expect from the U.S. that adjustments of our military presence in the areas would take place very moderately and in very close consultation with our friends and allies in the (Asia-Pacific) region," he told reporters here.

"Whatever happens, one does not want to abruptly leave a vacuum in the region because such a vacuum could be perceived by both foreign and domestic investors as a potential source of instability," he told reporters here.

"There may be some gradual reduction of our presence in Europe and East Asia," he added.

Mr Bosworth is visiting this country as part of a U.S.-Japan-Philippine business conference.

Mrs Aquino said Mr Cheney also told Mr Ramos that "any concern arising in the Philippines from certain media reports about the defense budget of the U.S. is unwarranted."

Mr Manglapus has claimed Washington was inclined to renege on its pledge to provide 481 million dollars annually in military and economic aid for Manila for 1990 and 1991 and supply the facilities with Philippine-made goods.

The agreement was signed in Washington by Mr Manglapus and then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in October 1988.

Meanwhile the head of the ruling Struggle for a Democratic Philippines (LDP), Senator Neptali Gonzales, asked Mrs Aquino Tuesday to declare her position on the post-1991 future of Subic and Clark.

"I think we should already grapple with this problem," Mr Gonzales told reporters. "We could no longer hide behind the options open policy."

Mrs Aquino, who is formally not a member of the LDP, has steadfastly refused to make a commitment on the facilities, saying she wanted to keep her options open until the current lease runs out in September 1991.

Mr Gonzales also urged Mrs Aquino to call off the scheduled bases talks with Washington since he said the U.S. government had failed to comply with its aid commitments.

USSR Wants 'Action' on U.S. Bases Issue

HK3001124990 Hong Kong AFP in English 1239 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Manila, January 30 (AFP)—The Soviet Union welcomes U.S. moves to close down military bases overseas, but is waiting for more concrete action, a Soviet Embassy official said here Tuesday. "We have already withdrawn our offensive potential from Cam Ranh (Bay in Vietnam) and we would welcome reciprocal action on the part of the Americans," said Charge d'Affaires Alexander Losyukov.

"What we hear right now are just talks of possible reductions," the second highest official in the Soviet mission told reporters. "But it is a welcome development and we hope it will be more concrete. And if it is true, things are going in the right direction."

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney on Monday proposed closing 12 U.S. bases abroad as well as reducing activities at a U.S. naval communications facility in the town of San Miguel in the northern Philippines. The proposal, part of efforts to cut government spending, did not cover the two largest U.S.

military bases overseas—Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, both in the Philippines.

Yuri Raikov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy here, said: "We are in favor of lowering military strength in the region on the part of any country because this tends to solidify tendencies toward peace and stability in Southeast Asia."

Ramos Makes Statements on U.S. Assistance

Doubts Rumors of Troop Cuts

HK3001140690 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
1300 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos assured President Corazon Aquino that the United States has no plans to reduce its forces in Asia after receiving U.S. defense chief Richard Cheney's letter. He said Cheney stated that there are not many political changes in Asia as there are in East Europe that could warrant the removal of American troops.

Soviet Ambassador to Manila Alexander Losyukov earlier said that the Soviet Union is continuing with its troops reduction in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific region.

Speaks on Military Funds

HK3101102190 Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Untitled report by Vic Pambuan]

[Text] Malacanang Palace—A five percent cut in U.S. military assistance to the country will not affect the military's counterinsurgency campaign. This was the statement of Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos.

Speaking in an interview at Malacanang Palace, Ramos said that U.S. military assistance is not used directly in dealing with security problems, including counterinsurgency, but is used to modernize the facilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Ramos also revealed that the Philippines can obtain funds from other sources for its campaign against insurgents, secessionists, criminals, and other threats to overthrow the current administration. However, he also said that the United States should honor its financial commitments to the country, notably an agreement granting \$200 million to the Philippines this year and a similar amount in 1991.

[Begin Ramos recording in English] We will just have to stick to the agreement as there is a commitment in the military assistance program of \$200 million for 1990 and a similar amount in 1991. Of course, these are best efforts pledges and need congressional action. There is also the matter of the conversion of \$29.4 million worth of FMS, or foreign military sales credit balances, so that these could become grants. [end recording]

Ramos also said that there are still many agreements which should be honored by the United States, including improvement of housing conditions for squatters around Clark and Subic Bases, purchase of Philippine products, and others.

Meanwhile, Ramos also called on the public not to worry and to ignore reports about foreign arms shipments to rebels as he dismissed such reports as false.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Australian Military Presence Foreseen in Pacific

BK2901092890 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0800 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] The leader of the opposition in the Solomon Islands has warned that the current crisis on the island of Bougainville will have a radical influence on Australia's military and diplomatic policies in the Pacific region.

Speaking in Honiara, Mr Andrew Nori said that unless a political solution could be found to solve the crisis between Bougainville secessionist rebels and the authorities in Port Moresby, there is a good chance Australia could become militarily involved.

THAILAND

Military Role for ASEAN Considered

BK2501011190 Bangkok THE NATION in English
25 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by Atthawibun Sisuworanan: "Is ASEAN Ready for a Military Role"]

[Text] Indonesia's recent proposal that ASEAN consider sending troops and civilian personnel into Cambodia to assist in implementation of a peace settlement is attracting ASEAN members' attention.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, co-chairman of the Paris conference on Cambodia, recently proposed the idea privately to other ASEAN members in the process of organizing a new round of informal talks on the Cambodian conflict to be held in Jakarta next month.

The suggestion is being taken increasingly seriously because of the changing situation in Indochina. Prospects for peace are growing in Cambodia, and Vietnam is perceived as less of a military threat by ASEAN nations since its troop withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos last year.

Indonesia's basic proposal was that ASEAN form a joint armed force to participate in a United Nations "international control mechanism" (ICM) that would maintain peace and oversee general elections. However, Alatas went further by suggesting that the joint ASEAN

force, with the consent of the Cambodian factions, carry out the task itself if a UN-ICM is rejected in the process of peace negotiations.

Alatas recently told a senior Thai official that an ASEAN role is inevitable given the grouping's capacity to supply an ICM with personnel who not only have regional military experience, but also have the advantage of cultural proximity to the Cambodian people.

An international mechanism under UN auspices, under a plan proposed to the Paris conference last August, would involve about 6,000-7,000 peace-keeping and 300-800 administrative personnel to oversee general elections. The UN-ICM's size would likely be expanded if it had the additional function of administering the country before and during general elections.

Effective interim control of the country by the United Nations was called for in a recent proposal made by Australia, which is now gaining a following because it circumvents the problematic question of power sharing among the Cambodian factions, a point that deadlocked the Paris conference.

On the other hand, the question of an ASEAN role in Cambodia has been discussed for quite some time. Tan Sri Ghazari Zhaifi, former Malaysian foreign minister, proposed as part of a peace package in 1982 that regional powers, including ASEAN members, Vietnam and Laos form a task forces to verify a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. The Malaysian proposal was the first to treat the conflict as a regional problem to be solved regionally.

Zhaifi's proposal was instantly killed, not only because it was presented well ahead of its time and the opposition of Vietnam, which then had the upper hand in the conflict after a successful campaign against Cambodian resistance guerrillas along the Thai border, but also because some ASEAN countries including Indonesia and Singapore argued that it was illogical for Vietnam to verify its own withdrawal.

Indonesia's most recent proposal has gained only limited public acceptance. Only Malaysia has mentioned that it is ready to send in Malaysian troops and civil servants to help Cambodia implement a peace agreement.

But while the other ASEAN members have shown reluctance to commit to anything but further consultations on the idea of "ASEAN joint armed forces," Vietnam is more enthusiastic. Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co said in Chiang Mai recently that he would welcome such as ASEAN role in Cambodia.

Had Co's comment officially reflected Hanoi's thinking, there would be considerable impetus for the Indonesian proposal. But Indonesia still needs collective ASEAN consent to put the wheels in motion.

One unmentioned factor is intra-ASEAN competitiveness. Thailand, for example, would likely be worried since the proposal would mean Indonesia presenting

itself physically in mainland Southeast Asia. It is only clear that the simple idea of a joint ASEAN force necessitates a debate on the future shape of ASEAN cooperation in general.

Taking account of ASEAN's achievements in security cooperation, members states have never moved beyond some form of bilateral or tripartite military exercises, and even these have been comparatively small annual events. Even the most significant security effort by the regional organization, assisting the Cambodian resistance forces fighting the Vietnamese occupying troops, involved primarily Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

There would be far-reaching implications for the region if a joint ASEAN force is formed. It would signify that the security aspect of ASEAN's regional cooperation would be heightened vis-a-vis its economic cooperation. On the other hand, if no force is agreed to, cultural and economic cooperation would dominate the regional grouping in the future after the Cambodian conflict has been resolved.

Programmes for economic and cultural cooperation in the next decade have already been agreed to in principle, but security for the region has essentially not been looked into yet.

Eventually, ASEAN will have to consider giving substantial assistance to Cambodia in its search for peace and independence. The need to show regional solidarity is unavoidable for ASEAN if it still wishes to rebuild and promote the region's stability and economic prosperity as a whole. The only question left to be considered is whether the aid for Cambodia should include a military form or not.

In any case ASEAN will have to make it clear that this sort of role can only be conducted collectively with international consent and agreement.

VIETNAM

Moscow To Reduce Military Assistance to SRV

BK3001012090 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
30 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] The Soviet Union recently decided to cut back military assistance to Vietnam by about one-third starting next year, following its pullout of offensive forces from Cam Ranh Bay, Hong Kong-based diplomatic sources said yesterday [29 January].

The sources said a Soviet deputy defence minister informed the Vietnamese of the cutback during a visit to Vietnam on November 27. The Vietnamese were reportedly forced to sign a document acknowledging the change, which would include relocation of Soviet refueling facilities from Cam Ranh Bay on Vietnam's eastern shore.

These two changes were mentioned by China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping during a Jan 1 in-house meeting of senior Chinese leaders as one of the "favourable conditions" for Beijing to improve its relationship with Hanoi.

Deng's assessment of the situation was that the sweeping political changes in the Soviet bloc were affecting aid to Vietnam, increasing pressure on Hanoi to mend its rift with China and the West, according to the diplomatic sources, who had access to Deng's speech.

In the same speech Deng called for closer cooperation among Asia's orthodox communist nations—China, Vietnam and North Korea—to "safeguard the flag of socialism."

Deng also predicted that if Vietnam's reformist party secretary general Nguyen Van Linh voluntarily stepped down at this year's communist party congress, the orthodox party would further alienate itself ideologically from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his radical policy changes.

Another favourable condition cited by Deng was the tendency of the Vietnamese party to follow the Chinese pattern of promoting economic reforms while steadfastly sticking to socialist principles in the political sphere.

Deng said the Chinese government should take several steps towards patching up the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The paramount Chinese leader was quoted as saying Beijing could reduce tension and avoid clashes with the Vietnamese on their common frontier and possibly on such disputed areas as the Spratley archipelago.

Deng has resigned from all his official posts in the communist party but many believe he still has the final say on major policy matters.

Deng also specifically mentioned the Cambodian conflict as an area where "indirect" conflict between the two countries has been serious and could be reduced.

He proposed an increase in the number of exchanges between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders. This particular step was reported by the Hong Kong-based SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST to have been announced on

the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic relations on Jan 18.

During a meeting to mark the occasion, China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told Vietnamese diplomats that China hoped to revive its friendship with Vietnam soon, according to the Hong Kong-based newspaper, which first broke the story of Deng's speech.

At the same time, Beijing decided to despatch a top Chinese leader, probably party secretary general Jiang Zemin, to Pyongyang, North Korea, to further cement ties with Kim Il-Song's regime.

In his speech on Jan 1, Deng said Gorbachev's dramatic policy shifts have led to stronger ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, both of which are concerned that the change sweeping communist nations in Europe could spread to Asia.

The most striking statement of Deng's speech to many analysts was his prediction of Gorbachev's downfall as a result of conflict within the Soviet Union.

Deng predicted the resurgence of Kremlin conservatives in Gorbachev's place.

The political implications of the changes in the Soviet camp on the Cambodian conflict remain to be seen, though many foreign policy analysts in Bangkok believe the upheavals in Eastern Europe and Beijing's new attitude towards Hanoi will help speed up the peace process.

One policy analyst pointed out that rather than ideology, Hanoi is likely to be more concerned with Vietnam's deteriorating economy, now on the verge of bankruptcy.

Vietnam has been economically isolated from the West primarily because of its part in the Cambodian conflict.

The "convergence of ideological interests" should provide an opportunity for Hanoi and Beijing to dispel their mutual suspicions, the analyst predicted.

As a result, Hanoi would have another incentive to accept a power-sharing agreement in Cambodia in which the Khmer Rouge—which is supported by China—would participate, he said.

ALBANIA

Soviet Reassessment of Afghanistan Invasion Viewed

AU1001103490 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 30 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Elmaz Leci: "How Tardily Moscow Remembered to Condemn the Invasion of Afghanistan"]

[Text] At its most recent meeting, the Soviet parliament denounced the decision made 10 years earlier to invade Afghanistan. It called the dispatch of Soviet military forces to Afghanistan a personal, not an objective, decision. According to the Soviet news agency TASS, the decision was not approved by the entire Soviet leadership of the time, but merely by four people: Leonid Brezhnev, then main leader of the party; Dmitriy Ustinov, then defense minister; Yuriy Andropov, then head of the KGB; and Andrey Gromyko, then foreign minister. After deploring the decision parliament took at that time, they produced a resolution stating that "The dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan deserves moral and political condemnation."

The reasons why the present Soviet leadership has begun to condemn the invasion of Afghanistan involves the current situation in the Soviet Union and certain definite political interests. When this act of aggression was carried out 10 years ago, progressive and revolutionary forces strongly condemned it. Socialist Albania and world public opinion exposed this act from the very moment this fascist step was taken by Soviet social-imperialism in December 1979. The invasion of Afghanistan was condemned then and during the next 10 years as a product of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy and strategy. Calling it "fascist-style aggression, like the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968," a ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on 5 January 1980, entitled "Aggressors Out of Afghanistan," called it "a new version of 1968 both from the military point of view, and in the arguments used to justify it." Time and the course of events has completely justified the correctness of our position and of world public opinion's condemnation of the Soviet act of aggression against the Afghan people. Moscow's present confession that this act was an invasion shows once again how right the position was of those forces who denounced the Soviet aggression, called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and supported the Afghan people's just struggle for freedom and independence.

The present Soviet leadership's condemnation of the decision to embark on aggression does not go so far as to condemn the official policy of the leadership of that time. The present Soviet leadership takes pains to lay the blame on four persons. However, their deeds cannot be separated from Soviet policy and, therefore, the entire course, policy, and strategy of the Soviet revisionist party must be condemned, something the Gorbachevite leadership is not doing, and cannot do. It is precisely by

condemning a few individuals that the Gorbachevite leadership is trying to save the entire revisionist and social-imperialist policy from being discredited, one of whose consequences was the invasion of Afghanistan. It is now trying to exploit the repudiation of this decision to invade both domestically and abroad. The leadership needs it not only to overcome the Soviet Union's reputation of being an invader, but to hasten perestroika, to win political capital among its East European allies, to make them believe the Gorbachevite promises that there will be no more interference, and in order to act on the promises of the Malta summit. Under such circumstances, Gorbachev and his team are making such tactical retreats as the repudiation of the invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet social-imperialists waged war in Afghanistan for almost 10 years. They caused destruction and ruin, but were also killed themselves; 15,000 Soviet officers and soldiers left their bones in Afghan soil. A total of 37,000 were injured and crippled. The Soviet economy was damaged to the tune of billions of rubles. Four dead people are held responsible for all this. This is the excuse for domestic public opinion, of which Gorbachev and his team become increasingly fearful everyday. So that they could fully extricate themselves and in order not to leave room for misunderstanding, Aleksandr Zhasokhov, temporary chairman of the parliament's Foreign Relations Committee, was given to say: "The condemnation casts no shadow on Soviet officers and soldiers, who honorably performed their duty" in Afghanistan.

It has been admitted that both acts of aggression, against Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, were violations of sovereignty. Both confessions are tardy, and extracted under the pressure of recent events in East Europe and in order to urge them further forward. It is becoming clear to the peoples that the aim of the aggressors' self-criticism is to throw dust in their eyes, and that Moscow uses such means to distract the peoples' attention from the unchanged Soviet policy of sharing out zones of influence with the United States. It is not coincidental that the repudiation of the aggression against Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan comes after the Malta Summit of Bush and Gorbachev, which showed once again the superpowers' aim of dominating other peoples and states.

BULGARIA

Deputy Defense Minister on Military Doctrine

AU1101145590 Sofia BTA in English
1140 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Unattributed article "Bulgaria's Military Doctrine"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 11 (BTA)—Bulgaria is in favor of equal security at the lowest possible level of military capabilities, says Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army.

Interviewed for the NARODNA ARMIYA daily, he discusses Bulgaria's military doctrine in connection with the seminar on the national military doctrines of the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe due to be held in Vienna.

Concerning the politico-military aspect of the doctrine, the interviewee points out that Bulgaria does not pose a threat to anybody. Under no circumstances will this country be the first to start hostilities against any state or alliance of states and will only resort to the force of arms if subjected to an armed attack.

"Bulgaria has no territorial designs on any of its neighboring states and does not treat any state and people as its enemies," General Dobrev says, stressing that the Bulgarian Government is working actively towards political agreements on disarmament.

The first deputy minister of national defense emphasizes that Bulgaria does not manufacture nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and does not deploy them on its territory. This country therefore insists on a ban on their proliferation and use and on a complete elimination of stockpiles.

He points out that the technomilitary aspect of the doctrine is determined by Bulgaria's geopolitical position: the country is located on the most vital crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa and borders on two NATO member countries.

The changes in the international relations, including inter-Balkan relations, are generally positive but the peace processes have yet to become irreversible, Colonel General Khristo Dobrev points out.

These circumstances prompt the measures needed to safeguard the security of the state. Bulgaria maintains a military capability which enables it to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity proceeding from the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

Being defense-oriented, the doctrine requires that defense be organized pre-emptively at the start of a war so as to serve as a deterrent compelling a likely aggressor to refrain from launching military operations, the general emphasizes. To this end the strength of offensive armaments, and above all of tanks and mechanized infantry, is reduced, and the strength of anti-tank weapons, air defense and other defense forces is increased.

The interviewee points out that the Armed Forces develop above all in terms of quality. This is prompted by the state and the trends in the development of the armed forces of the neighboring NATO countries, by the specific situation which has emerged in the Balkans, by the requirements of defense sufficiency, by the country's economic capabilities and its commitments within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Discussing Bulgaria's defense spending, Colonel General Khristo Dobrev recalls the resolution of the State

Council and of the Council of Ministers of one year ago whereby the numerical strength, the armaments and military spending were unilaterally reduced. Last year's military budget was cut from 1,825,000,000 leva to 1,605,100,000 leva. The latter amount was 146,500,000 leva less than the defense allocations in 1988.

General Dobrev Discusses Military Doctrine

AU1701185590 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 11 Jan 90 pp 1, 4

[Report on interview with Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense and commander of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, by a representative of the NARODNA ARMIYA Editorial Board; date and place not given—"For Equal Security at the Lowest Military Level"]

[Text] The fifth session of the talks of the 35 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe opens on 16 January in Vienna. The session will begin with a seminar on the national military doctrines of the CSCE participating states. On this occasion, a representative of the NARODNA ARMIYA Editorial board met and talked with Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, participant in the Bulgarian delegation to the session.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Comrade Colonel General, you will participate in the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Vienna seminar on the military doctrines that will take place from 16 January to 5 February. Could you describe the goals of the seminar?

[Dobrev] First of all, I would like to point out that the seminar on the military doctrines is an important political result of the talks of the 35 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. In fact, thus we implement the idea that was proposed at the 1987 Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries.

It has been envisioned to discuss in Vienna several groups of issues related to the national military doctrines of the negotiating countries. Of course, one should not expect to resolve all problems in this sphere within the framework of the seminar, especially as it is well known that the military doctrines are subject to constant development and elaboration. However, the fact that such a seminar is taking place is remarkable by itself. This is a unique meeting of high-ranking military leaders from 35 countries, which has no precedent in postwar Europe. The high level of representation speaks of the importance attributed to this forum: Almost all delegations are led by the commanders of the general staffs and include other responsible figures from the ministries of defense.

It is to be expected that the seminar will give a new impetus to further conducting the talks of the 35 and to the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. Our delegation is seriously approaching its participation and is ready to present the position of the People's Republic

of Bulgaria on all issues and first of all, on the issue of the national military doctrine's essence.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What are the basic premises of the Bulgarian national military doctrine?

[Dobrev] The military doctrine of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is based on the Constitution and the legal documents adopted by the National Assembly. It reflects the essence of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member countries, which was adopted on 30 May 1987, and takes note of the country's specific characteristics. It also is coordinated with the strict observance of all obligations that spring from the UN Charter, the universal norms of international law, and the concluding documents of the CSCE meeting—first of all the principles of sovereign equality, respecting the rights inherent to sovereignty, refraining from the use of force or threats against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and the inviolability of Europe's borders and the territorial integrity of all states.

The military doctrine of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is a system of official views of the higher state and military leadership on preventing wars and adherence to comprehensively strengthening peace, constructing the Armed Forces, training the Bulgarian People's Army and the citizens for repelling possible aggression, and developing means of conducting armed struggle for defending the Bulgarian people's freedom and independence.

It is impossible to present in detail the military doctrine within the framework of a brief conversation. Therefore, I shall present several basic elements.

The following is the essence of the military doctrine of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

The People's Republic of Bulgaria does not threaten anybody. Under no circumstances will it be the first to begin military actions against any state or alliance of states, and it will use weapons only if it itself becomes the target of an armed attack. It strives to resolve all disputed issues with all states only by peaceful means. Bulgaria has no territorial claims toward any of its neighbors, and does not consider any state or people as an enemy. We construct our relations with all states on the basis of mutual respect, preserving the existing borders, mutual security, and peaceful coexistence, regardless of the political system of the states, or their belonging to different military-political groups. The People's Republic of Bulgaria does not allow propaganda of war and armed violence, as well as national and religious hostility and racial hatred. We adhere to equal security at the lowest possible level of the military potential. Our government is making active efforts to achieve political agreements on disarmament.

The Bulgarian military doctrine is based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The country's defense is based on military cooperation with the other Warsaw Pact member countries, and first of all with the USSR. In case

of a military provocation or armed aggression, the People's Republic of Bulgaria will mobilize all forces of the Army and the people with the view to repel the possible aggression and restore the country's territorial integrity with the assistance of its allies.

Not producing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and having no such weapons on its territory, the People's Republic of Bulgaria insistently adheres to banning their proliferation and use, and eliminating the existing quantity of such weapons.

The essence of the military-technical aspect of the military doctrine of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is determined by circumstances such as: Bulgaria's geostrategic location at the crossroad between Europe, Asia, and Africa and in immediate proximity to two NATO countries, which have a great military potential and powerful armies near our southern borders; the changes in international relations, including relations between the Balkan states, which generally are positive, despite the fact that the peaceful processes are yet to acquire an irreversible character; the character of possible wars under contemporary conditions, and so forth. Such circumstances dictate the necessary measures of guaranteeing the security of the state. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has a military potential that allows it, on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The presence of nuclear equipment in the neighboring NATO states, as well as the existence of nuclear reactors and major chemical, biochemical, and pharmaceuticals plants on the territory of the Balkan states, which can be destroyed even with conventional weapons, could inflict great damage and requires that the Armed Forces and the population are prepared to act under conditions of radioactive and chemical contamination.

The defensive activities in the initial stages of the war, in anything related to their tactical, operational, and strategic aspects, have great importance. The defensive direction of our doctrine requires that we thoroughly organize our defense at the beginning of the war, and use it as a detaining means that would prevent the aggressor from undertaking further military actions. In this context, we decrease the quantity of strike means—first of all tanks and motorized infantry units from the first echelon, while simultaneously we increase the quantity of antitank weapons, antiaircraft weapons, and other defensive means.

Improving the quality of the Armed Forces is a priority direction in their training. This is determined by the state and trends in the development of the armed forces of the neighboring NATO states; the specific situation of the Balkan strategy; the requirements related to ensuring the reasonable defense sufficiency; the country's economic possibilities; and its obligations within the Warsaw Pact framework. The construction of the Armed Forces, and all military training regulations, charters, and programs are being coordinated with the defensive doctrine and the requirement to train the troops for

acting under complex circumstances. Maintaining high combat readiness and not allowing a sudden strike are in the center of our attention.

The country's defense expenditures are determined on the basis of the aforementioned factors.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] In this context, could you please demonstrate the dynamics of our military expenditures in recent years?

[Dobrev] Yes, this issue requires special attention. The data is as follows:

1986—1,671.3 million leva;
1987—1,728 million leva—an increase of 15 million leva or 0.88 percent;
1988—1,751.6 million leva—an increase of 23.6 million or 1.36 percent;
1989—1,605.1 million leva—a decrease of 146.5 million or 8.36 percent.

Certain additional clarifications are necessary about the military expenditures in 1988 and 1989. The date I cited refers to the real expenditures in those years.

The military budget for 1989 to the tune of 1,825 million leva was adopted at the December 1988 National Assembly session, and this is how the fiscal year started. However, on 27 January 1989, at a joint meeting of the State Council and the Council of Ministers a decision was adopted to unilaterally decrease the personnel, weapons, and military expenditures. The 1989 military budget was decreased 12 percent (220 million leva). On this basis we redistributed the expenditures and decreased them from 1,825 to 1,605.1 million leva. The decrease mainly affected the maintenance of the Army and the supply of new weapons and combat equipment. This act was aimed at expressing the consistent peaceful policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and increasing its contribution to strengthening confidence and security in the Balkans and Europe.

Our country will be led by this principle also in the future in developing and improving its defensive military doctrine.

Gen Dzhurov Addresses National Assembly

AU1701130090 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 16 Jan 90 pp 1,3

["Statement" of Army General Dobri Dzhurov, member of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee Politburo and minister of national defense, to the 13th session of the Ninth National Session held in Sofia on 15 January]

[Text] Comrade people's deputies, little more than 2 months have elapsed since 10 November 1989. That was a dynamic time. The multifaceted problems of the grave legacy left to us by the authoritarian regime were brought to the forefront. All the people have already been occupying themselves with these problems, which has immensely increased the degree of their politicization.

The citizens are manifesting a desire for all problems to be settled as speedily as possible, and this is fully understandable. However, each one of these problems requires an appropriate approach, in accordance with its nature; each problem requires a greater or lesser amount of resources, whether financial or material, and also requires science and dexterous, skillful organization. There are very many other requirements that exert an influence over the dynamics of the processes in public life, and make it necessary for the problems to be resolved successively by stages.

I have made these preliminary comments in order to emphasize that now society is building, restructuring, and renewing itself in a truly revolutionary situation, one in which we are living and working, and this makes it necessary to render account when resolving all the pressing problems.

At the last National Assembly session, I made a brief speech on the question of the strength and maintenance of the Bulgarian People's Army [BPA], and made a proposal that a law on the country's defense should be adopted by the National Assembly.

At the present National Assembly session, I would like to acquaint the people's deputies with three important problems in the wide range of issues concerning the construction of the Army.

First, on the building up of the Armed Forces.

The building up of the Armed Forces embraces a wide range of problems, connected with the following:

- building the Army's organizational structure;
- supplying the Army with all necessary modern weapons for warfare;
- training highly qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officer cadres;
- organizing the combat training of soldiers on fixed terms of service and building a modern training materials base; and
- drafting up-to-date training courses and programs and developing suitable teaching and methodological approaches and aids, together with the creation and application in troop training of a contemporary military doctrine, military science, and art of war.

These are basically the range of problems relating to the construction of the modern Army.

Second, on the factors affecting the building up of the Armed Forces.

We may divide these under the headings of internal and external factors.

a) Internal factors.

First, the policy conducted by our country in the domestic and international fields. The country's internal and foreign policies were clearly outlined at the 10 November 1989 plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and at the subsequent plenums.

This new political course of profound revolutionary reforms that our country has adopted will substantially influence the further development of the BPA.

Second, the strategic geographical position that Bulgaria occupies in the southwestern theater of military operations, in particular in the Balkan strategic sector, and our commitments to our Warsaw Pact allies.

As all of us know, in my speech at the last session I stressed that the People's Republic of Bulgaria shares a border with Turkey, which possesses the second largest army in NATO after the United States.

Third, the human potential of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the moral-political condition and national features of our people.

Fourth, the state and possibilities of the economy, the technological standard of production, the infrastructure of Bulgaria, and so on.

Fifth, the national and allied military doctrines.

As we know, the May 1987 Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee adopted a new defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states. On the basis of this doctrine, we developed a national defensive doctrine of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

This is exerting a marked effect upon the Army's strength and structure, training plans and programs, operational skills and tactics, methods of training the military cadres, the teaching materials base, and so on.

b) External factors.

First, the global foreign policy that NATO is conducting in reality. This has different aspects in the individual continents, theaters of military operations, and regions.

Second, NATO's military doctrine on the global continental and regional scales. It continues to be based on the "Strategy of Flexible Response," "Forward Defense," and so forth, which do not exclude launching a sudden attack, making a first nuclear strike, a first mass air strike, and so on.

Third, the technical and technological level of the NATO armed forces and the plans for developing their armed forces until the end of the century (the year 2000).

Fourth, the results of the Vienna negotiations on strategic nuclear forces, on reducing armed forces and weapons, on naval forces, on tactical nuclear weapons, on banning nuclear tests and chemical weapons, and so on.

Fifth, East-West relations on the global scale—how they will develop, and at what rates and with what dynamics the new political thinking will spread.

All the internal and external factors, together with the dynamics of their changes, must be taken into account when building the Army.

In connection with the foregoing, I would like to emphasize that over the past 45 years the Ministry of National Defense has always tried to have an adequate plan for developing the Army, and it has made appropriate changes in accordance with the dynamics of these factors and the appearance of new ones.

We once again updated our plan following the 10 November 1989 plenum and the subsequent plenums. The third issue covered by my statement concerns this. It relates to the plan of the Ministry of National Defense for the restructuring of the BPA.

Our public is showing justifiable interest in this issue. I will attempt to briefly outline our basic views and the concept for their implementation.

The first trend in the development of the BPA is to base the Army on the two main principles stemming from the collective and national defensive military doctrines.

The first principle is the principle of reasonable sufficiency. As you know, in applying this principle, in January 1989 we made a unilateral cut in the BPA's strength and weapons and carried out a number of organizational and structural changes that give the Army an exclusively defensive character. This line will continue to be followed by us in the future, while the extent and rate at which it will be applied will be determined by the results of the Vienna talks and the practical actions of our southern neighbors.

The second principle is to lay the stress on quality parameters at the expense of quantitative ones. This principle affects several aspects of the restructuring, namely:

- first and foremost, the base of the modern scientific and technical achievements and technologies, and the introduction of intelligent equipment for waging war;
- automation of the control of troops and weapons;
- high professional training of cadres at all levels, including other ranks; and
- raising the standard of ideological training work in order to instill in the soldiers love for their native land and readiness to sacrifice themselves at the altar of their fatherland.

The second trend concerns developing and perfecting the basic legal acts according to which the BPA lives and works, such as the statutes, instructions, codes of regulations, and so on.

This undoubtedly can be carried out following the adoption of the new constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the law on the Armed Forces, and the law on the country's defense. The Ministry of National Defense will take an active part in the drafting of these acts.

Third trend: revising and further improving the curricula and training programs of the higher education establishments and the Army as a whole.

Fourth trend: further building up the BPA on the single-command principle, while at the same time expanding "democracy and glasnost" in conformity with the specific nature of the Army's organism.

Fifth trend: developing a new concept for educational work in the BPA.

The rapid politicization of our people following 10 November 1989 also encompassed the personnel of the Armed Forces, including the BPA. The soldiers of the BPA spontaneously supported the new political course and the subsequent practical measures along the road of renewal. They also approved the decision of the plenum of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers of 29 December 1989. The personnel of the Armed Forces, including the BPA, also supports the repeal of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which the National Assembly has repealed today.

This new political course and these practical measures demand substantial changes in the contents of political education work, in the structure of the organs of leadership, in the performance of their work, and in the definition of the role and place of the party and Komsomol organizations in the Army.

The need arises for developing new programs for educational work, with the aim of educating personnel in patriotism, readiness to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the homeland, and the peaceful labor of the people, and fulfillment of our obligations to our allies.

We are already working on these matters, and the complete realization of this concept of ours in the course of time will depend on the time needed to draft and adopt the new constitution, the law on the Armed Forces, and the law on defense.

This, in brief, is our program and our concept for its implementation.

In this context, I would like to emphasize that these are exceptionally complex problems, and because of this they must be resolved after considering them in the greatest depth, carried out consistently and in stages. The special characteristics of the Balkan strategic sector require us under no circumstances to allow the BPA's combat readiness to be weakened.

In addition, as I stressed earlier, we must also take into consideration the decisions that are being adopted in Vienna on disarmament.

In realizing our concept, we must display sober judgment and a high sense of responsibility, in the name of the supreme interests of the people and the country.

In conclusion, I would like to express my own profound conviction, and the conviction of our soldiers, that we will be supported by the National Assembly and the Bulgarian people in our efforts to further develop the BPA as a modern army and as a worthy defender of the people's interests and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our homeland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Thank you for your attention!

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputy Defense Minister on Military Cutbacks

AU1901161790 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 18 Jan 90 pp 1, 7

[Report by Jozef Janto: "Safer With Smaller Armies"]

[Excerpt] Vienna—General Anton Slimak, first deputy minister for national defense, commander of the Czechoslovak People's Army General Staff, and head of the Czechoslovak delegation made a speech yesterday at a seminar on military doctrines. In his speech he emphasized that Czechoslovakia rejects armed force as a means of resolving problems; our military defense policy also proceeds from this premise. Czechoslovakia has a vital interest in preserving peace, and therefore, among other things, it is striving for a positive outcome to the Vienna talks and, eventually, for the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

He later referred to the fact that the Czechoslovak People's Army has already taken several important steps in the disarmament process: it is mothballing 850 tanks (20 percent of the overall number), 165 armored personnel carriers, and 51 fighter aircraft. From 1 February the number of forces and resources for fulfilling military tasks in forward based divisions, the air force, and air defense will be reduced by one-third. For example, this year approximately 90,000 fewer reserve soldiers will be called up to take part in military exercises. The idea of large-scale military exercises is being abandoned. Preparation for the new defense law, which will substantially shorten military service, belongs to this process. [passage omitted]

Dienstbier Talks With Soviet Ambassador

LD2201234490 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 1730 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Jiri Dienstbier received in Prague today Viktor Lomakin, Soviet ambassador to

Czechoslovakia, at the latter's request. They discussed topical problems of the international situation.

Soviet Military Movements Reduced After Protest

*LD2201202190 Prague Television Service
in Czech 1830 GMT 22 Jan 90*

[Text] A convoy of 120 tracked and 115 wheeled vehicles of the Soviet Army was to travel from tomorrow through the Olomouc district for military exercises in the Libava area. The wave of protests of citizens from Olomouc prompted the coordination committee of the local Civic Forum to hold talks with representatives of the Soviet Army in Olomouc, and these took place this afternoon. In the presence of students, representatives of national committees of the town and villages, and the transport inspectorate, tomorrow's convoy has been reduced to 18 wheeled vehicles. According to other demands put to representatives of the Soviet Army, tracked vehicles should not use roads in the future and a larger number of wheeled vehicles traveling on the roads must be announced in advance.

A representative of the Soviet garrison in Olomouc was asked to convey to the command of the Central Group of Soviet forces in Milovice the demand to completely stop military exercises and troop movements until their complete withdrawal.

Deputy Proposes Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2301210590 Prague Domestic Service
in Slovak 1655 GMT 23 Jan 90*

[Speech by Deputy Michal Kocab at the Federal Assembly session—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] I am speaking for the first time in the parliament and on a very sensitive subject. The problem that I want to deal with has not been opened here yet, thus I am taking up this task myself because in my opinion this is an urgent matter. Allow me, first of all, to briefly but emphatically express my support for proposals put forward by the president. I think that arguments by which the president supported his proposals are quite extensive and correspond to the view of a majority of our population. The change of the republic's name, the change of the state emblem, and the change of name of our army is welcomed as confirmation of a successful transition of our society from a totalitarian system to democracy by a greater part of the nation. There is, however, one more important fact that prevents the feeling that our changes are definite and irreversible. Allow me to voice at this forum, in the spirit of the Gorbachev's concept of international relations—as the principle of state sovereignty, noninterference in the affairs of other states—my view on the most urgent problem of our state: the question of the presence of Soviet troops on our territory and its legal basis.

The fact that in the past we have not been able to deal properly with this question has cost our nation much

pain and suffering. The presence of Soviet troops on our territory is based on a treaty between the CSSR and the USSR on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the CSSR territory from 16 October, 1968, and ratified by the National Assembly's resolution from 18 October, 1968. [passage omitted on treaty, which Kocab calls a clear violation of principles of international law, above all the UN charter] The treaty was concluded at the time when troops of five armies of the Warsaw Pact were present on our territory, thus, under obvious military pressure. The National Assembly agreed with the ratification of this treaty and proceeded from the unequal conclusions of Moscow talks in the period 23-26 August and 3-4 October, 1968, and said in its resolution at the 27th National Assembly on 18 October, 1968, that—and I quote—it is at this time the only possible way out for the gradual withdrawal of troops of the five states of the Warsaw Pact from the CSSR territory. [passage omitted]

The treaty is an obvious violation of the state sovereignty and other principles of international law, and thus I propose that it is declared null by the Federal Assembly, that is invalid from the very beginning. Such a declaration is a necessary prerequisite for an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. Recognizing the fact that the troops cannot leave as fast as they came, I propose that the Federal Assembly sets, in a sequel to the trust expressed to the CSSR Government in December for its talks with the Soviet side, the deadline for the definite withdrawal of Soviet troops to the end of 1990 with the point that a considerable part of troops and their equipment will be withdrawn by 15 May, 1990, and to turn, at the same time, to the USSR Supreme Soviet for support for these justified demands.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, allow me to read out the drafts of both resolutions:

The first resolution: The Federal Assembly of the CSSR declares the treaty between the governments of the CSSR and the USSR of 16 October, 1968, on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the CSSR territory ratified by the National Assembly on 18 October, 1968, invalid from the very beginning.

And the draft of the second resolution, including a message to the USSR Supreme Soviet, I quote: The intervention by troops of the Soviet Union and the other four countries of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 meant the violation of the basic principle of the international law. Because of the invalid character of the treaty on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on CSSR territory of 16 October, 1968, since its very beginning, the CSSR Federal Assembly considers it necessary for the troops of the Soviet Union, which for more than 21 years have remained on our state territory without a legal reason, to be withdrawn expediently. The Federal Assembly of the CSSR expressed the full support for the CSSR Government in the talks with the Soviet side and stresses the necessity to start the withdrawal of Soviet troops immediately so that by 15

May, 1990, a considerable part of the troops and their armament are withdrawn and the withdrawal completed by the end of 1990 at the latest. In connection with this, the Federal Assembly of the CSSR stresses the wish of the Czechoslovak people to fulfill the idea of identity, independence, and state sovereignty and turns to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the interest of friendly relations not burdened by the mistakes of the past, to support these justified demands of Czechoslovak people.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, it would be, no doubt, a great underestimation of you, deputies of the Federal Assembly and citizens of the whole country, if I were to defend both of my proposals also from my position as a human being. There is possibly no such a unity on other questions concerning the most basic matters of both our nations as regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces. Thank you for your attention.

Demonstration Against Soviet Troops Organized

Populace to Claim Vacated Premises

*AU2401194190 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 23 Jan 90 p 1*

[Unattributed CTK report: "Apropos the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Olomouc"]

[Excerpt] Olomouc—Students from Palacky University are organizing a demonstration which will take place in Horni Square in Olomouc on Sunday 28 January at 1400 in support of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their families. The concentration of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in this district is one of the largest in the CSSR—perhaps around 20,000 people, including civilian employees and the soldiers' family members. Approximately 1,500 apartments will thus be vacated in the district; some of them will be used to house nurses and hospital workers, and others, obviously, will be used to house soldiers from the Czechoslovak People's Army who have been withdrawn to Olomouc from our western borders. Other Soviet premises will be vacated and used to benefit education and health care. By the end of May, the Prokop Holy Barracks will also be vacated. [passage omitted]

Students Hold Rally

*LD2401203190 Prague Television Service
in Czech 1830 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] The abolition of military studies departments at universities and public discussion of the amendments to the defense law were demanded today by participants at a rally on the Old Town Square in Prague. The organizers of the event, the Students' Parliament, pointed out that they see the bill on shortening basic military service to 18 and 9 months as a first stage, consistent with the present situation in Europe. The problems of alternative military service were also referred to, as was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

AFP Report

*AU2401182090 Paris AFP in English
1806 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 24 (AFP)—Some 3,000 young Czechoslovaks demanding that the Soviet Union pull all its troops out of Czechoslovakia demonstrated here Wednesday, an AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE correspondent said.

Students, pacifists, actors and a handful of uniformed soldiers joined the demonstration in a central square.

Student member of parliament Jan Bubenik read out a statement made in parliament Tuesday by independent deputy Michael Kocab demanding an immediate Soviet troop withdrawal.

Soviet soldiers have been stationed here since they marched into Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crush the Prague Spring reform movement.

The demonstrators also demanded that Czechoslovakia reduce compulsory military service from two years to one year.

Several demonstrators appealed to the Civic Forum democracy movement to stage a mass demonstration to support the parliamentary moves to obtain a Soviet pullout.

Another demonstration is planned Sunday in Olomouc, Moravia, where there is a large Soviet garrison.

Prague and Moscow are to resume talks next month on a schedule for the pullout of Soviet troops. But Prague is pushing for the talks to be brought forward so an agreement can be struck when Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel visits Moscow early in February.

The demonstrators demanded that military service be reduced to one year, although a bill has been proposed to cut it from two years to 18 months.

Students at the demonstration also demanded an end to military classes in universities, which currently take up some 600 hours over two years.

Date for Soviet Troop Pullout Talks Not Set

*LD2401180290 Prague CTK in English
1653 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow, January 24 (CTK correspondent)—The date for the second round of Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia has not yet been set but both sides agree that the 2nd round should start soon and the sides should reach concrete results as quickly as possible.

The first round of the talks was held in Prague from January 15.

Head of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry's first territorial department Zdenek Cerny, who has been holding

talks on this question here since Tuesday, did not rule out that the second round will not only be started but will produce an agreement on the withdrawal of troops still before the visit to Moscow by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. The date of the visit has not been specified.

Cerny said Czechoslovakia had proposed to resume the talks January 25 January 26 while the Soviet side kept to the earlier agreed date in the first week in February [as received]. The talks will take place in Moscow with Deputy Foreign Ministers Ivan Aboimov and Evzen Vacek taking part.

According to Zdenek Cerny, Soviet diplomats have been reproaching the Czechoslovak side for too much haste. The Prague talks revealed that they themselves take into account the course of the Vienna talks on conventional forces and arms cuts in Europe. Nevertheless their readiness and goodwill to achieve quick results are clear, Zdenek Cerny told CTK.

Demonstrators Demand Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2401111490 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 0500 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] A mass demonstration demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia was held in Vysoke Myto yesterday. At least one-fourth of the citizens of this town of 12,000 inhabitants took part in it. The citizens handed the following demand to the commander in chief of Soviet troops there: withdrawal of troops by the time of the free election; immediate liquidation of the fuel storage, the evacuation of the building used by the command by the end of January and the return of the building of the former music school, which is now a museum of the Soviet Army's military glory.

Commentary on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD2601061290 Prague International Service
in English 1900 GMT 25 Jan 90*

[Text] The second round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, now under preparation, is discussed in the following comment by Milan Suchanek.

The Soviet Union agrees in principle with a complete withdrawal of its troops from Czechoslovakia. This is the main result of the first round of bilateral talks. What remains to be decided is the time schedule for the withdrawal. This should be solved at the second round of talks which will be held in Moscow later in January.

Thus the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia might be reached even before Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel visits Moscow in February.

The Czechoslovak Government demands a substantial reduction in the number of Soviet troops deployed here

by June when free elections will be held. And by the end of this year we want them all withdrawn. According to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, Soviet diplomats think that too fast, especially in view of the Vienna talks on conventional arsenals, while maintaining the military balance.

Following the Warsaw Treaty's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the deployment of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory, the United States strengthened their military presence especially in West Germany. This might be the main reason why Moscow is in no hurry to withdraw its troops. They might prefer a multilateral solution via the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament.

But the hope that a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement will be worked out in the near future is real. It is in the interest of both Czechoslovakia and the whole of Europe.

Foreign Ministry Confirms End to Arms Exports

*LD2601212390 Prague CTK in English 1833 GMT
26 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 26 (CTK)— The ways and terms of the cessation of sales of Czechoslovak arms abroad will be checked in connection with international agreements signed by Czechoslovakia as well as with respect to the gradual transition of the arms production to civilian production. A Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman has told CTK.

The cessation of arms supplies will not concern hunting and sporting arms, he added.

The spokesman referred to statements of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier which were published by THE NEW YORK TIMES yesterday.

Vacek on Army Reductions, Counterintelligence

*LD2601112990 Prague CTK in English 1010 GMT
26 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 26 (CTK)— "It can be expected that an agreement which will help reduce troops of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO will be achieved already this year. For the Czechoslovak Army it would mean a reduction by about 60,000 soldiers, 3,000 tanks, and almost 3,000 combat vehicles of infantry, armoured vehicles and other equipment", Czechoslovak Defence Minister Miroslav Vace said in today's RUDE PRAVO.

Asked about the shortening of the military service he answered that nowadays it is realistic to shorten it from 24 to 18 months and in case of university graduates who attended military departments to nine months. He said that, in his opinion, professionalization of the Army is less realistic since expenses for professional armies are four to six times higher.

Commenting on military training facilities he said that there are 14 in the country covering an area of 2,400

square kilometres, i.e. 2.6 percent of the total territory and that only about one third serves for training the Army. It is under consideration that some of the facilities will be gradually handed over to civilians, the minister pointed out.

He added that the Czechoslovak Army has already offered 65 T-54 and T-55 tanks for sale and that 11 of them have been sold so far.

Despite all positive steps in the world the Armed Forces of Czechoslovakia as well as of other countries will be in the centre of the interest of foreign intelligence services. Therefore, military counterintelligence must exist, the minister stressed and added that he can give a guarantee that the counterintelligence will serve only this purpose because by a resolution of the Czechoslovak Government Presidium of January 4 the abnormality of dual subordination of the military counterintelligence to the Interior and Defence Ministries ceased to exist. The dual subordination could have led to a misuse, the defence minister concluded.

Defense Minister Views Army 'Today and Tomorrow'

AU3001120990 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
26 Jan 90 p 8

[Report on interview with National Defense Minister Colonel General Miroslav Vacek by Igor Sirota; date and place not given: "The Army Today and Tomorrow; With Miroslav Vacek, Minister of National Defense, on the 'Term of Service,' Sales of Tanks, and Counterintelligence"]

[Text] Life in the green uniform—most men have lived this life—concerns each and every one of us. It concerns us whether our son, brother, or nephew will serve for 2 years, or whether his "term" will be somewhat shorter. It is everybody's concern how and what will be spent for defense purposes. We have discussed these and also other issues with Colonel General Miroslav Vacek, CSSR minister of national defense.

He replied to our questions with the frankness and military directness which are typical for him.

[Sirota] You have promised to acquaint our public with the draft of the new Czechoslovak military doctrine by the middle of January. You have not done so yet. Why?

[Vacek] I have had to change some of my plans. After a year of work, the doctrine was ready. However, the democratization process in our society has made it necessary to reassess it. Thus I must state that the Czechoslovak military doctrine is not quite ready yet. It will acquire its final form after the constitution is adopted.

[Sirota] Will the disarmament negotiations produce a further alleviation—that is, a reduction of our army's numerical strength?

[Vacek] It is to be expected that an agreement will be reached this year which should contribute toward a troop reduction both within the Warsaw Pact and in NATO. For the Czechoslovak People's Army [CSLA] this should mean a reduction of approximately 60,000 soldiers, about 3,000 tanks, and almost 3,000 combat infantry vehicles, armored vehicles, and other technology. These figures indicate that it would be a great step.

[Sirota] For quite a number of people these figures are a matter of the future. But the soldiers in basic national service are more concerned about today, about cutting back the length of military service generally. This is a idea which would probably be supported by everybody. So why not by the Army?

[Vacek] True, military service does involve many difficulties. From the human point of view, I understand this. Still, we must not ignore the realities of the correlation of forces, both in Europe and in the world.

If I could comply with everybody's wishes, I would surely become most popular. However, as a minister who is responsible both for his own department and for the CSSR's adherence to its international military commitments, I cannot agree to such requests. The realistic thing today is to reduce the length of national service from 24 to 18 months, and to 9 months for the graduates of military academy departments.

[Sirota] Will you meet, at least halfway, the young people's demands for an alternative military service?

[Vacek] We do not want the young people to get into conflict with their conscience and the laws because of their political or religious convictions. Just to round out the picture: As far as I know, there was no such possibility at the time of the first republic [1918-38].

Just now the first necessary step is to change the Constitution and to amend the law on military service. Moreover, the alternative service must last roughly 50 percent longer than normal service, since otherwise it would be impossible to prevent speculation. But many other issues are also involved: Who will come up with clothing and food for the young people, what about their leisure time after service hours, and so forth? The use of young people in medical services, ecological construction projects, or elsewhere should be a matter for the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

[Sirota] Would not all army problems be resolved if the Army turned professional?

[Vacek] In view of our traditions and of the possibilities of our economy, for the time being this seems to me less realistic. In fact, the expenses for professional armies are 4-6 times higher than for non-professional ones. Only the economically strongest states have professional armies.

[Sirota] The Army can help our economy precisely by reducing its expenditures—but also, for instance, by letting its soldiers work in construction and elsewhere.

[Vacek] As for construction brigades—a possibility considered in the past—the CSLA leadership has pointed out that they contradict the Geneva agreement on forced labor. According to this agreement, nobody may be induced to work except for economic motives. In other words, this means no construction brigades for us. However, in keeping with our original plans we will be strengthening our railroad troops. On top of that, the soldiers will work about 1.2 million working days annually for our national economy. The present figure is about 8,700 working days, not counting the short-term assistance to agriculture.

[Sirota] Will the reduction of our Army not endanger the social certainties of professional soldiers?

[Vacek] It would be insincere to say that these certainties are not threatened in part, because they are. But the "cause" is not the democratization process—it is the logical culmination of disarmament negotiations. We will resolve the situation via officers' retirements—although in the past we used to insist that they remain even after reaching retirement age. Another way to cut down the number of professional soldiers is to allow the young officers, who have found that they cannot cope with service requirements, to gradually leave the Army and enter civilian life.

However, I also want to say that we would not like to take our leave of those who have honestly served up to now, and who want to continue their service.

[Sirota] The military training grounds are still a problem. Will their number be reduced?

[Vacek] The citizens are not properly informed about the size of our military training grounds. They mostly occupy land which is quite unsuitable for agricultural purposes. We have a total of 14 training facilities, covering an area of 2,400 square kilometers, i.e. about 2.6 percent of the total territory of our republic; which is quite a large area. To round out the picture, it must be said that only about one third of it is used for troop training; the rest consists of military forests and farms. We are thinking of gradually handing over certain areas on the fringes of our training grounds for civilian use.

[Sirota] What interest is there in buying military technology?

[Vacek] The interest is not as great as one could expect. The primary reason is that this technology has a high fuel consumption. The situation is this: We have offered 65 T-54 and T-55 tanks for sale; 11 of them were sold by the beginning of January, for Kcs 100,000-150,000. Sales to museums abroad were far more profitable.

[Sirota] Military counterintelligence [VKR] is a powerful, and obviously dreaded, force. Was it also used for the surveillance of people because of their political views?

[Vacek] I will begin by digressing slightly. In spite of all the positive steps undertaken in the world, both our own

Armed Forces and those of other countries will remain an object of interest for foreign intelligence. That is why the VKR must exist.

I can guarantee that this will be the only task which our counterintelligence will have, because the CSSR Government Decree No 3 of 4 January 1990 has put an end to the VKR's abnormal dual subordination to the Ministries of Interior and of National Defense. The dual subordination which existed up to now could also have lead to abuse.

[Sirota] The number of soldiers and military equipment and the amount of armament expenditures are being cut down. Does this mean that the time for disbanding the military blocs is drawing near?

[Vacek] It is difficult to estimate today how long this will take. However, I think that we are closer to this step than we were 2 years ago.

[Sirota] Thank you for the interview.

20,000 Demonstrate for Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2801180590 Prague CTK in English 1702 GMT
28 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 28 (CTK)—The quickest possible departure of Soviet troops from the Olomouc District, North Moravia, was urged at a demonstration staged here today of more than 20,000 people, a number roughly equal to that of Soviet soldiers, civil workers, and their families staying in the district since August 1968.

The demonstrators also voiced support for Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's coming Moscow talks on the withdrawal.

At the Soviet command in Olomouc the demonstrators delivered a petition to garrison commander Major General Evgeni Meshcheryakov. He assured them that he will wait for the Mikhail Gorbachev-Vaclav Havel talks, and then discuss dates for the withdrawal with national committees (local government bodies).

He told the demonstrators that the activity of Soviet troops in Olomouc and in the Libava military area has no longer the character of military preparations, but is aimed at departure from Czechoslovakia.

Foreign Ministry on Soviet Withdrawal, Travel

*LD3001150290 Prague CTK in English 1414 GMT
30 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 30 (CTK)—One of the questions to be discussed during the visit of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier to the FRG on February 1-2 will be the simplification of travelling and visa practice. Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry's spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky said this at a press conference on Czechoslovakia's foreign policy here today.

The possibilities of progress in this sphere were also discussed during the recent visit of Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis to Prague. The spokesman stressed, however, that neither in the case of the FRG nor of Italy can visa-free travel with Czechoslovakia be expected as both countries are bound by agreements in the framework of the European Economic Community that do not make this step possible.

Jiri Dienstbier is to pay a one-day visit to Sweden in the framework of the preparations of an official visit of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to Sweden.

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens is to arrive in Czechoslovakia on February 8 at the invitation of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. The signing of an agreement on resumption of diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Israel is expected.

Foreign Ministry Press Department spokesman Jan Martinek said at the press conference that Czechoslovakia wants with this step, which confirms the new orientation of its foreign policy, to contribute to peace-building tendencies in the Middle East. Czechoslovakia is sending a team of experts to the seat of the Arab League in Tunisia to clarify the principles of Czechoslovak foreign policy in new conditions.

Lubos Dobrovsky said that the dates of a visit of Vaclav Havel to the Soviet Union and of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Prague have not yet been specified.

He informed journalists that in the week from February 5 to 11, a group of experts of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will meet in Prague for the second round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed on Czechoslovak territory since August 1968.

"We are convinced that this will be the final round of the talks that will create conditions for the signing of an inter-government agreement. We appeal for patience and tolerance of citizens who have endured the more than 20-year long stay of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. We should demonstrate sufficient political culture so that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops may be carried out continuously. The first stage of the withdrawal, which will not be simple as regards the technical aspect, is to be finished, according to our proposal, on May 15, i.e. still before the elections."

Speaking about an article in today's Army Soviet daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that pointed to an alleged hastiness of the demand of the Czechoslovak side, he stated: "The Czechoslovak Government and representatives of the Czechoslovak Army are qualified enough to take into consideration the degree of danger in Europe." According to Czechoslovak experts, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops will favourably influence the talks on conventional weapons in Europe conducted in Vienna, Lubos Dobrovsky said.

He added that if the need arises, after the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, on

the basis of a future agreement at the Vienna talks to deal with the question of deployment of a limited contingent of troops on some other territory, Czechoslovakia is ready to negotiate this question on the ground of the Warsaw Treaty, i.e. on a multilateral basis.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED-PDS Presents Disarmament Initiative

Gysi Describes 'Proposal: Security Model 2000'

AU1001164390 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 8 Jan 90 p 1

[Disarmament initiative submitted by Gregor Gysi, Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism chairman, in East Berlin on 6 January: "Proposal: Security Model 2000"]

[Text] Is Disarmament Possible in Europe?

This question, asked by Friedrich Engels, was a utopian vision in the past century. Today it is a tangible reality. In keeping with the tradition of the workers' movement, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] suggests that the two German states start demilitarization at the center of Europe, and that they stipulate cooperative security structures within their treaty-based community. This requires a new way of thinking. One should not think in terms of enemies and opponents, but in terms of a security partnership, and one should not speak about deterrence but about confidence.

This will become a reality through radical disarmament.

Who is preventing the two German states from reducing their armed forces by 50 percent by 1991? Would both sides not demonstrate their confidence if a demilitarized zone were established on both sides of the border, if there were neither low-level flights nor landing craft, nor submarines? Nuclear weapons, including those in depots, must be banned from German soil. Training areas and prohibited zones could be converted into recreation centers for people and the environment. Means that would no longer be needed for military expenditure in the two German states could be fed into a joint fund for large ecological projects.

We are not dreamers. Both German states belong to different military alliances. The standing armies in the European states that include over 6 million soldiers cannot be abolished overnight. However, it would be possible to eliminate their attack capability by the year 2000.

To shape the treaty-based community with the FRG in the military sphere, the SED-PDS proposes the following:

1. The National People's Army and the Bundeswehr are to be reduced to 50 percent of their current strength.

2. Any modernization of weapons and military equipment is stopped.

3. General military service is set at 12 months in both states.

At the suggestion of our extraordinary party congress, the GDR Government has submitted a corresponding proposal.

4. No units above company strength should be based within a distance of 50-80 km on both sides of the border. Training areas will be eliminated in this zone.

5. All low-flying exercises are immediately banned.

6. The two states have neither submarines nor landing craft in the Baltic Sea.

7. Arms production and purchases will be reduced considerably in this connection, and arms sales outside the respective alliances are banned.

8. The Allies are called upon to systematically prepare their troops for the complete, step-by-step withdrawal by 1999, starting in the border region. Low-level flights by their air forces are banned.

9. Nuclear and chemical weapons are to be withdrawn from FRG and GDR territory by 1991.

10. The civilian rehabilitation of professional soldiers will be carried out systematically and in a generous way, without any social disadvantages resulting for those concerned. A retired soldier is cheaper than an active soldier.

Without a reduction in military confrontation between the two German states, every word about the unity of the nation lacks credibility.

Proposal Called 'Naive'

AU1201184590 East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG
in German 9 Jan 90 p 1

[ADN report: "Egon Bahr in Potsdam: Disarmament Lags Behind Political Development"]

[Excerpt] Potsdam—Whereas rapid progress has been achieved in political developments, disarmament and arms control are lagging behind.

This was stressed by the member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Egon Bahr, during a lecture to the Scientific Council, teachers, and students of the Institute for International Relations at the Academy for State and Legal Sciences in Potsdam-Babelsberg. The policy of the two German states must be aimed at accelerating disarmament. Bahr stated that he is convinced that the Germans will never again fire shots at each other. The two German armies are no longer able to wage or win a war.

However, he described as "a little naive" the proposal of the Executive of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism aimed at the 50-percent reduction of the armies in both German states. Reductions by 50 percent would upset the balance of forces, because the FRG is more important for NATO than the GDR for the Warsaw Pact. However, the SED-PDS proposals are worth discussing, he pointed out. [passage omitted]

FRG Stand on Inclusion in NATO Criticized

AU1101201490 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 9 Jan 90 p 1

[Commentary by Bo Adam: "The GDR a Member of NATO?"]

[Text] Well, one year ago nobody could have foreseen that the democratization and restructuring of societies in Eastern Europe would take place at such a rapid pace. Nobody, not even those who are concerned, knew that. To be exact, however, the basic direction was clear since Gorbachev started the fight against Stalinism in the Soviet Union.

However, it is now coming home to the West that Gorbachev's concept of the common European home was not really taken seriously in the west of the continent, and that hardly any practical conclusions were drawn in the sphere of politics. The result is utter chaos in Bonn and the other European capitals, and immature security-political ideas are being tossed about.

However, the greatest blunder was made by the official of the Christian Democratic Union, Dregger, who simply demanded that the GDR should be incorporated into a slightly changed NATO. Since Dregger is not known to be a joker, one must take this seriously. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher expressed more sensible ideas when he called for early talks on cooperative security structures in Europe and, with a critical view of the coalition partner in Bonn, for the elimination of the wall of missiles and other weapons.

This attitude is in keeping with the "Security Model 2000," which was submitted by Gregor Gysi on behalf of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism. In a 10-point catalogue, practical measures by the two German states were proposed, including a reduction of military service to 12 months, for which it will probably be easy to find a majority in the GDR, and the reduction of the strength of the National People's Army and the Bundeswehr by 50 percent.

One should hope that these proposals will soon be translated into government policy so that negotiations can soon start at the state level. Otherwise the European calculation will not work out.

FRG Military Policy Comes Under Criticism*AU2401175290 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 19 Jan 90 p 2*

[Commentary by Wolfgang Wolf: "Security not the Rearguard"]

[Text] The first German-German top-level military meeting has taken place in Vienna. Lieutenant General Graetz (National People's Army) and Admiral Wellerhoff (Bundeswehr) spoke of a good atmosphere after the meeting, and stated that the talk was open, honest, and businesslike.

Such meetings—even if they do not yield immediate results—promote confidence and, in this way, contribute to greater stability, which is desired by all sides. Why should security issues be the rearguard in the process of German-German rapprochement? Ministers in all kinds of spheres meet—why not the defense ministers as well? GDR Defense Minister Hoffmann has submitted a proposal, but Stoltenberg does not seem to be very interested. He says there is no need to act. Does he want to leave the entire sphere of security and defense policy to Foreign Minister Genscher, for whatever reasons?

There is no doubt that specific steps, as are currently under discussion in Vienna, would be accelerated by German-German initiatives aimed at disarmament and confidence building. Such proposals might be taken up by the two alliances, and they could be worked out as a joint standpoint and published subsequently. This would certainly relieve the uneasiness and even fears of our European neighbors in view of the planned treaty-based community and security community of the two German states. This would also dispel fears among GDR citizens that result from existing disparities. On the one side there is a strong Bundeswehr, and on the other there is a reformed and renewed National People's Army. As is known, military service has been reduced to 12 months in the NVA, and the total strength of the NVA will be reduced to 110,000-120,000 men if corresponding results are achieved at the Vienna talks.

Stoltenberg has little to offer in this respect. Instead of shortening military service, he considered extending it from 15 to 18 months. As a matter of fact, the peacetime strength is to be reduced from 495,000 to 470,000 men by 1996, but the wartime strength of the Bundeswehr, which comprises 1.34 million soldiers will not be affected by this.

Ensuring peace with fewer weapons? This is hardly compatible with the fact that the Bundeswehr placed 8,600 orders for military equipment and 140,000 other orders involving DM21.5 billion (excluding construction measures) last year with the industry, and that it is facing financial obligations amounting to DM27.6 billion for developments and procurements in the sphere of defense as of 1990. The FRG Defense Ministry apparently sees a need for action—but in the wrong direction.

Spokesman on Conventional Forces Reduction*LD2901122390 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1138 GMT 29 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR Government has a far-reaching interest in the reduction of military confrontation in central Europe through the mutual reduction of forces and arms. This was contained in a statement by Government Spokesman Wolfgang Meyer sent to ADN on Monday.

The GDR Government unreservedly supports the USSR proposal to withdraw the forces of all states from foreign territories by the year 2000. As far as the stationing of Soviet troops (Western group) on the GDR's territory is concerned, this is a direct result of World War II laid down by Allied agreements. The same applies to the stationing of Western forces in the FRG's territory. The development of two sovereign German states, the government spokesman said, did not remove the right to station troops. The specific arrangements (stationing treaties) were agreed on between the GDR and the USSR and between the FRG and the three Western powers. Hence, in order to dissolve the agreements and the four-power rights and responsibilities, what is needed is both four-sided decisions by the major powers and treaty-based agreements with the states where the troops are deployed.

The status of the Soviet troops on the GDR's territory thus is fundamentally different from that of the troops in Hungary (Southern group) and in the CSSR (Central group). The troops are in those countries as a result of the events of 1956 and 1968 and as a result of the bilateral agreements and alliance accords concluded in connection with them.

The GDR, the government spokesman went on, is working actively in Vienna toward an agreement on drastic reductions in conventional forces in Europe before the end of 1990. If the proposed reductions are carried out, this will include the further withdrawal of Soviet forces and their arms from the GDR's territory and those of other major powers from the FRG's territory, too. This should be followed immediately, in the GDR's view, by further agreements (Vienna II) on even deeper cuts in the military potentials of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

HUNGARY**Army Chief of Staff on Hungarian Military Doctrine***AU2401212190 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 pp 1, 3*

[Report on interview with Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff of the Hungarian People's Army, by Peter Vajda; date and place not given: "The Chief of Staff Gives Interview to NEPSZABADSAG"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, who participated in the international seminar held within the framework of the Vienna disarmament talks this week, answered our correspondent's questions.

[Vajda] In your view, what is the sense and importance of such meetings?

[Borsits] This is the first time that such a meeting of military representatives of 35 countries has taken place, so this in itself is an important thing. First of all, we had an opportunity to exchange first-hand information on military doctrines. Second, I had the opportunity to express our position concerning the Hungarian Republic's military doctrine. Third, a whole series of personal meetings was also able to take place on this occasion.

[Vajda] What did you say in connection with the Hungarian military doctrine?

[Borsits] Among other things, I said that in our renewed military doctrine we consider strengthening the national character to be of utmost importance. This is an organic part of the reform process currently under way in Hungary. The political changes that have taken place so far, particularly the upcoming elections, exclude the acceptance of the argument which, like in previous decades, determines Hungary's vulnerability or our alliance concepts on an ideological basis. I also said that, although our long-term wish is to see a Europe free of military blocs, we are still planning our defense tasks within the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, we regard a thorough reform of our alliance as necessary, and we encourage this, primarily the democratization and modernization of domestic relations and decision mechanisms.

[Vajda] What questions did your colleagues ask you, and what questions did my colleagues ask you at the news conferences?

[Borsits] The military leaders asked many questions concerning our doctrine's defensive character. I told them that, looking at it from the political perspective, it is essential that we no longer have an image of an enemy, formulated on an ideological basis. From a technical viewpoint, it is important that we eliminate, for example, 50 percent of our land missiles, 47 percent of our tanks, and 40 percent of our artillery and fighter airplanes from our People's Army. As to the questions asked by journalists, the French journalists wanted to know whether the present Hungarian defense policy concept resembled the French one, which is based on defense from every direction. My answer to this question was affirmative. Our task is to secure and defend the Hungarian Republic's borders from all directions and to halt and drive out any attacking force. I was also asked many questions on whether we had coordinated our sensational initiatives (the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the "open-sky" Canadian-Hungarian military flight) with others. My answer was that all these were independent Hungarian initiatives.

[Vajda] What issues did you discuss during your bilateral meetings with other chiefs of staff?

[Borsits] I asked Soviet Chief of Staff General Moysyev to start negotiations on the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in Budapest this very month. The general promised to convey the request. During my talks with General Powell, chairman of the joint committee of U.S. chiefs of staff, we positively evaluated the lecture tour of U.S. officers in Hungary, which will soon be followed by a similar tour of Hungarian officers in the United States. During my talks with the French chief of staff, among other things, we discussed the joint proposal we made at the Vienna talks and cooperation in military instruction, something that has been going on successfully for years....

[Vajda] Do you expect similar cooperation with other Western countries, perhaps also NATO countries?

[Borsits] This is also very possible.

[Vajda] Is it also possible for Hungarian officers to go on to study in these countries' schools and academies?

[Borsits] There are not concrete plans for this yet, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there will be such plans later, on a mutual basis, and provided the financial side of such cooperation is guaranteed.

Deputy Chief of Staff Reports on Military Cuts

*LD2501215590 Budapest MTI in English 1900 GMT
25 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 25 (MTI)—Addressing the Thursday session of the Vienna seminar on military doctrines, Brigadier General Jozsef Biro, first deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian People's Army, spoke about the reduction of Hungarian Armed Forces and military budget, and the Army reform. Jozsef Biro is heading the Hungarian delegation to the second stage of the conference which opened on Monday.

The brigadier general said that maintaining the current size of the Hungarian People's Army was not justified by the country's geostrategic position, nor was it allowed by its economic situation. The planned 30-35-percent cut in the Army strength would be accompanied by the strengthening of its defensive traits. Accordingly, the total strength would be reduced from 106,000 to 75,000, the number of tanks from 1,400 to 800, artillery devices from 1,700 to 900, and military aircrafts from 113 to 80. Plans call for the units deployed in western Hungary to be distributed proportionally throughout the country.

Speaking about Hungary's military budget, Jozsef Biro pointed out that the figure had dropped by 33 percent over the past four years, currently at 4 to 4.5 percent of the state budget. Ninety percent of the remaining funds was absorbed by personnel and maintenance costs, with a mere 10 percent left for the purchase of new appliances and weapons. This led to the aging of devices, and made it necessary to retain 20-25-year-old tanks.

Troop Deployment at Austrian Border To End

AU2601104890 Paris AFP in English 1037 GMT
26 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna, January 26 (AFP)—Hungary will no longer deploy rapid intervention troops along its border with Austria, Hungarian General Jozsef Biro said at military talks here, reliable sources said Friday. Gen Biro also detailed forthcoming troop reductions in his country, and said Hungary would no longer produce offensive weapons and would transform its arms industry into a civilian production.

He told a seminar on military doctrines, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that "in the future, the Hungarian Army will be deployed the same way throughout the country". Troops "with the highest capacity for rapid intervention" would no longer be concentrated on the Austrian border, the sources quoted him as saying.

Gen Biro explained that Hungarian military units were broken down into three categories: the first had up to 60 percent of its troops "always prepared for intervention", in the second 30 to 60 percent were ready, and less than 30 percent were kept ready in the third group.

He said reforms called for reducing the Armed Forces by 30 to 35 percent. This would cut the number of troops from 106,000 to 75,000, the number of tanks from 1,400 to 800, and the number of fighter planes from 113 to 80. The size of both Army troops and material "surpassed Hungary's financial capabilities", he said.

The seminar opened here January 16.

Defense Minister on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2801181190 Budapest MTI in English
1634 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Budapest January 28 (MTI)—Minister of Defence Ferenc Karpati discussed the possibility of withdrawing the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary in an interview with the Budapest weekly political newspaper VASARNAPI HIREK (SUNDAY NEWS). The minister of defence said that the number of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary is somewhat less than 50,000.

"Under the terms of the agreement between the Hungarian and the Soviet prime ministers, talks are to open on the theme next week. From the Hungarian side, the talks will be attended by Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, and Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff. The Soviet delegation will include Deputy Foreign Ministry Ivan Aboimov, and Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, deputy chief of staff. These talks will lead to the final agreement on the soonest possible end to the Soviet troop withdrawal. Our geographical situation also makes the complete pull-out of Soviet troops possible without this lessening the security of Hungary, and the security of the entire Warsaw Treaty.

"This process shall not disturb the power balance, and will take into consideration the Vienna talks. It will not affect our membership in the Warsaw Treaty, and we shall continue to strive to modernize and democratize this organization," the minister of defence said.

Further on Soviet Troop Withdrawal from Hungary**Ministry Reply to Soviet Paper on Troops**

LD3001185790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Untitled report by Peter Laszlo]

[Text] According to the Foreign Ministry's state secretary, today the Soviet Army's newspaper carried an article about the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. In Ferenc Somogyi's view, it is only the private opinion of the article's author that the withdrawal of troops would be premature [elsietett]. The state secretary feels that, with regard to the departure of Soviet troops deployed on a so-called temporary basis in our homeland for more than 3 decades, it is incomprehensible to speak about haste.

The state secretary for the Foreign Ministry expects the Soviet delegation to present the official Soviet stance at the bilateral negotiations, which begin 1 February.

Withdrawal Talks 1 Feb

LD3001133990 Budapest MTI in English
1224 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Budapest, January 30 (MTI)—Hungary and the Soviet Union are to launch talks on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in the country on Thursday.

MTI has learned from the Foreign Ministry that the first round of talks will last two days, and the Hungarian side will be putting forward the demand it formulated previously that the Soviet pullout should be completed this year.

The Hungarian delegation will be headed by Ferenc Somogyi, Hungarian state secretary of foreign affairs, and include Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, Chief of Staff, and Gyorgy Doro, deputy president of the National Planning Office.

The Soviet delegation will be led by Ivan Aboimov, deputy foreign minister, and composed of Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of staff; V. Sitnin, deputy finance minister, and Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary.

POLAND

Soviet Troop Unit To Be Moved From Torun

LD2201213690 Warsaw PAP in English
2027 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] Torun, January 22—Plenipotentiaries for Soviet troops stationing in Poland, General Viktor Dubynin on the Soviet side and General Mieczyslaw Debicki on the Polish one, met with the local authorities today to discuss withdrawal of the Soviet Army unit from Torun.

Discussed were questions pertaining to the need to allocate the grounds used by the Soviet Army for housing construction purposes.

The Soviet side promised to undertake actions with a view to moving the unit elsewhere.

Daily Claims Poland Shipping Arms to Ethiopia

Sales Continued for Two Years

LD2301131190 Warsaw PAP in English
1242 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] Warsaw, January 23—Over the past two years Poland sold 8.3 million dollars worth of weapons to Ethiopia, the Solidarity daily GAZETA WYBORCZA reported today, saying that they had waited with breaking this news until the crewmen of the Polish Cargo ship Boleslaw Krzywousty kept captive by the Eritrean rebels since January 3 were released.

The paper disclosed that a plane full of weapons left for Ethiopia from Warsaw's Okęcie Airport on January 12 when the negotiations with the Eritrean rebels on releasing Polish sailors were under way.

This shipment along with another two contracted for the same period will give Poland 2.5 million dollars, says the paper, quoting the Central Engineering Board, a body licenced to sell arms in Poland, as a source.

"Polish ships carry not only Polish weapons on the seas all over the world, sealed containers with unknown cargo are taken from ports in Western Europe," wrote the daily.

The GAZETA WYBORCZA also quoted a Foreign Ministry official as saying that sales of arms are good business for Poland which is disarming itself and gets rid of outdated weapons for good payment.

Details of Kidnapped Ship Crew's Release

LD2501020590 Warsaw PAP in English
2204 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Warsaw, January 24—Three days since the release of the crew of the MS Boleslaw Krzywousty, representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the chief negotiator in the operation Jerzy Vonau, a

director at the Polish Ministry of Transportation and Maritime Economy, met here today with newsmen to present details of the case.

Vonau said that the most dramatic moment was when the Sudanese press agency reported on January 17 that the Ethiopian Government intended to release the Polish crew by force. This happened at a time when negotiations with the Eritreans were headed in the right direction and such a move by Addis Ababa could not only stall the talks but even lead to the death of the ship's crew. A speedy report delivered to Warsaw and talks with the Ethiopian side in its wake turned out to be effective.

When on January 20 it seemed that the hour of the release of the Poles could be aired through radio, it turned out that the previous information supplied by a representative of the People's Front of the Liberation of Eritrea about the date and place of the Poles' release was not precise. Presumably, the leadership of this organization decided that holding the Poles hostage for a longer period of time should be used to promote the Eritrean cause on the international arena.

At this moment, the American Embassy in Khartoum joined the efforts to release the hostages very vigorously. The U.S. Federal Government made a decision on the matter. The American action and Vonau's efforts prevailed. Presenting Lech Walesa's statement calling for the possibly quickest release of the Poles, the Polish negotiator tried to convince the Eritreans that Polish newsmen were on board a special plane in Cairo ready to report on their intentions to the global community if the sailors were not released immediately.

Arms Trade With Ethiopia Reported

AU3001085890 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 23 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Stanislaw Turnau: "The Seamen, Eritrea, and the Kalashnikovs"]

[Text] GAZETA WYBORCZA has waited until the crew of the cargo ship Krzywousty—held prisoner from 3 January by the Eritrean partisans, who are at war with the Ethiopian Army—were safely released before publishing the following information.

On 12 January, a plane full of arms and munitions took off from Warsaw Airport bound for Ethiopia. At precisely that time, representatives of Polish Ocean Lines and the Foreign Affairs Ministry were meeting with the families of the Krzywousty seamen and giving assurances that they were doing everything possible to ensure a safe and speedy return of the captured crew. The loading of the wide-bodied jet with the name "Ethiopian" clearly marked on its fuselage had been observed by many Polish Airlines personnel based at Warsaw Airport.

"Friday's consignment was one of three contracted shipments due for delivery during this period, and it is regrettable that the loading was not done at night. The next two consignments have been halted," explained Krzysztof Plominski, a director in the Consular Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A similar consignment was loaded at Warsaw Airport a week earlier, and the whole operation was clearly visible from the public viewing gallery. At that time, the Polish seamen had already been in the hands of the Eritreans for over 24 hours.

"The Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation has responsibility for our arms trade," stated Plominski. A Foreign Ministry spokesman elaborated: "We regret the incident, but the minister's license permitting trade in arms is held by the Central Engineering Board." Director Pawluczuk of the Central Engineering Board explained: "In fact, we should have called the plane back, but this is a highly profitable business, and we should not put a stop to it. If you publish details of our arms trade with Ethiopia, it might cause an upheaval. It now seems very likely that licenses will be granted directly to various enterprises. These firms, contrary to the trading practice of my enterprise, might act against the interests of the Polish state. Trading in arms is an organizational and not a moral problem, although, as a human being, I do sometimes have my reservations."

During the past two years, the value of our arms sales to Ethiopia has amounted to \$8.3 million. We expect to receive \$2.5 million for the last few shipments, including those lately observed at Warsaw Airport. These figures were confirmed by the Central Engineering Board.

Polish merchant ships transport arms throughout the world's oceans. These arms are not exclusively manufactured in Poland. Many sealed containers with "undeclared contents" are picked up by our ships at West European ports.

One of the directors at the Foreign Ministry explained to me that the arms trade is highly profitable for Poland: Poland is in the process of reducing its military strength, and the armaments sold abroad would be unsuitable for use in our civilian sector; therefore, in this way we are helping to get rid of the problem and are being well paid for it.

Polish Military Doctrine Described as 'Defensive'

General Jerzy Szumski on Doctrine

*LD2501022790 Warsaw PAP in English
0002 GMT 25 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 24—Polish military doctrine "unequivocally obliges Polish Armed Forces to pursue tasks of defending the state exclusively as defensive operations. First Deputy of the Polish Army's military

doctrines and concepts Gen Jerzy Szumski said at a seminar of representatives of 35 CSCE states here.

He recalled that until the start of the 1980s it was envisaged in the Polish military doctrine that in case of an aggression the Armed Forces, after repelling it and inflicting losses on the enemy, "would swiftly shift the hostilities to its territory." Now, the Polish military doctrine envisages the conducting of defensive operations exclusively "within the borders of Poland and the alliance."

Deputy Minister of Defense Speaks

*LD1701223990 Warsaw PAP in English
2126 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 17—Chief of the General Staff, Polish deputy minister of defence, General Jozef Uzycki presented the basic assumptions of Poland's defensive doctrine during the CSCE seminar on military doctrines here today.

General Uzycki said that Poland's defensive doctrine ensues from the reason of state of the Polish republic. Its security, right to life in peace, independence and sovereignty, the integrality and inviolability of the country's territory.

Polish Armed Forces are organized in tune with the principle of defensive sufficiency. Their structures and the size of manpower are shaped in such a way so they could withstand an aggression alone or in the frame lines of the coalition defensive system, stressed General Uzycki.

ROMANIA

Official Says Romanian Army Training 'Defensive'

*AU3101110690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0949 GMT 31 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, 31 January (ROMPRES)—Speaking at the Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrines of the states participating in the CSCE process, Colonel General Nicolae Eftimescu, first deputy chief of the General Staff, referred to a number of important aspects of the Romanian Army's operational and battle training, with special reference to its defensive character. The Romanian Army training, the speaker said, is essentially founded on the idea of repelling any act of aggression launched by a better equipped and numerically superior enemy. It cooperates closely with the local forces, with the people.

By its entire activity, the Romanian Army shows to have no other aim than to defend national sovereignty and independence, and the territorial integrity of the country.

BRAZIL

Chemical Weapons Detector Purchased from UK

90WC0030A Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 5 Jan 90 p A8

[Untitled article by Roberto Lopes]

[Text] Brazil has received permission from Great Britain to import small quantities of the CAM (Chemical Agent Monitor), a portable monitor used to identify the type of toxic gas being used by the enemy. It is considered the most sophisticated survival equipment in chemical warfare today.

The CAM was ordered by the Navy for use by crews on its new Inhauma-class corvettes (built in Brazil), but the Marine Corps is also interested. As far as the big powers are concerned, chemical warfare is as sensitive a subject as nuclear war—hence the need for Third World countries such as Brazil to obtain special authorization to import the related equipment. Brazil does not maintain stocks of toxic gas.

Representatives of Great Britain's Graseby Ionics firm, which manufactures the equipment, and of the British Ministry of Defense will be in Rio de Janeiro in February to demonstrate the equipment. The unit price of the CAM comes to approximately 4,000 pounds (about 77,500 new cruzados). The contract is being negotiated by a Rio de Janeiro businessman who recently succeeded in obtaining an Italian antinuclear weapons system known as "full-day citadel" for the Brazilian corvettes.

The CAM's are being imported at a time when the Navy is deciding whether to buy a batch of reconnaissance and attack helicopters from Great Britain's Westland firm. Also competing for this contract are Kamman of the United States, Aerospatiale [National Industrial Aerospace Company] of France, and Agusta of Italy. This is also a period of especially good political relations between the two countries. During the second half of 1989, Brazilian diplomats were very helpful in bringing about the resumption of high-level talks between the British and Argentine Governments (which had broken off diplomatic relations in 1982).

In Great Britain, the matter is being monitored by International Military Services, Ltd. (IMS), a firm that has a hand in all exports of military equipment by that country. IMS negotiates release certificates, examines the quality of the product to be sold, and oversees the setting up of financing plans and compliance with the financing requirements. It was IMS which informed the Brazilian Navy a little over a month ago that the British Ministry of Defense had approved exportation of the CAM.

The CAM was designed to identify and measure the degree of contamination by the two toxic gases most frequently found in the chemical warfare arsenals of the big powers: the one that attacks the nerves (nerve agent

vapor) and the one that produces skin infections (blister agent vapor). In 1988, UN teams used the CAM to verify whether Iraqi troops had used toxic gas in the war against Iran (the answer was yes). The Brazilian Navy will also buy special suits for the crews that will have to move about in areas exposed to the action of chemical agents, bags for transporting the bodies of toxic gas victims, and other equipment.

Equipment Modernization Difficult

Procurement of the CAM is the most important step taken by Brazil to prepare itself for possible chemical warfare. Last year, the Army called for foreign bids for the supplying of gas masks (by yearend, the West German bid appeared to have the best chance of success). The Army's courses in chemical warfare are theoretical and deficient.

In the Navy's case, procurement of the CAM will be an important step toward modernization. The Brazilian Navy operates few systems of the latest generation. In 1989, foreign firms were invited to submit proposals for the modernization of electronic equipment, but there is not enough money to close the deals. In some cases, an example being the replacement of radars on the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, the only reason new models were purchased was that spare parts for the old systems were no longer available.

Under the next administration, the Navy will receive three corvettes and one submarine built in Brazil with West German assistance. At the end of last year, it received four secondhand U.S. frigates. Their boiler systems are no longer used in the United States. The Navy commander in chief, Admiral Ivan da Silveira Serpa, has told FOLHA DE SAO PAULO that the boilers on those ships "are more sensitive" but that their operation is controlled automatically and is considered reliable.

For economic reasons, the crews of those frigates (which are called destroyers in Brazil) could not be trained in the United States. Training will begin immediately so that the first frigate can be operational by the end of March.

HONDURAS

Armed Forces Commander on Reorganization, Other Issues

PA2601181790 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1145 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Statements by General Arnulfo Cantarero Lopez, Honduran Armed Forces commander, to the local press at the National Congress on 25 January—recorded]

[Text] [Cantarero] President-elect Callejas is a very intelligent man. He has an open mind and he has chosen his best men as members of his government team. We will closely follow the work they carry out and then judge whether it is good or bad.

[Reporter] What role will the Armed Forces play in the new government's development program?

[Cantarero] [Word indistinct] heading toward the development program you mentioned, and it is basically oriented toward the production of basic grains and a few other areas for which we already have some experts.

[Reporter] Do you think the Armed Forces will be strengthened for the benefit of our nation?

[Cantarero] Yes, but we must state that, depending on the geopolitical situation in the area, the president and the National Congress will decide whether the Armed Forces will have to be sacrificed.

[Reporter] To what extent could the government reduce the Armed Forces' budget?

[Cantarero] That will be decided by the president and the National Congress.

[Reporter] Will you maintain the current Armed Forces hierarchy or will you make some changes to improve the organization?

[Cantarero] On Tuesday, 30 January, we will announce the new organization of the Armed Forces.

[Reporter] Are you talking about an in-depth reorganization?

[Cantarero] Yes, there will be significant changes.

[Reporter] Such as?

[Cantarero] We will change battalion and force commanders. We will change most positions. It will be a completely new organization.

[Reporter] Will the Armed Forces hierarchy be maintained?

[Cantarero] Of course. We are a permanent institution and the hierarchy of the Armed Forces will remain unchanged.

[Reporter] Will the contras leave Honduras?

[Cantarero] The contras will leave if the Central American presidents decide so and, of course, if our president decides so, because he is the one most closely involved in this matter.

[Reporter] In his message, the current Honduran President said that Honduras has always supported the contras' departure from our country?

[Cantarero] That is what the Central American agreements establish. The only problem is that they are being fulfilled at intervals. I believe the contras should be either in Nicaragua or in some other country, because we have given them shelter—or whatever you want to call it—for a long enough time. Thus, I believe the contras should leave Honduras.

[Reporter] Would Honduras' image be enhanced by providing an honorable solution to the problems our country is facing, especially the contra issue and the quarrels currently being dealt with by international organizations?

[Cantarero] Those decisions have to be made by the executive branch. We, as the Armed Forces, are involved with matters regarding security.

[Reporter] What do you think about Panama not wanting to have a permanent Army?

[Cantarero] That is a different country. Honduras has an Armed Forces, and I believe they fulfill their obligations. That [not further specified] will also depend on future negotiations.

[Reporter] Will the existence of area countries without an Army benefit Central America?

[Cantarero] Costa Rica does not have an Army, but it has a Civil Guard larger than the Honduran Army.

Interview With New Armed Forces Commander

PA2601200190 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras
in Spanish 1145 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Interview with General Arnulfo Cantarero Lopez, who is to become new commander in chief of the Armed Forces on 29 January, by Juan Bautista Vasquez and Jorge Montenegro in Tegucigalpa; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] What will be your initial policy to achieve internal unity within the country's Armed Forces?

[Cantarero] Good morning, reporter Juan Bautista Vasquez. Let me tell you that I believe that the Armed Forces are solidly united and my job, of course, will be to keep them that way. To this end, we have to make well-thought-out decisions while always pursuing the objectives of the institution, the proper completion of work programs, and an understanding of the concerns and problems of the man in uniform.

[Reporter] General, we would like to carry out this interview in the form of a kind of dialogue so that the Honduran people can be informed of the functions that you will assume at the helm of our country's armed institution. We have here our comrade Jorge Montenegro, who will ask questions along with me.

[Reporter] Good morning, General. I have a question. Under your command, will the Armed Forces observe the constitutional mandate to be an apolitical institution that is obedient rather than deliberative?

[Cantarero] Good morning, Mr Jorge Montenegro. Yes, the development of the institution is based on respect for the law, and one of our main goals will be to keep it within the legal precepts that govern the Armed Forces.

[Reporter] But the present head of the Armed Forces, General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, has said that the military has been kept apart from the tasks inherent in the country's development process. Do you share this feeling, and if so, what will you do to remedy this?

[Cantarero] One of my policies will be to continue some of Division General Regalado's criteria. To this end, we will try to become more deeply involved in the process of developing the country and its human and material resources, since we have some of those resources. We will also try to employ them more effectively within this development process.

[Reporter] Gen Cantarero, what will your conduct be in the new scheme of things, with respect to the government that will be headed by Rafael Leonardo Callejas?

[Cantarero] In this regard, we are governed by objective internal laws and in our desire to serve. We are at the disposal of the president to cooperate in all activities that he orders within the process, as required by the Honduran people.

[Reporter] Gen Cantarero, how would you describe the performance of your predecessor, General Regalado Hernandez, at the head of the Armed Forces?

[Cantarero] I have said publicly on other occasions that I believe that it has been very positive, and the progress made by the institution in the past few years has been clear. A number of goals have been met, to the credit of Gen Regalado as head of the institution. I publicly congratulate him.

[Reporter] how will you manage relations with the United States, General? Do you believe that the United States is a trustworthy partner?

[Cantarero] I believe that our relations with the United States are limited to the area of military cooperation, and we can consider those relations to be normal. In this area, our task will be to keep them normal, and, of course, to improve them if possible.

[Reporter] Speaking of the situation with the United States, General, will you ask that country to continue providing military and strategic assistance to Honduras?

[Cantarero] In this respect, we will make a revision and assessment to keep the aid they offer us and have offered before at acceptable levels.

[Reporter] Will you help fight drug trafficking and allow the arrest of drug traffickers?

[Cantarero] The war on drugs is one of our very important objectives, and we will continue doing our best to combat this criminal scourge afflicting mankind.

[Reporter] We would like to ask the following question: What would you do if it was proven that top-ranking Honduran officers are involved in drug trafficking? Would you let them be brought to trial?

[Cantarero] Yes. The law makes no distinctions. Any military man whose involvement in drug trafficking is proven will be punished in accordance with the law.

[Reporter] There is a very important topic that is the subject of rumors. Do you think there is unity in the Armed Forces? How will you ensure there will be no internal conflicts among the different generations as a result of a struggle for promotions?

[Cantarero] I think there is unity within the military institution. It is guaranteed by the professional training of each officer, as each one solidly believes in the concept of loyalty to his institution, and that draws him away from personal or group interests to solely serve the interests of the institution. There cannot be a generational struggle, because, if the law is adhered to, each generation advances periodically to higher command posts. That is a natural law we follow every 3 or 4 years.

[Reporter] There are many vital topics on which it is important that we know your views. Let us talk of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution. Must the adversaries of the Sandinist regime leave or remain in Honduras?

[Cantarero] I feel, and I think most will agree with me, that the contras must not remain indefinitely in our country. They must return to their country or be moved to a third country. The president or the Foreign Ministry must answer this question.

[Reporter] What if the United States insists on turning Honduras into a platform from which to invade Nicaragua? Would you allow it?

[Cantarero] I think this is a foreign policy issue, and I would rather not comment on it since it is not within my purview.

[Reporter] Would you be ready to hold talks with the top Sandinist leaders, such as Daniel Ortega, to achieve peaceful coexistence between Honduras and Nicaragua?

[Cantarero] Again, I feel that the decision is up to the president, so I would rather not comment.

[Reporter] Tell us about your personality. How do you define yourself in ideological terms? Are you a conservative or a progressive?

[Cantarero] I maintain the position of a professional. I have dedicated my life and all my actions to the service of the Armed Forces. I will struggle to strengthen the Armed Forces and will make by best effort to help improve the Armed Forces so it always continues operating according to the interests of the Honduran people. Based on this, I would like to ask you: Do you think I am a conservative or a progressive?

[Reporter] General, what role do you think the Armed Forces should play? For instance, should the Army join the development process and assist in the agrarian reform process?

[Cantarero] The Armed Forces—as established by the law and because of its own essence—has an important role to play in the development process. Therefore, we are willing to increase our participation in all sectors in which our activities can help to improve the living conditions of our people, because we are part of the people, and must serve the people. I have already drafted some plans and intend to hold talks with international organizations to find ways to assist in the efforts to attain the level of development we all want for Honduras.

[Reporter] There is an issue that has been discussed over the past few days. I would like to know what you think of the argument that some Hondurans are making that the Armed Forces' budget should be cut.

[Cantarero] Let me tell you that the Armed Forces is one of the components, among the various institutions, on which the Honduran state is based. As such, the Armed Forces has duties that are set forth in the Constitution, so the Armed Forces fulfills its responsibilities. Therefore, I believe that, just as other institutions, it needs suitable financial support. If the financial support is unsuitable and is assigned illogically, the responsibilities will not be fulfilled, and there will be failures in the overall state system. We know the Honduran people do not want that.

[Reporter] General, what is your reaction to the attitude of some civilians who maintain the military are parasites of the state?

[Cantarero] My reaction is one of understanding and of alert because those statements are made by people who

refuse to recognize the reality, efforts, and the work we perform for the benefit of the Honduran people. Those statements are also made by citizens who serve interests that run counter to the democratic system of progress and liberty that has developed in our nation.

[Reporter] General, thank you very much for responding to questions from the HRN [Voz de Honduras Network] Press Department. As commander in chief of the Honduran Armed Force, do you have a message for the Honduran people?

[Cantarero] I want to advise you that since the 27 January ceremony is simply the ceremony at which the sovereign National Congress will swear me in, the military ceremony will be held on 29 January, which will be the transfer-of-command ceremony. That will be a purely military ceremony to which you are invited. I also want to tell the Honduran people that we will make our utmost effort to help this government, which is a government from which the people expect so much. We recognize that the current situation, and the crises in Central America are difficult. However, based on all our resources—and as I said before—we want to make a contribution. We want to give the Honduran people peace of mind. I also want to tell Hondurans that we should defend the democratic system that has cost us so much, and that they should believe in the Armed Forces because we are their brothers and their armed wing. Thank you very much.

[Reporter] Thank you, Gen Arnulfo Cantarero Lopez, commander in chief of the Honduran Armed Forces.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Iraq, Jordan Agree on Joint Military Units

*JN2801145290 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic
26 Jan 90 p 1*

[Text] In a new move to bolster military cooperation and coordination, Jordan and Iraq have decided to form "joint military battalions" drawn from the various ground, air, and naval military units, AL-ITTIHAD has learned. These battalions will serve as emergency forces to confront any foreign challenge or threat to either of the two countries. AL-ITTIHAD also learned that the new military organization is based on the formation of selected and special combat units from both the Jordanian and Iraqi Armies. The commanders, assistant commanders, and chiefs of staff of each of these units have already been nominated and appointed, according to the information given. This new formula of military cooperation between the two countries was discussed during Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's visit to Jordan and his bilateral talks with King Husayn.

AFGHANISTAN

Politburo Member on Cuts in U.S., Soviet Arms

*BK2901004490 Hong Kong AFP in English
1811 GMT 28 Jan 90*

[Untitled article by Kate Webb]

[Text] Kabul, January 28 (AFP)—A senior member of Afghan President Najibullah's Politburo said Sunday [28 January] he had the impression that Moscow and Washington might be close to agreement on a mutual arms reduction to the warring Afghan sides.

"Yes, we have the same impression," said Najmuddin Kawiani, when asked if he thought the superpowers were likely to agree on a weapons-supply cutback at a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow February 6-7. (Mr Shevardnadze said in an interview with an international news agency in Moscow, published Sunday, that a political settlement to the Afghan war was "literally knocking on the door.")

Mr Kawiani, generally considered the third most-powerful member of President Najibullah's People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), also said he thought it was possible that an agreement on arms reductions could come into force ahead of peace talks. "That, on its own, can be a beginning (in the search for peace)," Mr Kawiani said in an interview here.

A cut in weapons supplied by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to the mujahidin resistance, and a simultaneous cutback by Moscow to the Najibullah regime was thought to be essential for a ceasefire and the beginning of peace talks, observers here said.

"We are mentally prepared (for a mutual reduction)," Mr Kawiani said. The Soviet-backed Afghan regime receives aid worth an estimated 200 million-300 million U.S. dollars from Moscow every month.

Mr Kawiani made his comments after members of a high-ranking Soviet parliamentary delegation had told reporters here Saturday that continued Soviet aid to Afghanistan was in the context of a search for a political solution.

A leading member of the 10-man delegation, Valeriy Nikolayevich Ochirov, told U.S. journalists after the press conference that he believed a breakthrough on negative symmetry (mutual reduction) was near. He also said it was one of the topics the Soviet delegates had discussed with Afghan leaders, both military and civilian, during their week-long visit here scheduled to end Monday.

Mr Ochirov, deputy chief of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Defence and Security, as well as an Afghan war veteran, said that Moscow's position was "not one of supporting a particular regime," but of supporting a state.

The main stumbling block to Washington's agreeing to urge the mujahidin towards talks has been the the mujahidin's insistence that Mr Najibullah was a "Soviet-installed puppet" and must be removed before peace talks can begin.

"We have not been told or informed (of imminent joint reductions), but we are optimistic," Mr Kawiani said in the interview Sunday.

He said that both the Soviet Union and President Najibullah had long espoused the negative-symmetry formula, which was first proposed and then dropped by Washington at the time of signing the 1988 Geneva accords.

Mr Kawiani said he felt that Washington had erred in failing to persuade the seven-party resistance alliance, based in Pakistan, to negotiate immediately after the Soviet troop pullout a year ago. "They had a great chance of winning then," he said in a rare admission of government qualms at the time of the February 15, 1989 troop withdrawal. "Things would have changed in their favour. Then the mujahidin had a patriotic image (of fighting against a foreign invader)," he said.

He said he felt the mujahidin had now lost their lustre and were seen as fighters without a cause or a political leadership, but hastened to add that his own party had become isolated from the people.

Mr Kawiani, who is on the PDPA Secretariat and is in charge of the party's (as opposed to the government's) foreign relations, also said he had seen indications of a change in the U.S. negotiating position.

He said U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt, during his visits to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia this

month, had not emphasised a military solution, and he described Mr Kimmitt's statements of support for the mujahidin as delivered with a kind of "hopelessness." "There is still an amount of military pressure. But they (Washington) are trying to find a political solution," he said. But he warned that if a mutual arms reduction were to occur, it must apply to all parties involved, including Saudi Arabia, which reportedly matches Washington dollar-for-dollar on aid to the mujahidin.

China and Iran, which formerly supplied weapons to the mujahidin, have distanced themselves since the Soviet troop withdrawal.

Diplomats and other foreign observers here, as well as the few remaining Afghan intellectuals who did not flee to the West during the Soviet occupation, have said they felt that a weapons cutback would reduce the scale of agony in the Afghan war, even without a peace agreement or talks.

They referred to the use by government troops of devastating Soviet-supplied Scud and Frog missiles, as well as aerial bombing and artillery. On the mujahidin side, they pointed to the use of Stinger missiles, lethal anti-personnel rockets and mortars, which have caused more casualties in Afghanistan than ever before.

Mr Kawiani stressed that the Najibullah government had always related an arms reduction to a simultaneous ceasefire, an apparent reference to the fact that most of the active fighting was currently concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan, where the mujahidin's bases are.

It is in those areas that Kabul's air supremacy has given it a decisive edge on the eastern battlefields and cities, which the mujahidin tried to take after the Soviet pullout.

Former Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, Yuliy Vorontsov, said last July that bombs would be included in any arms-reduction agreement.

Mr Kawiani repeated Mr Najibullah's assurance, given at a press conference last week, that the mujahidin would be left in charge of areas they currently control. Mr Najibullah also said at the same news conference that—in the event of peace talks and eventual elections, supervised by the United Nations and conducted by an interim government—a national army composed of mujahidin and government troops could be formed, "but only as a last resort."

EGYPT

Plant's Production To Replace U.S.-Built Tanks

JN2501170590 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic
23 Jan 90 p 1

[Untitled article by Husayn Fathallah]

[Text] Abu-Za'bal—Dr Jamal al-Din al-Sayyid, state minister for military production, has announced that the first M1A1 tank will be produced by Military Plant 200

in July 1992. Al-Sayyid emphasized that so far 85 percent of the construction and technical work at the plant has been completed and that the plant will become operational for producing and repairing tanks in September 1991. He indicated that tanks will be produced to replace their U.S.-produced counterparts together with spare parts.

This came in a statement al-Sayyid made yesterday while accompanying General Carl E. Vuono, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, during his visit to Military Plant 200 in Abu-Za'bal. Dr Jamal al-Din al-Sayyid said the plant, in cooperation with the Armed Forces, is now considering several international offers to produce multipurpose armored personnel carriers.

Al-Sayyid said: The plant is currently repairing U.S. tanks of the M60A3 type in accordance with the plans and requirements of the Armed Forces. It participates alongside Military Plant 100 in producing the required spare parts for heavy tanks.

Al-Sayyid added that the plant supports industries related to military production, opens markets for repairing and producing tracked vehicles for friendly states, and enhances Egypt's defense capability, combat readiness, and pan-Arab security.

INDIA

PATRIOT Calls For Development of Domestic ICBM

BK2201142490 Delhi PATRIOT in English
12 Jan 90 p 4

[Editorial: "India's ICBM"]

[Text] In the past two years, the Defence R&D [Research and Development] Organisation has developed a range of missiles for the armed forces—from "Nag", the anti-tank missile, "Prithvi", the surface to surface missile, to "Trishul" surface to air, and, finally, "Agni", the intermediate range ballistic missile [IRBM]. These developments are the results of the decision taken around 1981 that India will remain vulnerable without missile capability in the armed forces. The decision was hastened after China acquired missiles in the late 1970s. In retrospect, it turns out to be a judicious decision. In India's neighbourhood the Saudis have the IRBM, thanks to China. Pakistan has some missiles and is developing others (and failing which, it can get this from China). Iraq has a range of missiles and it has tested a rocket with the capability of an IRBM. Israel is also reported to possess a variety of missiles, including the IRBM. However the case of the intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM, with a range of 5000 km, is different. The two super-powers and China have deployed them in their defence system while France and Britain have built

them for their submarines and Japan has the capability. Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, director of the Defence Research and Development Laboratory, has said that, if given the go-ahead, and provided the resources, India can build the ICBM. But the issue here is mainly political. Does the security environment of 1997 warrant our possession of the ICBM? In terms of relative priorities, with our per capita income being below 300 U.S. dollars, should we go for the ICBM which we can make nuclear if the contingency arises? The objection on the ground of proliferation is largely irrelevant because proliferation has already taken place. If the ICBM is going to be as common in 2001 as the IRBM will be in 1993, why wait for that day, at least in capability building? After achieving competence, one can pause. The Government must not take a strong ideological stand against this.

IRAQ

French Defense Minister Arrives on Visit 27 Jan

JN2801120690 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic
1700 GMT 27 Jan 90

[Text] French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement arrived in Baghdad today heading a delegation on a several-day, official visit to Iraq.

In a statement to INA, the French minister paid tribute to the ties of cooperation between Iraq and France and described them as strong and old. He highly valued the Iraqi peace initiative announced by his excellency the president on the 69th anniversary of the establishment of the Iraqi Army. He added Iraq's peace initiative is viewed as positive, serving the cause of peace and stability in the region.

Defense Minister General 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal and the French ambassador in Baghdad welcomed Chevenement at the airport.

French Defense Minister Discusses Iraqi-French Relations

Received by Ramadan

JN2901151690 Baghdad Voice of the Masses
in Arabic 1300 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and first deputy prime minister, has received French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement and his delegation.

The RCC member emphasized the strong and distinguished nature of Iraqi-French ties. He said that these ties will be broader and more developed in the future.

The French defense minister praised the advanced French relations with Iraq, and expressed his country's interest in strengthening and broadening them. He also praised the process of building and progress in Iraq.

During the meeting, which was attended by the Iraqi ambassador to France and the French ambassador to Iraq, the future of Iraqi-French relations and means to develop them were discussed.

Departs 29 Jan

JN2901191290 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1730 GMT
29 Jan 90

[Text] Baghdad, 29 January (INA)—French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement and his delegation left Baghdad today after a 3-day official visit to Iraq.

In a statement to INA, the French minister expressed his happiness in visiting Iraq and meeting with President Saddam Husayn. He praised Iraq's efforts to speed up the improvement of its military and economic strength, particularly in the post-war era. He said these efforts are the result of the Iraqi leadership's strong will.

The French minister also said that Iraq is a strong and earnest country that is seeking sincerely to achieve security, stability, and a comprehensive and permanent peace in the region.

ISRAEL

First Syrian MiG-23 Test Run 'Successful'

TA2901152390 Jerusalem Domestic Service
in Hebrew 1500 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] The first test flight of the Syrian MiG-23, whose pilot landed in Israel 4 months ago, was completed successfully this afternoon. Our military affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe reports the plane was flown for more than 1 hour by an Air Force test pilot. The Air Force has been studying its systems with the help of Syrian pilot 'Adil Basim.

A senior Air Force officer said after the test flight the MiG-23 still is considered the backbone of the Syrian Air Force, and that presence in Israel will reduce the element of surprise.

PAKISTAN

Envoy Tells UN of Kabul's Scud Missile Firing

BK1701153590 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
1500 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Text] Pakistan has invited the attention of the United Nations to the Scud missile attack [as heard], which was recently fired by the Kabul regime into Pakistani territory. In a letter to the UN secretary general, Pakistani Ambassador Nasim Ahmad warned the Kabul regime to desist from such steps.

This letter was issued today as a document of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.

Minister Inaugurates F-16 Engine Overhaul Project

*BK2401160090 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
1500 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] An F-100 engine overhaul project was inaugurated in Kamra today. Under this program, the life of F-16 aircraft engines will be doubled.

The minister of state for defense, Colonel Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, retired, inaugurated the project. He said that by acquiring the capability of rebuilding and improving F-16 aircraft engines locally at the aeronautical complex, Pakistan has achieved another significant success in defense production. He added that the government will provide all possible assistance to continue the project despite financial constraints.

Ongoing SDI Research Noted

90UM0110A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Nov 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Maj Gen B. Yegorov, doctor of technical sciences, and Lt Col B. Petrovich, candidate of technical sciences, in the column: "Military-Technical Review": "SDI Without Sensation"]

[Text] More than 6 years have passed since that March day in 1983 when R. Reagan, the former President of the U.S., announced the establishment of the SDI program—the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Billions in appropriations; unprecedented military tasks; the wide scope of associated research and development; all this generated far-reaching discussions. Today, the consensus among most foreign experts is that Reagan's statement of the time—"to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete"—amounted to a slogan, not the purpose of the program.

The purpose of the program is more realistic: with large-scale research as a basis, to create a large fund of scientific and technical knowledge to make an informed decision relative to the feasibility of establishing an ABM defense system; and to devise alternate defense structures and determine the kinds of components that will make up the system.

The American military and political leadership charged at the same time that the first phase of the program was completed. That was the reason for the intensification of congressional discussions: It was necessary to choose a strategy to provide additional financing for the program. The opinions held by the president and the Congress differed to such an extent that a final decision was not made by 1 October - the official day marking the beginning of the new fiscal year. This fact is referred to in many publications as the "crash of SDI." Readers are led to believe that there are no problems with the SDI; and that, since the activity continues to be pure "research," the program is safe. Is that really the case?

We probably run the risk of appearing banal, but we remind the reader that in all countries of the world today (the same as yesterday, incidentally), military technology reaps the primary benefit of the most important attainments made in basic research, and of "supermodern technologies."

Western experts are already maintaining that the SDI program has so far produced definite results that can and will be applied to the improvement of military technology. In addition, the press points out that the scientific and technical base that is being formed will endow future developments with flexibility, thus making it possible to modernize concepts of definite systems and weapons in an ongoing manner.

Structurally speaking, the program consists of five subprograms, each of which includes a considerable number of projects: means for detecting, lock-on,

tracking, and kill evaluation of targets; directed-energy and kinetic-kill weapons; systems for performing analysis, communications, and control. The foreign press reports that the SDI has so far cost more than 14 billion dollars. Presently at the "demonstration testing and evaluation" level are: projects for ground and orbiting missile systems; and systems for observing ballistic targets in space in the boost phase and in the atmosphere during the terminal phase. However, observers maintain that the question of their fate remains open. The new BSTS satellite is the only project that has garnered general support in Congress, since it presently affords a significant advantage outside the context of the large-scale ABM defense system: modernization of the existing early warning system, by virtue of enhancing the features of response time and accuracy of determining the coordinates of a launch location.

Of the pure research programs, the creation of directed energy weapons is deemed to be of paramount importance. These include space-based chemical lasers; free-electron lasers; ground-based excimer lasers; and orbiting X-ray lasers and accelerators.

Chemical lasers have undergone the most development to date. The most powerful is the MIRACL (2.2 MW). The press has reported that this laser was used in testing carried out in 1986 to destroy a stage of the Titan missile; and in February of 1989, it was successfully employed in an experimental intercept of an air-to-air missile. Nevertheless, military experts are of the opinion that chemical laser technology is not sufficiently advanced for incorporation into ABM complexes at the present time.

Work is continuing, however. A search is on for new active media for lasers. Feasibility studies are in progress to employ nonlinear optical processes to solve the problem of propagation of powerful optical beams and of converging several beams into a single beam. This is still in the research stage. But it should lead to something. It would be unwise to ignore this development.

Incidentally, it follows from statements made in the press that the serious difficulties encountered in developing directed energy weapons have given rise to the increasing importance attached to the development of layered ABM defense systems that could be built on the basis of existing technologies. One of the proposed versions is a two-layer ABM system.

The authorities in charge of the SDI program have until quite recently attempted to refrain from giving preference to any one version of ABM defense, instead opting for maximum progress in all areas of attendant technologies. The Office of Technology Assessment, which was formed as early as the time the SDI program was initiated, is destined to keep its finger on the pulse of all these matters. It is no accident that its sphere of interests encompasses more than 40 different aspects of research (based on program requirements).

James Johnson, former head of the department, formulated its tasks as follows: "Our mission is not confined to basic research; it does not consist merely of incorporating completed research elements. We must endeavour to fill the needs of definite developments with the results of basic research."

The above describes the situation as it exists. For example, the requirement for increasing the operating speed of computers, which is dictated by special needs of the tactical control system, has given rise to heightened interest in optical computers (both analog and digital), prospective architectures offering parallel data processing, and mathematical algorithms written for these computers.

Relative to target detection and recognition, the office's interests are focused on aspects which at another level can solve the unique problems of early detection of missiles (at distances of several thousand kilometers), precise indication to active interception in the space phase, and target tracking.

The list could be continued. The area of interest of the office also includes nontraditional concepts of power sources, both nuclear and non-nuclear: promising materials and designs for space; high-temperature superconductors; materials offering metastable properties; new semiconductor-based structures; new types of rocket fuels; fundamentally new concepts of engines...

Now for the financial side of the matter. The Office of Technology Assessment receives an annual appropriation of up to 100 million dollars, which amounts to approximately 3 percent of the entire program budget. Is that much or little? It is entirely sufficient, considering that the office is limited to performing an exploratory and intermediary function, with the costs of the projects proper paid by the Pentagon out of a special programs budget.

Clearly, successes attained in the creation of fundamentally new technologies are conducive to the appearance of new projects within the framework of the SDI program. It is sufficient to recall the work related to the creation of space-based interceptors, which in 1987 evolved to the "demonstration testing" phase. Plans of that time called for conducting two cycles of flight testing by 1992. A group of independent experts has estimated the cost of the ABM defense system component projects that are in the "demonstration testing" phase.

It has been determined that development of the necessary 300 space vehicles with their 3,000 interceptors will incur a cost of about 45 percent of 115.4 billion dollars (the total outlay for the system). Such impressive figures gave rise to a review of the concept. This resulted in a proposal to dispense with the complex system of target tracking fitted directly to the interceptor in favor of large-diameter optical devices that would permit extending the homing system's lock-on range. Estimates indicate that this would reduce expenditures for developing and purchasing materiel from 52 to 18 billion

dollars, with about another 11 billion dollars saved by diminishing the number of satellites employed in the data-gathering system.

The above describes how the highly-touted "Brilliant Pebbles" concept was born. Its core consists of such components as a wide-angle telescope that is collocated with a multispectrum high-resolution sensor developed by the Livermore National Laboratory; a multiunit antenna designed for communicating with ground control stations; special missile nozzle units; etc. These represent attainments made in supermodern technologies which at first glance seem to be products of basic research.

Also in existence are plans to channel, for a two-year period, some of the funds previously earmarked for "demonstration and testing" of space interceptors to reworking the "Brilliant Pebbles" concept, temporarily halting the other efforts. This will make it possible, when the time comes to make the subsequent decision, to shift to full-scale work on all space interceptor versions, which should all be at the same level of development. There is no need to comment here.

Two Views on Nuclear Deterrence Debated

Defense Domination Proposed

18120037A Moscow *SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW*
in English No 12, Dec 89 pp 50-51

[Article by Mikhail Aleksandrov, senior expert, Assessment and Planning Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Defence Domination Versus Nuclear Containment"]

[Text] Speaking at a congress of the American Legion held in Louisville, Kentucky, in September 1988, George Bush declared that SDI was neither a naive nor an unfeasible programme and the US was on the verge of being in a position to contain war by defending itself. After becoming President, Bush repeated that his attitude to SDI had not changed, nor was it subject to change.

To my mind, it is time we became realistic and gave up the hope that SDI-related work will be discontinued. It appears that if the trend towards the development of defence technologies is correctly oriented, it may, far from leading to destabilisation, result in a better model of strategic stability than the one we have. Everything will depend on future defence developments in the Soviet Union in the eventuality of the United States implementing the SDI programme.

The first alternative is an asymmetric response. According to this scenario, to counter the deployment of the American ABM system, the Soviet Union would take steps aimed at enhancing the penetration capability of its strategic offensive weapons on the one hand, and at

neutralising the US ABM system on the other. This type of military rivalry would be the most dangerous and destabilising.

It appears, therefore, that our military-strategic, economic and political interests would be best suited by a model of military structuring symmetric to the American. This must in no way be taken literally: tank for tank, plane for plane etc. What is implied is the development of technologies similar to those in the United States. This variant would envisage that, with stringent limitations imposed on strategic offensive arms, the ABM systems would be given plenty of scope for perfection. Given a number of conditions, this option would bolster the crisis stability, rather than shatter it. The introduction by both sides of restrictions on the numbers of strategic offensive weapons and their qualitative parameters might be the first condition. The qualitative limitations could involve the prohibition of additional capabilities for strategic offensive armaments to enable them to overcome ABM systems, including the prohibition of relevant tests.

Another integral element of this model of strategic stability is complete repudiation by both sides of anti-satellite weapons, which is essential for survivability of space-based ABM components.

It is evidently expedient that outer space should be open to only those ABM elements which effect observation, detection and tracking of a target, and also control, command and supervision. As to interceptor missiles, laser and particle beam weapons, they must be exclusively ground-based. Moreover, they should be prevented from being able to discharge the anti-satellite function.

The given model will ensure a sufficiently high crisis stability, as domination of defence over the offensive in a crisis situation will not stimulate a first strike. Furthermore, unlike the offensive armaments race, a race of defensive systems is not a destabilising factor. First, these weapons are not intended for strikes against the opposite side. Second, after a certain, sufficiently high, density of defence (with limitations imposed on strategic offensive weapons) has been attained, further strengthening defence potential virtually loses all sense.

Finally, this model will bring about a radical change in the nature of strategic relationships between the East and the West. Domination of the offensive over defensive will give way to defence domination. The model of defence domination will make it possible to switch over, in deed, and not in word, to a defensive military doctrine at all levels of confrontation.

There is no doubt the transition to the new model of strategic stability will involve a certain political risk. There are apprehensions that at a definite stage the US might try and use its technological superiority in some fields in order to deploy an effective ABM system before the Soviet Union has a chance to do so, thereby attaining military advantage. It seems, therefore, that the only way

to the new strategic structure is that of gradual mutually agreed and coordinated steps, which might include phased deployment of ABM components, strictly restricted both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Considering the alternative models of strategic stability, we cannot gloss over such an important issue as the economic consequences of this or that way of military structuring. It is often argued that the asymmetric way will prove cheaper than the symmetric. Following the asymmetric way, however, we would invest in unpromising technologies, which would yield a temporary military effect but do nothing for the development of our country's technological basis. Conversely, investing in promising branches, such as directed energy, space industry, optics, microelectronics and artificial intellect, we will proceed towards strengthening the country's defence capability for a long period of time and, besides, lay a technological foundation for the progress of our industry in the 21st century.

ABM Treaty Crucial

18120037A Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW
in English No 12, Dec 89 pp 50-51

[Article by Major General of the Air Force (Ret.) Boris Surikov, Cand. Sc. (Technology), participant in the Soviet-American SALT-I talks: "ABM Race Is Inadmissible"]

[Text] How to safeguard the world against a catastrophe in the nuclear space age? How to make it safer? These questions today are asked by politicians, scientists and the military. The foregoing article by Mikhail Aleksandrov is of indisputable interest, as it contains quite a few correct conclusions. However, I cannot agree with the author on the main point.

He tries to prove, for instance, that "our military-strategic, economic and political interests would be best suited by a model of military structuring symmetric to the American." The author also maintains that a "race of defensive systems is not a destabilising factor."

Implementation of Mikhail Aleksandrov's idea would first nullify the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), which is the basis for further talks on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

The signing of the Treaty confirmed the inter-relationship between strategic defensive and offensive armaments, which is of an intransient and objective character, irrespective of their technical level. Moreover, the more perfect the ABM systems, the greater their influence on the relationship between the sides' strategic potentials, which renders them utterly unstable and destabilises the overall strategic situation.

If, for some reason or other, the ABM Treaty was to become invalid, this would destroy the foundation for the Soviet-American negotiations on limiting and

reducing their nuclear weapons. In actual fact this would spell an uncontrolled arms race for decades to come. That is why the Soviet Union holds that strict observance of the ABM Treaty must necessarily underlie the conclusion of a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive armaments now in the working.

The author's arguments against the Soviet Union's asymmetric response to a likely SDI development are also dubious. The fact is that the deployment of a wide-scale ABM system with space-based elements by no means implies US repudiation of strategic offensive weapons. Consequently, the realisation of the SDI programme is bound to result in strategic instability, irrespective of whether or not the Soviet Union's response is symmetric or asymmetric.

In the event of symmetric development of territorial ABM systems in the Soviet Union and the United States, the sides will enter a new stage in the race of strategic armaments. The essence of a military threat consists in that the ABM space echelon can fulfil both defensive and offensive missions: intercept ICBMs and SLBMs with limited efficiency; hit, within a short time, enemy space apparatuses (warning, combat control, communication and reconnaissance satellites); unexpectedly, destroy particularly vital objects, featuring high effectiveness and a minimum flight time.

Fundamental and technological problems and financial limitations make Star Wars proponents search for ways of acquiring a sort of immunity for the future. One such way is believed to be expeditious transfer of the SDI programme from the research phase to the phase of development, full-scale testing and mass production.

This is served by the concept of a "limited" object-territorial ABM system in the US. Along with the numerous ground- and space-based detection and tracking facilities, it must include three echelons of ABM kinetic weapons. Space platforms in the first echelon must carry up to 100,000 Brilliant Pebbles. The second echelon is to use ground-based (in silos) long-range anti-missiles. The third echelon must use short-range anti-missiles.

Soviet scientists believe that the foregoing ABM echelons, based on the use of light anti-missiles (weighing 50 to 60 km [as published]), will fail to be as effective as they are expected to be, as they are intended for intercepting existing and not future strategic missiles with a shorter boost leg. Not unlikely is a buildup of strategic armaments for which there are no effective interception facilities to date, e.g., ballistic missiles with a short boost leg and missiles launched from nuclear submarines on low-angle trajectories. Another step may involve mass deployment of sea-to-ground and air-to-ground cruise missiles. Specialists are also aware of other methods to neutralise a territorial ABM system.

As a result, the arms race will break out into boundless space, which will further whip it up on land, on the sea and in the airspace. This will be a world in which terrible

and unexpected things may occur at any moment both due to fallacious political decisions and through malfunctioning of hardware.

I doubt that following the asymmetric way will result, as my opponent claims, in the Soviet Union's lagging behind the US in the sphere of advanced military technologies and, as a consequence, in delayed development of the country's entire technological basis. First, the US has never succeeded in keeping military-technological leadership in any sphere. As to the technological progress in the entire Soviet industry, global experience shows that this is best done by developing appropriate civilian industries.

It has been stated more than once that the Soviet Union is a staunch opponent of deploying a wide-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Should such a system be deployed by the United States of America, our response will be asymmetric.

Risk Seen in Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar

90UJ0309A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Aviation Major General (Retired) B. Surikov, candidate of technical sciences: "Will The World Be Safer...If Krasnoyarsk Radar Is Dismantled?"]

[Text] It would seem it is a paradox: By reducing armaments, we are increasing the danger of nuclear war. But the whole point are the kinds of armaments we are cutting!

We, I am speaking of our government, as is well-known, have agreed to dismantle the superpowerful Krasnoyarsk radar. We agreed in the hope of setting an infectious good example, and, of course, under the strong pressure of the U.S. Administration. It attributed the start of a new upward turn in the arms race—the development of the so-called "Star Wars"—directly to construction in the USSR of this now regrettably well-known radar.

The decision by the Soviet Government was preceded by long negotiations with the Americans. The United States insisted that the construction of a radar with such power is a violation of the ABM treaty—anti-ballistic missile defense. They had their own reasons, inasmuch as such radars, according to the treaty, could only be located on the periphery of one's national territory, with the antenna systems oriented outwardly. And we built it, it can be said, right in the center of the country.

But we also had our own reasons. "Nuclear deterrence," which is still an operative strategy in the United States, in contrast to the USSR, allows the employment of a nuclear first strike. Defense Secretary R. Cheney announced on 13 September 1989 at the Hudson Institute that the United States and its allies have no reasons to change the currently operative strategy. Naturally, in such a situation, a missile attack warning system has

special significance for us. And it consists, it will be recalled, of space- and ground-based information systems.

The space echelon is several on-watch artificial earth satellites (ESV) [earth satellite vehicle] that provide continuous monitoring of all ground-based and naval-based missile threat areas. However, detection is possible from space only of missile movement in the boost phase, owing to the thermal emanations of the jet engines. The ESV's quite often produce false alarms.

The principal means of detecting a nuclear missile attack today are considered to be radars that can detect a strategic missile at distances of thousands of kilometers and the modeling of their flight trajectories. American specialists know that the radars located in Murmansk, Riga, Mukachevo, Sevastopol, Mingeaur, and at Balkhash and Pechora, provide monitoring of all missile threat axes. **With the exception of the northeast!**

For the purpose of creating a 360-degree radar warning field and of ensuring monitoring of the northeastern missile threat axis, research was completed in 1979 on the creation of a radar in the Far North in strict conformity to the ABM treaty. At the same time, draft work was also performed on construction in the Krasnoyarsk area. And it turned out that this variant would be three times cheaper than the deployment of a radar in the Far North.

It was decided not to coordinate the construction at Krasnoyarsk with the American side, inasmuch as the new radar, which was informational in nature, would be deployed at a distance of more than 3,000 km from the center of Europe and could not be considered to be a part of the ABM territorial radar system of the country. In addition, the radar does not have an independent power supply and works in the meter waveband, and such radars, and this is known to the American specialists, are "blinded" for one to two minutes by a nuclear explosion and, for this reason also, could not be considered to be full-fledged ABM equipment.

No one surmised at that time that, within 4 years, U.S. President Reagan would come out with the SDI [strategic defense initiative] program, and that the Krasnoyarsk radar would become a trump card of the American Administration in disarmament negotiations. Despite all of our efforts to explain, in the final analysis we were compelled to agree to its dismantlement. It would seem that justice triumphed. We removed one more obstruction on the road to the development of normal relations between the USSR and the United States. But has this made it easier for us and the Americans to live?

Alas, as a result of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the danger of a nuclear catastrophe is not being decreased, but it is being increased!!!

At no time during the elaboration of the ABM treaty now in force did any one of the experts suppose that near-earth space would be so densely filled with nonfunctioning artificial satellites and other space objects that it would be difficult for an astronomer to observe the starry sky. From space, our Earth resembles a stirred-up beehive, around which bees are swarming in a solid ring. There are more than 17,000 space objects of an artificial origin, and they are continuously leaving orbit and entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, and...they can be interpreted as ballistic missiles that are attacking us.

This is the kind of data that Lynne Sennot, professor of mathematics at Illinois State University, cites in his work: For the period 1977-84, the United States registered 1,152 false alarms of average seriousness concerning Soviet ICBM attacks on the United States. It is not known how many such alarms there were in the Soviet Union; we did not publicize this kind of information, but even if there were just as many as in the United States, then, through error, we were on the brink of a third world war many times. Fortunately, warning systems are an art, I would say, and the talent of officers working with extremely complicated equipment in the Soviet Union and the United States, saved us from a nuclear catastrophe.

I will cite the recently expressed opinion of Doctor John Steinbrunner, director of foreign policy research programs at the Brookings Institute. He reported that analysis shows: If the space- and ground-based echelons of the warning system are functioning normally, then the officers of the combat control center, even in extreme danger, can correctly estimate the situation with a probability of 0.95. That is, almost error free.

However, disablement of the space- or ground-based echelon of the warning system reduces the probability of a correct decision to 0.6. But, you see, also not excluded are some kind of malfunctions and interference with the warning optics, at which time the probability of a correct estimate would fall to 0.2. This is a very dangerous level!

What is the conclusion? Essentially, after the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, which will cost \$50 million, we in the Soviet Union will not have a ground-based warning system against a nuclear missile attack from a northeastern direction in a sector of 120 degrees on the horizon. Of course, it can be replaced with two warning radars in the Far North. Which is permitted by the ABM treaty. But here again there are expenditures—not less than \$1 billion. And, also, it is hardly likely that the sites could be put into operation before the year 2000.

When I expressed my fears relating to the dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar to S. Kinney, an American ABM expert, he asked me: "Why were explanations regarding the actual role of the Krasnoyarsk radar not made known to the American public in a timely way? And how come the technical problem was turned into a political one?"

I had no answer to his question.

In the summer of 1989, the USSR and the United States signed an agreement about avoiding dangerous military activity, which should lessen the danger of an outbreak of armed incidents resulting from an incorrect estimate of the intentions of one of the sides. The agreement went into effect on 1 January 1990, and it will promote greater stability and the security of both sides. However...

Can the Americans today experience a feeling of satisfaction from the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which, in fact, insured their own security by preventing an error in reaching a decision concerning the initiation of an ICBM attack?

It is always easier to ask questions. Therefore, I would like to conclude with a proposal for real steps, as it seems to me, that are directed at reducing the danger of the start of a war "by mistake." It is necessary to establish permanent direct communications between command posts of the missile attack warning system and to arrange the exchange of data on deorbiting space objects to ensure joint express-analysis of false alarm signals... And may God help us not to become hostages to our own arrogance!

Speed of Elimination of Soviet INF Missiles Questioned

90WC0037A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Letter to the Editor and Response from USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: "Why We Are Hurrying"]

[Text] *It follows from the 2 January 1990 USSR Ministry of Defense report that we are significantly leaving the U.S.A. behind in the matter of eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles and launchers for them. Where are we hurrying to? Why is the U.S.A. lagging behind us in this matter?*

A. Litvin, Shchelkovo Moscow Oblast

The information contained in the USSR Ministry of Defense report reflects precisely the fact that both parties are clearly accomplishing the obligations that they have assumed in accordance with the INF Treaty. Still, just why has the Soviet Union eliminated more missiles than the U.S.A. to this day.

This is explained by several circumstances resulting from the provisions of that treaty. First, the parties must have destroyed all shorter range missiles during the course of the first year and a half after it entered into force as was done by the end of 1989. The USSR had 957 of these systems—OTR-22 [SS-12 Operational Tactical Missile] and OTR-23 [SS-23]—that is, a bit more than 50 percent of the total number of all intermediate and shorter range missiles. And the U.S.A. had 169 Pershing-1A's that totaled only about 20 percent of the number of intermediate and shorter range missiles.

Second, during the six month period after ratification of the treaty, the parties must have eliminated all tested but non-deployed missiles. In accordance with this, the Soviet Union reduced its nuclear potential by 80 RK-55 [SSC-X-4] ground-based cruise missiles. The U.S.A. did not have any missiles of this same category (tested but not deployed). Naturally, they were also not required to destroy any.

There is yet another reason. In accordance with the requirements of the treaty, each party must have 200 warheads for intermediate range missiles left 29 months after the treaty has entered into force, that is, by October 1990. For the U.S.A., this means that they can retain up to 200 missiles since there is one warhead per missile. As we all know, the majority of Soviet intermediate range missiles have three warheads each. Consequently, we must have a correspondingly fewer number of missiles remaining.

These same circumstances also explain the higher rate of elimination of Soviet operational missile bases and other facilities that are covered by the force of the treaty.

This answer was obtained at the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO Members Disagree on Troop Adjustments

LD2601112490 Paris Domestic Service in French
0700 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] Three foreign ministers met in Vienna yesterday, where the conference on conventional disarmament in Europe is being held. Roland Dumas and his counterparts from West Germany and Italy had one aim: a coherent political approach to disarmament. These good intentions were wrecked by the Belgian Government, which wants to withdraw its troops from Federal Germany. The Western nations are thus reacting in disorder to changes in Eastern Europe.

Here is Ralph Pinto:

[Pinto] One wonders whether the system of every man for himself has started to operate in NATO, because this morning, following Belgium, the Netherlands announced its intention to start withdrawing next year a first contingent of their soldiers stationed in West Germany. Officially, the doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance remains consultation and cooperation between the 16 members of NATO, but the Belgian minister, who caused a sensation yesterday, wanted to make a political gesture to respond to the wishes of the Hungarians, expressed on 24 January, to see the Soviet soldiers go home. However, the Belgian minister probably also wanted to set the scene for the visit he begins today to the Soviet Union.

It was still not the best moment, because in NATO the U.S. grand ally is already asking itself questions on the stationing of its 300,000 men in Europe. With the wind of democratization in the East, President Bush has already announced that adjustments must be provided for. On 29 January he will present his draft defense budget. Thus, in Congress we will hear much more from the supporters of a disengagement from Europe, with this slogan: We cannot do the work of the Europeans, if they themselves are unconcerned about their situation. To calm things down, several European leaders last year called for the alliances to be maintained, to negotiate with the East in an orderly way. Thus this is the first crack which has sounded, but it is, perhaps, also the first sign of a dislocation of the Western military system.

Foreign Ministers Call For CFE Agreement to Stabilize Europe

Genscher, Dumas, De Michelis News Conference

AU2601122790 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG
in German 26 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] On 25 January the foreign ministers of the FRG, France, and Italy appealed to NATO and Warsaw Pact member states to conclude a conventional disarmament agreement this year, and to pave the way for a summit meeting of all CSCE states on the future of Europe.

At a news conference in Vienna's Hofburg, Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Roland Dumas, and Gianni De Michelis spoke out in favor of solving the problems that have not yet been settled at the Vienna Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] through political impulses.

Genscher said that it is "absolutely necessary to provide a framework of stability for the dramatic developments in Europe." He resolutely pleaded for a "partnership of stability" between East and West, and stressed that it could not be in the interest of any one that the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe should create instability.

De Michelis also pointed out the necessity of a "strong political impetus," not only for the CFE but also for the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, which are taking place in parallel.

Dumas argued along the same lines. He said that for the current movements in the political landscape it is important that a first conclusion is reached for the CFE and the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe by the end of the year.

The three foreign ministers reiterated their support for the reform policy of the Soviet state and party head but refused to indulge in speculations about the political future of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Genscher on Disarmament Momentum

AU2501193290 Vienna Domestic Service in German
1700 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Report by Helmut Opletal on statements by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at CFE conference in Vienna on 25 January; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Roland Dumas, and Gianni de Michelis called for a CSCE summit meeting before the end of the year. Before it can be implemented, a comprehensive agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe must be concluded, they stated.

[Genscher] "We now have to preserve the momentum in the disarmament process so that it will not lag behind the political development. The political development and the disarmament process must keep in touch, otherwise the security problem would obstruct the political development."

The three foreign ministers showed rather clearly their support for Gorbachev and they advocated a speedy stabilization of the situation in Eastern Europe.

[Genscher] "Responsibility means in the first place that no speculations about other governments or personalities of other governments are made, but interests are defined. There is the joint interest of all European states, which the three of us express here, that is, that Gorbachev's policy of opening up will be successful."

A completely new security situation, which calls into question previous positions of the West, is already developing now in Europe, Hans-Dietrich Genscher said.

[Genscher] "It is hard to imagine that in the early nineties the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles which would be, so to speak, directed at the reformist states, at democratic states which are making progress in the process of disarmament together with us, might occur to anybody."

However, the East must also give in on some details of disarmament, for example, the inclusion of strategic combat aircraft, the three foreign ministers demanded.

Dumas on Disarmament

AU2501235990 Vienna Television Service in German
2100 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Interview with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas by Adalbert Krause in Vienna on 25 January—recorded; Dumas statements in French with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Dumas] We three ministers, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, my colleague De Michelis from Italy, and I have come to Vienna to give new political impetus to the negotiations.

[Krause] For the three NATO ministers it is imperative that a military treaty must be achieved now in order to prevent destabilization as a consequence of the start of new democracies in Eastern Europe.

French President Mitterrand recently made the proposal on a so-called European confederation, while the EC is still on its way toward the single market. What does this mean?

[Dumas] It concerns those East Bloc countries which are going to detach themselves from CEMA and adopt democratic forms. The European economic union of the EC is a priority. However, President Mitterrand formulated this idea of a confederation precisely for these new states.

This is a juridical concept for states outside the EC, which, however, as democratic states, strongly desire cooperation with Western Europe.

[Krause] Of course, the question arises whether this idea of the French president would not have to be regarded as a possible balancing factor in Europe if German reunification were to become a political and economic reality at the pace that has been set so far and the Germans were to predominate.

[Dumas] This idea of a European confederation is not to be interpreted as the answer to German reunification. It is an idea that tries to find an answer to those political changes and process of democratization in the East which are taking place before our very eyes.

Dumas, Genscher, De Michelis Address Arms Talks

PM3001102690 Paris LE MONDE in French
27 Jan 90 p 4

[Untitled report by Claire Trean]

[Text] Vienna—"Time is running out. Do not allow yourselves to be overtaken by political events": That was the substance of the joint appeal which three foreign ministers—Mr Dumas, Mr Genscher, and Mr de Michelis—made on 25 January to the representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries negotiating conventional arms reductions in Europe in Vienna. Indeed, the impatience of the East European peoples will not tolerate the relative slowness of these negotiations due partly to their technical complexity. The new Czechoslovak and Hungarian authorities have just demanded the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops deployed in their territory as soon as possible—a demand which the USSR cannot or does not wish to resist: It has started bilateral talks with the Czechoslovaks and is about to start them with the Hungarians, and has already announced its agreement in principle.

In this context, and while impatience is beginning to make itself felt in the Western camp too, the German, French, and Italian ministers wanted to give a political boost to the multilateral disarmament process and firmly reaffirm the importance they attach to the objective of the negotiations—to conclude an initial conventional arms reduction agreement before the end of this year.

The negotiations, "overtaken on some points by the European political impetus," run the risk "of no longer being consistent with the real situation," Mr Dumas said. This is the case, he added, with the proposals which have been presented concerning reductions in U.S. and Soviet troops deployed outside their territories in Europe. At the initiative of the United States, NATO had proposed that those troops "deployed" be limited to 275,000 men on each side. All the Western countries now agree that this ceiling is too high, given the pressures in the East European countries against the Soviet military presence, according to a diplomat in Vienna who thinks that new proposals will be drawn up in the Western camp and that a "realistic" figure would be between 200,000 and 250,000 men.

However, discussing this subject, Roland Dumas was anxious to reaffirm two principles very clearly: The first is that these reductions in the number of soldiers deployed can only be applied to U.S. and Soviet troops and not, as the USSR is demanding, to the French, British, Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian troops present in the FRG. Countering the statements made the same day by Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme, he said that "the maintenance of West European forces on FRG territory reflects a special relationship of solidarity which cannot be affected by the Vienna negotiations."

The Italian minister, who was less categorical, expressed the hope that this question will be postponed to a later stage in the negotiations. Roland Dumas also stressed the fact that the Soviet and U.S. troops are not comparable either politically (the latter are desired by their host countries) or strategically because, in one case there is territorial continuity and, in the other, the break formed by the Atlantic Ocean.

In this connection, NATO placed itself in a tricky position with its proposal for a ceiling of 275,000 men which, at the time, had its advantages but which seems to establish a link of equality between Soviet and American soldiers which must now be severed. Indeed, the USSR has not had its last word on the question of the forces deployed. The pace at which things are moving, especially in the GDR, means that it cannot be completely ruled out that Moscow will one day be forced to play the card of total withdrawal, calling for the parallel withdrawal of any U.S. military presence in Europe.

The German unknown factor is in everybody's mind in Vienna and not just in Western minds. However, Mr Dumas has taken care not to close any option to the East Germans. "Nobody must be able to use the result of the Vienna process," he said, "to hamper the aspirations to unity and democracy now being demonstrated in Europe. In accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the European states must be free to join military alliances or not, and to accept or refuse the presence of foreign troops in their territory. In this connection, the limits which the Vienna agreements set must be regarded as upper limits, not as lower limits."

Since the start of the Vienna negotiations in March 1989, the elements of an agreement have been found with regard to land forces and are close to being found on the definition of zones of concentration for different armaments. An initial conventional disarmament treaty worthy of the name should also include an agreement on air forces—the second point, together with the forces deployed, on which there are major disagreements with the Soviets. The USSR, which points, this time to its advantage, to lack of geographical proximity, in other words the fact that some aircraft, based in the United States, are left out of the sphere of negotiations, would also like to exclude some categories of its fighter planes. The Western countries are refusing and will not give in on the principle of including all fighter planes based in Europe. Once this principle has been accepted, however, they could envisage arrangements: "Our position," Mr Dumas said, "is not one of take it or leave it. We are prepared to examine the USSR's special concerns."

With regard to the two controversial points of aircraft and the forces deployed, the hope is that there will be progress at the next two meetings: the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow on 7 February, and the meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Ottawa on 11 February for the "Open Sky" conference. This means that an initial conventional disarmament treaty could be signed toward the end of

this year at the summit of heads of state and of government of the 35 countries participating in the Helsinki (CSCE) process, of which these negotiations form a part.

On 25 January, the three ministers strongly emphasized this link and the broader prospects opening up beyond this initial treaty. Mr Genscher and Mr De Michelis raised the idea that a new phase in negotiations could start which would go far beyond the current objectives and in which other categories of equipment and the strength of national armed forces could be discussed. Mr Dumas did not want to count his chickens before they were hatched and apparently prefers to know with certainty what the current negotiations will produce before thinking about the content of subsequent negotiations. On the other hand, he reaffirmed the role which France played in linking these negotiations with the general CSCE process which involves countries other than the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and subjects of all-European cooperation other than disarmament, and in promoting the idea that there should be negotiations among sovereign states and not negotiations between alliances. This idea has probably never seemed so relevant as it now does.

BELGIUM

Martens on Withdrawal of Forces From FRG

LD2601175490 Brussels Domestic Service
in French 1700 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Excerpt] Finally we note this short remark by Wilfried Martens to journalists concerning the statements by Defense Minister Guy Coe on an assessment of the gradual withdrawal of Belgian forces from Germany. According to the prime minister, it is only an assessment and both NATO and the Vienna conference on disarmament in Europe must reach the same conclusions on the withdrawal, Wilfried Martens said. The effects of such a move would be considerable on the Army as well as on the families of the military and on the future of the buildings used by the Belgian forces in Germany. [passage omitted]

CANADA

NATO Urged To Concentrate on Arms Reduction

52200009A Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English
2 Dec 89 p B2

[Text] If NATO is in danger of becoming an anachronism, its membership is more to blame than the changing international environment.

The alliance certainly does have a role even in the world of friendlier East-West relations. For all the turbulence, NATO is still the most appropriate forum for the handling of basic Western security concerns. And it has the expertise and organization to negotiate arms control agreements with the Warsaw Pact.

The trouble is, some member governments and many NATO staff members are still fighting the Cold War.

At a recent meeting, NATO defence ministers insisted on telling a skeptical world that the Warsaw Pact is still a military threat.

The Americans are angry with the West Germans for objecting to plans to modernize short-range nuclear weapons.

And the Europeans are in a panic about U.S. budget proposals that will result in even bigger reductions of American forces on the continent than those currently being negotiated in Vienna. Incredibly, U.S. Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney was scolded by the British for saying deeper cuts are possible because the likelihood of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is at its lowest level since the Second World War.

"We know there is political and budget pressure to make bigger reductions, but to link them to what's happening in Eastern Europe is infelicitous," said a British official. Not content just to sound foolish, the official went on to be condescending. Cheney's remarks, he said, are "all people like the Belgians and the Danes need to start demanding big reductions in NATO spending."

He might as well have included the Canadians. Prime Minister Mulroney should make a case for more drastic negotiated arms reductions when he meets with the other heads of NATO governments next week.

It would be a rescue mission of sorts. If NATO wants to retain its credibility with the Western public, it must catch up to reality. This means concentrating on arms reductions, rather than arms accumulation. NATO is not destined to become irrelevant. It just needs a new job description.

TORONTO STAR Calls for Halt to Arms Race

52200011A Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
29 Dec 89 p A24

[Text] There's never been a better time for the superpowers to call a halt to the arms race they've been running for four decades.

The Cold War has thawed, the Iron curtain is corroded and the Berlin Wall has crumbled into pieces for sale as souvenirs. East and West Germany are humming the tune, if not yet writing the lyrics, of reunification.

And Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is much too busy trying to drag his faltering economy into the last decade of the 20th century to think of waging war against the United States.

Since reductions in nuclear arsenals have already begun, it should be easy for the superpowers to accelerate them, destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons and agree to produce no more.

It will be more difficult to get men and arms out of Europe. The Soviet Union has troops in East Germany; the U.S. has them in West Germany. Should they all go home?

When Western nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 40 years ago, it was intended to be more than a military alliance. Now that history is nullifying its military usefulness, NATO can take up that other role by making common cause with the Warsaw Pact to spread freedom and democracy throughout Europe and into the Third World.

Surveillance Overflight Test Run Agreement With Hungary

52200010A Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*
in English 4 Jan 90 pp A1, A2

[Untitled article by Ross Howard]

[Text] Hungary and Canada have agreed to a test run later this week of the so-called open skies concept which allows Warsaw Pact and NATO military aircraft to conduct surveillance flights over each other's territories.

A Canadian Forces overflight of Hungary, and of Czechoslovakia along the way, is likely to be matched within a few weeks by the flight of a Hungarian or other Warsaw Pact plane—perhaps a Soviet aircraft—over any part of Canada that the Warsaw Pact chooses.

Aside from special, prearranged flights involving dignitaries' travel or emergency situations, it will be the first time that a military aircraft from a Warsaw Pact country has entered the airspace of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member unchallenged.

The Canadian Forces aircraft is expected to spend several hours this Saturday flying across Hungary and will pass over major Hungarian and Soviet military installations, Canadian officials said yesterday.

The agreement for the test flight of the unarmed Canadian plane—a Hercules transport aircraft—on a route chosen by Canadian military officers was reached at meetings in Ottawa and Budapest before Christmas.

The flights are designed to test the ease with which future reciprocal surveillance flights can be negotiated at an open skies conference of 16 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact nations, which opens in Ottawa on Feb 12 and continues in Hungary later this year. Canada is the principal promoter of the open skies conference.

Canadian officials have told Hungarian and Soviet officials that a Soviet aircraft or other Warsaw Pact aircraft can fly over Canadian territory if Hungary is not able to provide a long-range plane.

"The Hungarians were most co-operative, and the arrangement was reached without complications. Since

Czechoslovakia is on the route to Hungary, we invited them to participate and they readily agreed," said a Canadian diplomat.

Canadian officials are hopeful that, as a demonstration of interest in the open skies principle, the Soviets may propose to conduct a pair of test flights over Canada and the Soviet Union between now and the February conference.

The first overflight involving Canada and Hungary will be done by aircraft not equipped with electronic sensors, and are designed to show communications and identification abilities when unfamiliar aircraft fly over the host countries.

The Canadian Forces Hercules will fly from its base in Lahr, West Germany, across Czechoslovakia and along a Canadian-chosen path over Hungarian territory. The flight will last about three hours an official said yesterday.

DENMARK

Bloc Developments Complicate Defense Consensus

Hedegaard Accepts No-Growth

90EN0193A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 10 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Ole Dall: "Conservative: No More Money for Defense Now"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Connie Hedegaard (Conservative) warns against defense cuts but also confirms that "this is not the time to demand additional appropriations." Social Democratic spokesmen will demand less money for defense if there is an arms reduction agreement between East and West.

While regimes are falling in the East, and the major powers are preparing for new arms reduction agreements, Danish politicians are trying to determine the consequences for Danish defense.

Before the end of the year the Defense Commission will deliver a report which will form the basis for new defense discussions when the coalition expires at the end of 1991.

From the major coalition parties—The Social Democrats [S], Conservatives [KF] and Liberals [V]—there are different ideas of the importance of the international developments to the Danish defense economy.

As members of the coalition government, the Conservatives and Liberals wanted an extra 800 million kroner for defense, but the coalition Government's compromise with the Social Democrats produced an economic zero.

Today the political spokesman for the Conservatives, Connie Hedegaard, said "This is not the time to demand increased appropriations for defense." But she warns against cuts.

Nor Is It Time For Cuts

"One should not induce the public to believe that large cuts can be made because of developments in recent months. With a major arms control agreement it can also very well be expected that the United States will withdraw troops from Europe, and thereby the Europeans themselves will acquire additional tasks. And arms control will also mean an expensive verification system," said Connie Hedegaard.

Hans Haekkerup (S): "International arms control will be coined in savings from the Danish defense budget. If there is an arms control agreement between East and West on conventional weapons and with significant savings it will be entirely unacceptable if the Danish people say that there can be no savings in the budget."

Peter Sonderby (V) said, "So far nothing has happened in East Europe which has immediate significance for Danish defense," and he added, "Besides, the burden sharing in NATO shows that in any case Denmark is not the country which should reduce its defenses first, if it becomes possible to reduce NATO defenses."

The Defense Commission is continuing its work tomorrow, and a request by Pelle Voigt (Socialist People's Party) [SF] to postpone the report because of developments in the East was unanimously rejected by the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats.

Defense Commission Report

90EN0193B Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in
Danish 21 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Ole Dall and Susanne Hegelund: "This Is The Defense Layout"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The Defense Commission recommends extensive efficiency engineering in the Defense Department. The Draken aircraft is eliminated. Until there is an East-West arms control agreement the defense budget will not be cut, but an agreement will open the possibility of savings.

Changing the organization of the defense forces, extensive efficiency engineering, farewell to the Swedish-built Draken aircraft and diplomatic wording about the size of the Danish defense budget.

Those are some of the main messages in the Defense Commission's report about the future of Danish defense. About the economy of defense, it was maintained that as long as the East and West have not reached an agreement on limitation of conventional arms (CFE agreement), there is "no basis for a reduction of the Danish defense budget."

The chairman of the Defense Commission, department head Michael Christiansen, believes that it is realistic to expect that it will be a year before an agreement is reached. When it is finalized later, "a savings can be realized in the defense budget" it says in the report, and it adds, "further disarmament agreements can lead to further savings."

Carefully and diplomatically it adds that the size of the budget—also after an arms control agreement—will be seen "in the light of the overall security policy situation." All parties with the exception of the Socialist People's Party could agree to this wording.

The Defense Commission is an interesting mixture of politicians, government officials, military, and non-military experts. Among other things the report sets the stage for the following changes in the Danish defense forces:

- The Defense Command will be reduced from 580 to 410 men. Some of the positions involved will be transferred to subordinate commands.
- The three positions for Defense Inspectors will be abolished.
- Tasks will be delegated from the Defense Command to subordinate authorities. Specific defense tasks will be transferred to a new combined land command for the Army, "The Army Commando", and to the Navy's Operational Command and the Air Force Tactical Command.
- The Defense Council will be deactivated.
- Today the Air Force has two types of fighters, Draken and F-16. The Draken will be eliminated during the 1990's, and an arms reduction agreement will put Draken entirely out of the picture in the mid-1990's. It is therefore up to the politicians to evaluate and determine how many extra F-16's should be procured.
- The main workshops at Karup Air Base and a supply depot will be deactivated. That will create annual operational savings of 50 million kroner.
- The existing six fighter squadrons will be reduced to four or five. Two will remain at Skrydstrup Air Base. Karup Air Base or Aalborg Air Base will be inactivated in peacetime, while one of these bases will be retained with two or three squadrons.
- From 1992-96 the first priority for purchase of new materiel will go to updating of existing F-16's, modification of Hawk missiles and close-in missile defense.
- The Commission believes that the Army's existing structure, size, and readiness should remain largely unchanged, but an arms reduction agreement will have a number of consequences.
- If the agreement is based on the West's concerns, the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and attack helicopters will be reduced by 10-15 percent. That will, for example, mean 35-40 fewer tanks.
- Beginning in 1992 high priority will be given to procurement of ammunition, electric target illumination, individual personnel equipment, hand weapons, fire control radar for artillery, and night vision equipment.
- The Defense Compromise established the structure of the Navy for far into the 1990's. That means, among other things, that the Navy's wartime strength will be reduced from barely 13,000 men to about 11,000, and the peacetime strength will fall from about 7,900 to 6,800 men.
- From 1992-96, third series standard flex ammunition and self-defense for inspection ships will, among other things, have first priority.
- It says in the report that the Navy will not be included in a conventional arms reduction agreement, but an agreement will bring increased warning, and will thus reduce the requirement for instant preparedness.
- An investigation of the Home Guard is being conducted. Among other things there will be a focus on simplification of administration and organization, so that the most possible resources can be transferred to recruiting and training of volunteer personnel and procurement of materiel to build up the endurance of the Home Guard.
- In new procurement during 1992-96 the highest priority will be given to cutters and night-vision equipment.
- The Construction Service will be reduced from 470 to about 150 men. A large part of the positions involved will be transferred to local services and to the Air Force Materiel Command. Total reduction of about 100 men.
- The local service places will take over the responsibility for maintenance and operation of buildings, management by the ministry will be strengthened and the Construction Service reorganized.
- It is called "less appropriate" that the Defense Command and the Defense Information and Welfare Service perform information functions within partly the same areas. But the Commission believes that the combining of the two should be seen in a "broader political connection."
- Consideration should be given to moving social counselor activities out of the Defense Information and Welfare Service and into the office of Defense Description and Recruiting.

Defense Chief Accepts Plan

90EN0193C Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 21 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Defense Chief Is Satisfied With Outcome"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The result of the CFE negotiations about conventional arms reduction in Europe will be of decisive importance for the future size of Danish Armed Forces, said the defense chief, General Jorgen Lyng, who is satisfied that the work in the Defense Commission was marked by broad political unity.

"Defense can confirm with satisfaction that very broad political unity has prevailed during the work of the Defense Commission."

This statement was made yesterday by defense chief General Jorgen Lyng after the Defense Minister had released a number of excerpts from the report about the structure and tasks of the Danish Armed Forces in the 1990's, which is the result of one and a half year's work by the Defense Commission, and which will be published in full on 10 January.

The defense chief emphasized that the Commission had especially occupied itself with the probable results of the CFE negotiations in Vienna about the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. He confirmed that these results will have decisive importance for the size of future Danish Armed Forces.

A 10-percent reduction of NATO conventional forces can mean that Denmark must scrap a squadron of 15 Draken aircraft, 50 of the oldest Centurion tanks plus a little artillery and some armored personnel carriers.

Gen Jorgen Lyng emphasized that in its thinking the Commission recommended increased efficiency engineering, which could mean economic benefits, which could eventually be used for modernization and procurement of new materiel.

Among the areas which were recommended to be included in the efficiency engineering were the Defense Command, the Defense Building Service, and the Draken Aircraft Service Organization.

Finally the defense chief pointed out that the three-phase decisionmaking process which the Commission set the stage for "will be able to create the necessary foundation so that the Armed Forces can continue to contribute to the security of our country, stability in Europe and participate in NATO defense in such a way that the risk of armed conflict in coming years is kept at the lowest possible level."

Broad Support From Parties

90EN0193D Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 21 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Ole Dall and Susanne Hegelund: "Political Satisfaction With Defense Report"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] CD [Democratic Center Party] is ready to go along with the defense compromise, which the party is outside of for the first time since 1973. With the exception of SF [The Socialist People's Party], all parties support the Defense Commission's report.

There is political satisfaction with the report that the Defense Commission has now presented. The Socialist People's Party is the only party to withhold its approval.

Defense Minister Knud Enggaard (V) emphasized that East-West relative strengths continue to favor the Warsaw Pact, and that there is no basis for cutting the Danish defense budget before an agreement is reached on conventional arms control. "The key word from now on is flexibility," he said.

"It is a victory to have the nonsocialist parties agree that money can be saved in the defense budget after an agreement has been reached on conventional forces," said Hans Haekkerup (S), who was also pleased that the Center Democrats would in all probability approve the report. Thereafter he welcomed the party to enter the group of defense compromise parties—KVR [Conservative-Liberal-Radical (coalition)], Social Democrats and KrF [Christian People's Party].

"We have no problem with that," said Peter Duetoft (CD) at the expected supplementary appropriation from Arne Melchior, who is the party's representative on the defense commission.

The Center Democratic Party, which for the first time since 1973 is not in the defense compromise, considers it important that the international arms control agreement be signed before there are readjustments in Denmark, and that any future benefits from rationalization will be used for the purchase of new materiel.

Connie Hedegaard (K) believes that the main benefit of the Commission's work is that seven out of eight parties are saying no to unilateral Danish disarmament measures, and she maintains that developments in Danish defense will take place in parallel with security policy developments in the rest of the world. "Denmark will not anticipate its pleasures in advance," she said.

Peder Sonderby (V) is not surprised that the Socialist People's Party is not subscribing to the report, but he is astonished that the Progress Party [FP] came out with a special statement about total defense after the defense report was finished.

In the statement the party's Annette Just noted, among other things, that the defense had used money for social measures for personnel instead of investing in new weapons systems and better training.

Jorgen Estrup (RV) [Radical Liberal Party] is satisfied with the report, but said at the same time that the Commission could only partly accomplish its mission, because events in East Europe were moving so unbelievably fast. He pointed out that it could therefore be necessary to intervene and participate in the existing defense compromise.

Fleming Kofod-Svendsen (KrF) agrees with that, if developments move faster than expected. "So we must have the defense compromise up for evaluation again," he said, but added, "Let's don't sell the skin before the animal has been shot."

Pelle Voigt (SF) in a minority report rejected the Defense Commission's report. He is dissatisfied that the Commission did not delay its final draft until a time when the international picture was more clear.

He concludes his minority report by saying, "The original objective, to mark out the long lines of Danish security policy, is still not accomplished."

Center-Democrats Accede

90EN0193E Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 23 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by sus: "CD Approves Defense Report"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Since neither the Conservatives [KF] nor the Radical Liberal Party [RV] want the Center Democratic Party [CD] in the defense compromise the issue is settled, according to Arne Melchior. "We will not go courting," he said.

The Center Democratic Party is wholeheartedly behind the report released by the Defense Commission. This was confirmed by the party's member of the Commission, Arne Melchior.

He has been traveling, and therefore the members of the party who remained behind did not want to give final approval to the report.

At the same time Arne Melchior cut through the talk about the Center Democratic Party's eventual membership in the existing or a future defense compromise, about which Folketing members Peter Duetoft and Erhard Jakobsen have made different comments:

"Two of the parties in the existing defense compromise have announced that they do not want us to participate. The question is thereby decided," confirmed Arne Melchior, who "will not go courting" to gain admission to the compromise.

The parties are the Radical Liberal [RV] and the Conservatives [K], which have indicated that they are not interested in having the Center Democratic Party in the compromise.

About the party's participation in a future compromise, Arne Melchior would not venture to say at this time: "Nobody knows what will happen in three or six months, much less in two years," he said.

Commission Lauded

90EN0193G Copenhagen INFORMATION
in Danish 22 Dec 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Future of The Armed Forces"]

[Text] Can one imagine a more hopeless task than in the autumn of 1989 to estimate the condition and contents of Danish defense in the 1990's? The wave of democracy

in what was once the East Bloc makes it completely impossible to put together a security policy basis for the future Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, that has just been the task of the Defense Commission. Confronted with a hopeless task, the Commission moved undramatically ahead. It combined sound, rational thinking with what we know. As it relates to the military threat against Denmark and NATO, it was confirmed that despite the beginning, unilateral disarmament exists here and now. One hastens to add that CFE negotiations in Vienna will obviously be of great importance.

One is content to observe that the security policy can go well, and it can go poorly. Just now it is going exceptionally well, but it is vitally true that the revolutionary process in the East, which is the basis for the reduction of tensions, is still more unpredictable than everything else which the Commission wisely refrained from trying to anticipate.

Unity—minus the Socialist People's Party [SF] and partly the Progress Party [FP]—is the Commission's most distinguished accomplishment. Conversely, it is already coming out from that which has been provisionally released that the direct participation of politicians in the work is an experiment which, seen analytically, should not be repeated. On the other hand if it is a matter mainly of saving a few hundred positions here and there—and perhaps it will—then the model and the result are excellent.

SDP Spokesman's Views

90EN0193H Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 23 Dec 89 p 8

[Guest commentary by Hans Haekkerup, defense policy spokesman for the Social Democratic Party: "Defense Will Save in Step With Disarmament"]

[Text] Political changes in East Europe are moving by leaps and bounds.

This happy political development has also influenced military thinking in the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We saw one of the latest examples of this when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited NATO headquarters in Brussels. A visit which would have appeared unthinkable just one year ago.

The enormous speed with which developments are moving can naturally not avoid influencing Danish defense thinking. The Defense Commission has just delivered a report which, among other things, anticipates cuts in the number of tanks and combat aircraft as a part of the CFE agreement, which is expected to be signed next year.

The Defense Commission came into being in 1988 following an initiative by all the Folketing parties with the exception of SF. Within one year the Commission was to report how Danish Armed Forces should be

organized in the future. All parties in the Folketing have been represented in the Commission, which also included people from the Armed Forces as well as security policy experts.

In the light of security policy developments so far it has been a difficult task to say anything more definite about future Danish defense efforts. Against this background the Commission has chosen to recommend a number of rationalizations and restructurings which can be carried out independent of political and military developments.

The recommendations include, among other things, that there should promptly be extensive efficiency engineering in the highest leadership of the Defense Ministry and in the Defense Construction Service. Specifically, it is recommended that 270 positions be abolished, including three positions as shelter inspectors. In addition, the Commission recommends extensive rationalization of the structure of the Air Force.

But beyond these changes the Danish Armed Forces will naturally also be influenced by future arms control agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Since the Defense Commission began its work, an agreement in Vienna about conventional forces has drawn significantly closer. Everyone now expects that an agreement can be reached before the end of 1990, and thereafter realized during the next two to three years.

Therefore it is possible to say something more precise about the consequences of such an agreement for the Danish Armed Forces.

If the agreement takes as its point of departure NATO's negotiating memorandum, both the Danish Army and the Danish Air Force will be affected. The Army will, responding to the West's lead, reduce the number of tanks by at least 35 to 40. And the Air Force will cut at least 15 combat aircraft, if the cuts are distributed evenly.

A cut in the number of tanks will, however, bring a relatively modest saving, consisting of the expenditure for the planned modernization of 35 to 40 old Centurions, the pay of the crews which would have driven them, and the operating costs. By avoiding the reacquisition of aircraft we can on the other hand achieve a large savings in the budget for purchase of materiel plus a nice amount for operating costs.

The Defense Commission concludes, therefore, that savings can be made in the defense budget when the Vienna agreement is reached.

And that later, more extensive arms reduction agreements will lead to further savings.

A couple of years ago the nonsocialist parties fought fiercely against the Social Democratic Party's zero solution.

We consider it undeniably a bit of a victory that the nonsocialist parties now are saying yes, there can be cuts in the defense budget in step with disarmament.

Hedegaard Explains Stand

90EN01931 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 2 Jan 90 p 8

[Guest commentary by Connie Hedegaard, member of the Folketing and member of the Defense Commission (Conservative Party): "The End of Unilateral Danish Initiatives"]

[Text] According to Jorgen Carsten Hansen in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 26 December, when it comes to Danish defense and developments in East Europe, I am "transported by emotions."

Where Mr Hansen got that idea, I can't imagine. In fact quite the contrary, for example, in the Defense Commission I tried to be especially sober in my evaluation of events in the East Bloc and the consequences for our defense. An attitude which I also believe is characteristic of the Commission's conclusions and recommendations. Again and again the uncertainties are emphasized, and the risks of stopping or turning in what seems at the time to be a positive direction. And as a result it has been firmly established that Denmark must consistently allow its future defense policy to reflect developments in the world around us—including with our allies. In other words, stop all talk about unilateral Danish initiatives. This is actually a nonsocialist victory. Conservative voters should be happy, especially against the background of the confusing signals which came mostly from the Social Democrat Party earlier in the 1980's!

Because the Defense Commission is not setting the stage for actual cuts. It does not desire that we forestall eventual disarmament happiness. On the contrary, it is naturally clear that we will cut back the day there is a negotiated arms control agreement, in which arms cuts are distributed pro rata, meaning proportionally equal between countries. Such a first arms control agreement, a CFE agreement, will probably not have major consequences for Denmark.

But if events continue with yet another arms control agreement, in which countries presumably will disarm to about 50 percent of existing NATO levels, that will naturally mean large cuts and possible savings for Danish Armed Forces.

However we conservatives have again and again—also with the publication of the work of the Defense Commission—emphasized that one should be careful that an arms control agreement is not necessarily the same as proportional cuts in the budget. For example, necessary control and verification systems cost appreciable amounts. And who dares to predict how a continued European disarmament process will influence American attitudes in relation to American troops in Europe?

What will the consequences be for the reinforcement agreements which Danish Armed Forces depend upon so heavily today?

And finally one should also remember that Danish defense will not in the future remain at its present level without more resources. Disarmament can therefore help us to solve a problem which we otherwise would have great difficulty solving. But that also means, that if positive developments stop, or if they become directly negative, there will be consequences for Danish defense.

It is one of the merits of the Defense Commission that in the midst of the general euphoria to point out that there is also uncertainty in the developments, and that a risk of increased instability and breakdown exists in, for example, the Soviet Union. When one, for example, occupies himself with the coming phase-out of our old Draken aircraft, it is thus established that in case of continued arms reduction and reduction of tensions we can perhaps avoid replacing the phased-out squadrons—whereas in the negative scenario it would be an economic burden to avoid a noteworthy, qualitative deterioration of the Danish Air Force.

The key words in the Commission's report are thus flexibility and stability. The task is to gear Danish defense to be able to meet very different challenges and scenarios. History has shown that we are rather good at disarming—in advance, also—whereas we have traditionally had a hard time realizing when there is a need for arming.

That seven out of eight parties plus the defense representatives on the Commission in cooperation jointly agree on a sober defense line, and definitely reject other unilateral steps than needed rationalization, is a historically favorable development for the defense.

It is honestly difficult to understand why conservatives should be dissatisfied with these developments, on top of the politico-military turbulence of the 1980's.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Air Force Disarmament, Arms Control Issues Viewed

90WC0029A Hamburg *VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FUER SICHERHEIT UND FRIEDEN* in German Sep 89 pp 145-149

[Article by Dieter Lutz: "Air Forces, Non-Offensive Capability and Disarmament"]

[Text] Sociologist Dr Dieter S. Lutz is the deputy director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg and the editor of a series of books entitled "Military Establishments, Armaments, Security" published by Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft.

Air forces other than those in the strategic field have thus far not played a part in disarmament agreements. And, as far as I can tell, they have not been or have hardly been included in the debate about structural non-offensive capability. One of the few exceptions to this rule was the so-called generals' meeting held at the University of Hamburg's IFSH on 28-29 March 1989 between officers of the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army of the GDR. The fact that the discussions quickly ran into the question of "whether everything that flies must be done away with" attests to the explosive nature of the air forces issue.

The following paper represents a first attempt to deal with this neglected issue. Part one demonstrates that the threat avoidance function of structural non-offensive capability is inextricably related to the air force issue. Part two goes into the problems resulting from the flexibility and ambivalence (from the threat viewpoint) of aircraft. Part three provides a short summary of recent relative force capabilities and Part four lists 10 conclusions or, rather, demands for the disarmament of air forces.

1. Structural Non-Offensive Capability

In the late eighties, protective defense on the basis of structural non-offensive capability represents the goal of both armament and disarmament. Let me offer the following tentative definition of structural non-offensive capability:

"We speak of structural non-offensive capability if and when armed forces have the purpose of providing military protection and, if need be, efficient defense but do not manifestly demonstrate a capability for military aggression as regards their organization, structure, arms, and strategy."¹

The basic premise of structural non-offensive capability is threat avoidance on both sides for both sides. The express demand in this instance is for "non-offensive capability." That very phrase clearly goes beyond a "mere" threat-reducing function or a "mere" defensive posture. The problem of differentiating between defensive and offensive forces and weapon systems thus does not arise. Rather, the organization, structure, arms, and operational concepts of the armed forces must be such that they are not only more defensive than they were, but also that they unambiguously do not allow for military aggression.

Thus, the military and security policy significance of structural non-offensive capability in terms of a ban on border-crossing offensive capabilities using whatever weapons (i.e. also with respect to aircraft) cannot possibly be overestimated. The ultimate goal of structural non-offensive capability is to achieve threat avoidance by way of non-offensive capability—without any limitations whatever. Under the circumstances, it will not do to restrict non-offensive capability to "non-invasion capability"—with the accent on ground forces.

In fact, it makes more sense to stress the overall threat avoidance function of non-offensive capability. It is not only restricted to area-occupying operations such as invasions or (partial) occupations. Its more significant aspect is the avoidance and prevention of such threats (in fact, the very threats) which result from the capabilities of air forces (among others) to carry out (preemptive) strikes against military facilities deep inside enemy territory as well as the capability to devastate and destroy large areas of enemy territory and, finally, from the capability partially or totally to destroy other societies and their inhabitants and, in the final analysis, mankind itself. For the threat avoidance function of structural non-offensive capability, the war aim of occupying enemy territory in the traditional sense of invasion, occupation, and annexation, represents only one alternative among others—possibly even a secondary one at that. It is not only traditional wars of annexation that have to be avoided, but also escalation and preemptive deep strikes as well as "world war in spite of itself" (due to computer error, human error, etc.) or hegemonydestabilizing partial disarmament strikes without intent to occupy territory ("decapitation of the Soviet chicken") or retaliatory wars and wars of annihilation waged as a consequence of insanity or "rationality."

At least on the level of a teleologically conceived definition, any serious consideration of structural non-offensive capability necessarily calls for an absolute ban on border-crossing offensive capabilities of all armed forces and weapons, including air forces and aircraft.

2. The "Aircraft" Issue

The ban on border-crossing offensive capability does not include the defender's counterattack capability on his own territory. Ideally, it does not pose a threat. Logically therefore, it is not part of the threat avoidance imperative of structural non-offensive capability. It is questionable whether this theoretically correct fact also applies in the real world to air forces and to their principal instrument, i.e. "aircraft," the reason being that aircraft are faster and more mobile than almost every other weapon system; that they are long-range; that they are highly flexible in their use or—depending on how they are in fact used—that they possess great (threat) ambivalence.

To be sure, other weapon systems are also flexible to some extent. Howitzers such as the NATO M-109 and M-110, or missile systems such as the Soviet Frog, for example, are dual-use, i.e. they can be used both as tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The Lance and Pluton missiles and their follow-on systems, or the Soviet SS-21, also are bifunctional, i.e. they can be used both in the so-called short-range theater nuclear forces (SRTNF) area up to 100 km, and the medium range theater nuclear forces (MRTNF) area. And finally, the Nike Hercules system also demonstrates that systems can be both dual-use and bifunctional while fulfilling a dual mission at the same time, i.e. as anti-aircraft missiles and surface-to-surface missiles in this particular case.

Nevertheless, aircraft are the most flexible and thus most ambivalent systems of all.³ They are dual-use and multiple-role all at once. As a rule, aircraft may be conventionally armed; but they can also be nuclear-operational. The British-French Jaguars or the Soviet SU-24 Fencers, for example, are capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Aircraft such as the F-4 Phantoms widely used by NATO can engage in aerial combat or provide (close) ground combat support depending on their reconnaissance equipment, or they can even be used deep in the enemy's rear area, e.g. to attack his second echelon. Aircraft such as the French Mirage IV bombers, the U.S. F-111 fighter bombers, or even more so the FB-111 medium range bombers can even serve strategic and Euro-strategic functions, e.g. to destroy the enemy's decisionmaking and power centers and strategic arsenals. Finally, aircraft designed as multiple-role systems are capable of carrying out various missions, e.g. as naval warfare control centers and/or as surface target oriented launch vehicles. However, if systems such as the ones just referred to which are used in naval operations, like some of the German-British-Italian MRCA Tornado fighter bombers or the Soviet TU-26 Backfire bombers, (must) be included in listing numbers of aircraft but they are not or are only partially taken into consideration in relative force capabilities and disarmament negotiations because they lack surface target orientation, then this can only be due to restrictive definition and phony attempts to make work easier. In a real emergency, i.e. in case of war, this may well fall by the wayside. Solution of the problem is certainly not made easier by the fact that there are aircraft serving the opposite purpose from those based on the ground and used for naval operations, i.e. aircraft deployed on aircraft carriers which are used to attack surface targets.

Whereas the above-mentioned examples deal with functional imponderables which (may) apply to many other weapon systems on the basis of their deployment site and operational target and the range of the weapons themselves, even more pronounced or entirely new problems both with regard to allocation and threat perception tend to arise in connection with mobile (and transportable) long-range systems.

To be sure, the mobility problem is not restricted to aircraft alone. For example, the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles to the NATO countries consisted not only in their longer range and greater target accuracy, but also in their mobility and transportability. Even more than the SS-20 that was much discussed in the late seventies and early eighties, or the submarine-based (and consequently mobile) SLBM [submarine-launch ballistic missile], missile aircraft are multiple-role systems as mentioned above and (at least in theory) are flexible. In contrast to the missiles referred to earlier, they can be moved from place to place in relatively short order, thereby fulfilling a not immediately discernible function in a particular operational area. The actual assignment of different types of aircraft must be made, however, according to combat range and not according to maximum range as it would be if aircraft were moved

(without return flight) and under favorable flying conditions, i.e. with fuel-efficient load, altitude, and speed. In view of the enemy's antiaircraft defenses, the operational radius will instead be determined by a high-speed, low-altitude flight plan which does not always proceed along a straight line, i.e. involving large amounts of fuel in consideration of the return flight. In-flight refueling and the installation of supplementary internal and external fuel tanks tend to relativize the problem of fuel consumption and range considerably. Above all, however, aircraft are capable of quickly changing their original positions by making intermediate stops. The Soviet SU-7 Fitters, for example, which have an operational radius of less than 500 km and cannot be refueled in flight but are nuclear-capable, could easily take on theater-wide and/or deep interdiction missions by making an intermediate stop in the GDR or another non-Soviet Warsaw Pact country. Even NATO "borderline cases" such as the early sixties F-104 Starfighters which do not have an in-flight refueling capability would be in a position to almost double their internal fuel supply with the help of two tip and two pylon tanks, if they were to transport atom bombs (which is not part of their mission, by the way). The refueling operation as such would take just about five minutes. This short period of time enables the system to make intermediate refueling stops with relatively little danger at airfields or even on superhighways close to the border. If need be, NATO aircraft could also make use of the alternative option—like the Warsaw Pact systems—of flying (LRTNF) missions from bases of their alliance partners, e.g. from Norwegian, Danish, Greek, or Turkish territory, against the Soviet Union.

Quite obviously, the categorization of aircraft which formally reflects their threshold ranges of, say, 200, 500, 1,000, or more kilometers must be replaced by a role-oriented, target-oriented perception which either puts the future existence of any and all aircraft into question in the context of disarmament negotiations (in line with the slogan "anything that flies must be done away with") or at the very least calls for stringent implementation of verification and on-site inspection procedures. At the latest, conclusions and demands of this sort become absolutely imperative once sophisticated missiles and cruise missiles have been placed into service—missiles which may themselves have an operational radius of many hundreds of kilometers and thus make penetrations by the carrier aircraft into enemy airspace largely superfluous.

In conclusion, let me add a word on a theme I have touched on indirectly in the above section of my paper and earlier. As a rule, aircraft cannot be viewed as weapons in and of themselves. Their basic purpose is to serve as carrier systems for weapons and delivery systems. What is more, they cannot automatically be considered expendable delivery systems such as missiles but

are in fact multiple-role systems. These two aspects demonstrate that sortie rates play an important part in the assessment of relative force capabilities, both in case of war and on paper. Sortie rates, however, depend on a number of qualitative parameters which must under no circumstances be disregarded in disarmament negotiations, insofar as a zero solution is neither sought, nor achieved. These parameters include pilot training as well as the state of the technology, avionics, and electronics of the different aircraft and the number and quality of airbases, hardened sites, and runways, plus (at first glance mere) numerical data such as the type and total volume of munition stockpiles and the number and composition of the weaponry on board the individual aircraft.

3. Initial Data/Relative Force Capabilities

Looking at the inventory estimates and relative force capabilities of the air forces in East and West against the background of the problems outlined in section two above, one finds that the breadth and discrepancy of the data reflect both the imporderables inherent in the flexibility of aircraft and the actual lack of information concerning their functions, capabilities, and missions. Nonetheless, I propose to restrict myself to citing three recent relative force capabilities without further comment. In view of the above-mentioned problems, aircraft can only be dealt with in disarmament negotiations via a zero solution or, following deep cuts, by means of strict verification. More on this subject in section four of my paper. In both instances, the current figures (and their relative accuracy) merely serve to illustrate both the problem of excessive armaments and the discrepancy between initial data and relative force capabilities.

According to the data published by NATO in November 1988, the numerical balance of forces in Europe is as follows:⁴

Systems	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Combat aircraft	3,977	8,250
Attack helicopters	2,419	3,700
Air defense systems	10,309	24,400

The Warsaw Pact figures published in January 1989 paint a different picture:⁵

Systems	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Combat aircraft	7,130	7,876
Interceptor aircraft of total	50	1,829
Naval aircraft of total	1,630	692
Attack helicopters	5,270	2,785

At this time, the most reliable compilation of data would appear to be that of the Bundeswehr Office for Studies

and Exercises. That table, for 1986, lists the NATO and Warsaw Pact air force potentials as follows:⁶

Systems	NATO		Warsaw Pact	
	Operational	Reinforced	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact	Total
Fighter bombers/light bombers	2,190	2,990	651	2,711
Fighter aircraft	533	1,078	1,565	3,300
Reconnaissance aircraft	241	385	150	537
Airborne early warning systems	79	95		145
Antiaircraft missile launchers	1,218	1,381	1,218	9,568

4. Disarmament in Europe

4.1 The CFE Negotiations

Since March 1989 the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] negotiations have been taking place in Vienna.⁷ The objective of CFE is to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the reduction of asymmetries, and through disarmament, arms limitation, redeployment, and, in particular, the elimination of offensive capabilities. The CFE participants include the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The negotiations cover the land territories of all participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Caspian Sea, including the European islands (with the exception of a small strip of land in southeastern Turkey opposite Iran, Iraq, and Syria). The CFE negotiations in Vienna are concerned with all the conventional ground forces of the 23 European participants, i.e. indigenous as well as foreign forces. The negotiations are not concerned with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and naval forces, or with the above-mentioned forces in the excluded Turkish territory.

The CFE negotiations are concerned, however, with land-based conventional air forces. The original NATO position, however, was that the air forces should not be dealt with in the initial stages of the talks. This negotiating position did not change until after U.S. President Bush made a corresponding proposal at the NATO summit in Brussels in late May 1989.

The details of the Bush proposal call for reducing (by way of destroying) the number of combat aircraft and helicopters to common limits 15 percent below current NATO strength. This proposal was officially submitted as the NATO proposal at the CFE negotiations on 13 July 1989.

Accordingly, the present NATO position establishes an upper limit of 5,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 attack helicopters, irrespective of their use (i.e. offensive, defensive, or multiple-role) or their deployment in the area between the Atlantic and the Urals. This includes all aircraft and helicopters of which NATO or the Warsaw

Pact has at least one model equipped with weaponry. (This also explains the discrepancy with respect to the NATO relative force capability figures cited in section three above.) The proposal would thus call on NATO to scrap 900 aircraft and on the Warsaw Pact to scrap 7,900. In accordance with the so-called sufficiency rule, the inventory of each individual nation would then be limited to a maximum of 3,420 aircraft and 1,140 attack helicopters.

In contrast to NATO, the Warsaw Pact included the air forces in the CFE negotiations from the very start. In its proposals dated 5 May 1989 and 29 June 1989, the Warsaw Pact called for limits of (only) 1,500 combat aircraft and 1,700 attack helicopters. In accordance with a regional breakdown, the two Warsaw Pact proposals call for the following limitations: north: 30 combat aircraft and 30 attack helicopters; center: 1,120 aircraft and 1,250 helicopters; south: 290 aircraft and 360 helicopters; rear: 60 aircraft and 60 helicopters. In accordance with the sufficiency rule, each individual nation's inventory should consist of 1,200 aircraft and 1,350 helicopters.

4.2 Ten Thoughts Concerning Disarmament of Air Forces

Aircraft are multiple-role, i.e. they are fast and can be used in a highly mobile fashion over long distances, if need be, with great combat effectiveness. (From the positive point of view) this means that air forces are capable of unleashing their combat effectiveness in case of an emergency in an efficient and concentrated manner wherever necessary after a brief reaction time (cf. section two). As far as disarmament and restructuring negotiations are concerned, this means (from a negative point of view) that merely small reductions as called for by the NATO proposal or, for that matter, regional concepts as proposed by the Warsaw Pact are inadequate by themselves. Even a concept calling for redeployment to the rear or for a "combat aircraft-free zone," analogous to the nuclear weapon-free zones or armor-free corridors would not be adequate in and of itself.

Modern aircraft are multiple-role combat aircraft and can be used or misused accordingly. Although the distinction between fighter bombers (for deep strikes inside enemy territory), ground combat support aircraft, and air combat aircraft (perhaps even including airborne early warning combat aircraft) may be helpful as a working hypothesis, it may well prove ambivalent in real life.

Insofar as zero solutions are not, or not yet, possible at this juncture, a combination of the following four elements is herewith offered:

- Reduction/limitation to the smallest possible inventories;
- Extensive redeployment of (remaining) inventories;

—Extensive reduction of airfields, runways, hardened sites, and other infrastructure; and

—Stringent verification, including on-site inspections.

In concrete terms, these and similar ideas could be included in the following 10 proposals for disarmament of air forces and/or suggestions for the CFE negotiations in Vienna.⁸

1. Since strategic bombers pose a threat to Europe due to their long range, but they are not included in the CFE talks, the issue of these aircraft needs to be addressed at the START talks or subsequent negotiations scheduled soon thereafter while protecting European interests. The same also applies to land-targeted aircraft stationed on aircraft carriers. The latter in particular are to be eliminated or removed from the inland and marginal seas of Europe.

2. Medium-range bombers and bombers on the strategic bomber threshold, e.g. the U.S. FB-111s (in Great Britain) or the Soviet TU-26 Backfires, are to be eliminated or removed from the entire Atlantic-to-Urals (ATTU) area.

3. All fighter bombers in the entire ATTU area will be scrapped (by stages). Insofar as there seems to be a need for a small inventory of fighter bombers (and possibly medium-range bombers), particularly with a view to the future establishment of a collective security system in and for Europe, this remaining inventory is to be placed under the command of an international authority.

4. In the boundary states of each pact system, a corridor or border security area (of 100 km on both sides of the border) is to be established, inside which no air forces may be deployed. This provision applies to Norway, the Soviet Union, the FRG, the GDR, the CSSR, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

5. In the central region of the ATTU area, i.e. in the FRG and the Benelux countries as well as in the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR, there is to be no deployment of ground combat or ground combat support aircraft.

6. The lowest possible equal limits (e.g. 20 percent of the present NATO inventory) are placed on the total number of combat aircraft in the entire ATTU area.

7. Existing airbases, runways, hardened sites, and other infrastructure are dissolved or destroyed in accordance with measures and stages to be implemented. This applies in particular to the border security area and the central region.

8. Circumvention of disarmament procedures by means of upgrading and through procurement of combat drones, cruise missiles, etc. is strictly prohibited.

9. Air defenses may be strengthened, with the emphasis on land-based anti-aircraft systems. Insofar as the procurement of so-called light home protection fighter aircraft seems indicated, their number must be included in the total combat aircraft inventory inside the ATTU area.

10. Disarmament, arms limitations, deployment, and modernization are to be supervised by means of stringent verification procedures, including on-site inspections.

Footnotes

1. Lutz, Dieter S., "Zur Theorie Struktureller Angriffsunfähigkeit" [The Theory of Structural Non-Offensive Capability], Hamburg Studies on Peace Research and Security Policy, No. 22, 1987, p. 24, Section 4.1.1, p. 43ff.

2. On methodological problems, cf. Lutz, Dieter S., "Zur Methodologie militärischer Kräftevergleiche" [The Methodology of Military Relative Force Capabilities], IFSH Research Reports, No. 24, 1981; Lutz, Dieter S., "Toward a Methodology of Military Force Comparisons," Baden-Baden, 1986.

3. Regarding the data below, see also: "The Military Balance 1988-1989," International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 1988, p. 238ff; Krivinyi, Nikolaus, "Taschenbuch der Luftflotten 1983/84" [Handbook of Air Forces 1983/84], Koblenz, 1983.

4. "Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa, Daten und Fakten" [Conventional Forces in Europe, Facts and Figures], published by FRG Press and Information Service, Bonn, 1988, pp. 16-19, 26.

5. "Warschauer Vertrag und NATO: Kräfteverhältnis in Europa" [Warsaw Pact and NATO: Force Comparisons in Europe], Moscow, 1989 (unpaginated).

6. "Konventionelle Militärpotentiale NATO/WP 1949-86 aus offiziellen Quellen" [NATO and WP Military Potentials 1949-86 Based on Official Sources], Bundeswehr Office for Studies and Exercises, Bergisch-Gladbach, 1989, pp. 190, 198, 206, 212, 220, 230, 244, 248, 254.

7. Facts and figures also cited in "Extra. Brief zur Truppeninformation No. 1/1989" [Extra. Troop Information Newsletter], FRG Ministry of Defense, (status as of 17 March 1989).

8. "Europäische Sicherheit 2000. Überlegungen zu einem Gesamtkonzept fuer die Sicherheit Europas aus sozialdemokratischer Sicht" [European Security 2000. Thoughts on an Overall Plan for European Security from the Social Democratic Point of View], FRIEDEN UND ABRÜSTUNG [Peace and Disarmament], No. 30 (2, 1989), Bonn, 1989; Teicht, Arnold Peter, "VKSE/Luftstreitkräfte" [CFE/Air Forces], SISTRA 3-4, 1989;

Unterseher, Lutz, "Umriss einer stabilen Luftverteidigung" [Designing Stable Air Defense Systems] in "Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung-Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik" [Confidence-building Defense-Reform of German Security Policy], Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik [Study Group for an Alternative Security Policy], Gerlingen, 1989, p. 188ff.

Defense Minister Interviewed on NATO, Bundeswehr

AU2301154790 Hamburg *DIE WELT* in German
23 Jan 90 p 6

[Untitled interview with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by Manfred Schell; date and place not given]

[Text] [Schell] Mr Minister, dramatic political changes have taken place in Eastern Europe. What is your balance sheet of the events at the beginning of 1990?

[Stoltenberg] The year 1989 was a year of historic changes. The strength and power of the liberal popular movements in nearly all East European countries are most impressive. The development toward democratic constitutions should be confirmed and consolidated in most countries this year. The biggest problem for the new democratic governments lies in an unchanged, difficult economic situation, which is even worsening in some countries, and in the passive resistance in sections of the communist-led administration. For this reason, active aid from the West, particularly also in the economic sphere, is of particular significance.

[Schell] Have developments in the Soviet Union been advanced in the same way as in the other East European communist states?

[Stoltenberg] The special development in the USSR, which has been misunderstood for a long time, is unpredictable. So far, even the reform-minded forces within the party leadership have been convinced that a renewed Communist Party, dominated by more openness and pluralism, could maintain its leading role and act as a link between the different republics of the Soviet Union. However, this has now been questioned by the critical development, mainly by the conflict between the different ethnic groups. The situation is aggravated by the lack of success of half-hearted economic reforms. Thus, developments in the Soviet Union are less predictable today than they seemed 1 year ago. One can conceive of several possibilities as to how the internal situation in the USSR may develop.

[Schell] Can you elaborate a little on this? What prospects do you see?

[Stoltenberg] What is most obvious are the conflicts between the different ethnic groups that have erupted. The peoples in the Baltic republics clearly strive for independence. The return to their own history and culture is impressive, but one may have doubts as to whether the Soviet Union will accept their secession. In

the Transcaucasia region, the conflicts have led to dreadful violent fights, to the brink of civil war. However, the use of the military will not resolve this problem in a lasting manner. In view of these events, the powerful emergence of a pan-Russian nationalist movement, of those forces who played a strong and negative role in Russia's history, has largely gone unnoticed. Three possible developments are conceivable: Gorbachev will soon overcome the crises and maintain full control. However, it is also possible that he will be facing a long and continued crisis that leads to the further weakening of the current leadership and may result in paralysis. Finally, a change in the leadership cannot be ruled out either. We are, of course, interested in the success of a sensible reform policy, so that the Soviet Union will continue to be a predictable partner. However, the future is open. We must also be prepared for negative developments.

[Schell] What impact would such conceivable developments have on the policies of the West?

[Stoltenberg] Despite the alarming deterioration of the situation in the Soviet Union, the West must still make full use of the historic opportunity that has opened up for the final elimination of the European division and the creation of common European structures. We should continue the course of comprehensive political and particularly economic and security-political cooperation. However, recent developments have shown that this will not be easy. Firm cohesion among the alliance, the shaping of the EC, and a carefully worded link between concepts for disarmament and defense capability are necessary elements of Western policies.

[Schell] Do you see a future for the Warsaw Pact as a partner for talks with the West?

[Stoltenberg] Nobody can say how the Soviet Union sees the future of the Warsaw Pact. Currently there are signs that it is making an attempt to consolidate this system politically. However, the calls by several new governments for the complete restructuring of the pact and of CEMA and the demands concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops must not be overlooked either.

[Schell] Does this mean that it is useful to conduct bilateral negotiations with individual Warsaw Pact member states?

[Stoltenberg] This applies to foreign-policy and economic issues. Several of the new governments are already expressing their interest in bilateral talks with the EC on forms of partnership and cooperation. We should be ready for such negotiations. However, disarmament talks will continue to be held at a multilateral level in the next few years. We stick to the idea that we want to develop and introduce a joint concept of the alliance. The East European states will decide whether they want to hold talks as members of an alliance or whether some governments want to present their special viewpoints as independent states.

[Schell] What chances do you see for the conclusion of a disarmament agreement this year?

[Stoltenberg] I am optimistic that we will conclude an initial agreement this year. The deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union underlines the need for a reduction of its military expenditure which continues to be too high despite the recent cuts. I am confident that the U.S.-Soviet START talks will lead to a considerable reduction in strategic weapons this year. I also believe that we will arrive at agreements on the gradual elimination of chemical weapons this year or next year. However, the military policy of the Soviet Union continues to be contradictory on various points. On the one hand there are signs of Soviet interest in disarmament, but at the same time their units in the Warsaw Pact countries are constantly supplied with modern weapons systems. A total of 400,000 soldiers of the Red Army are still deployed in the GDR. It has to be clarified both during the disarmament talks and the continuing CSCE process what long-term goals the Soviet Union is pursuing.

[Schell] What about the next disarmament steps? Is NATO prepared?

[Stoltenberg] We must carefully prepare the second round of the Vienna talks within the Alliance. It is already clear today that a further essential reduction in Soviet troops but also a more far-reaching reduction in the U.S. forces in Europe will be the main topic. As a result of the tight budget situation, there is currently an intensive discussion in the United States about new structures for the Armed Forces. There are indications that the U.S. Army might be trimmed to a certain extent. We want to cooperate constructively toward joint proposals of the Alliance on the future strength of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. If the Soviet Union is ready to substantially reduce its troops during the next round, particularly in the Warsaw Pact states, a certain reduction in the U.S. Armed Forces may actually be compatible with our security interests. However, a great deal of discussion is required here. Once we know the leeway that results from disarmament measures by the Soviet Union and the United States, we can discuss what consequences this will entail for the Armed Forces of the West European allies and for all of us.

[Schell] How long do you think this will take?

[Stoltenberg] The second round of talks in Vienna should start next year. As soon as we can assess the outcome of the first round of talks, we can make specific proposals within the Alliance for the next round of talks.

[Schell] Does the organic link between conventional and nuclear disarmament not suggest opening talks on sub-strategic weapons as soon as possible?

[Stoltenberg] The NATO summit held in May this year adopted the goal of reducing nuclear weapons systems in Europe. This is also the German position. We are particularly interested in achieving this goal. As a matter of fact, we are facing a massive superiority of the Soviet

Union in the sphere of nuclear weapons in Europe as well. This can only be eliminated through talks. In such case, a tangible reduction in the Western nuclear weapons systems in Europe might be conceivable. However, we are against the denuclearization of Europe, that is, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They proved to be an element of security in the past, and this applies to the future as well. However, we can now guarantee this stability with a fraction of the current systems—that is an equilibrium at a considerably lower level—if the overall process moves in the right direction. We must discuss this very carefully with our allies. There are three nuclear powers in Western Europe—France and Great Britain besides the United States—with whom we will hold talks within the framework of the Alliance.

[Schell] There is also a debate on the future of NATO. Critical questions are being raised as to whether the existence of NATO as a military alliance will be justified in the future?

[Stoltenberg] The truth is that last year NATO furnished proof of its significant role concerning defense capability, but also in the sphere of foreign policy and the peaceful restructuring of Europe. Without the intensive consultations within the Alliance we would not be able to develop joint concepts for increasing political cooperation with the Eastern European states, for active economic aid, for overcoming the division of Europe, and for disarmament talks. During this phase of change, people are increasingly realizing that NATO has never been a so-called military bloc. It has always been an Alliance based on a common foreign policy and security policy, which will also be needed in the future. In case the development in Europe continues to be very positive, changes in its structure are conceivable. However, speaking of a dissolution of NATO or the abandonment of NATO by the FRG is absolutely unrealistic.

[Schell] There have been deliberations during the past few days that a united Germany is only conceivable as a NATO member. Would this not have a considerable impact on the security interests of other countries?

[Stoltenberg] In his 10-point program, Chancellor Kohl has not only convincingly outlined our German goal but also described the most important stations on the path toward this goal. It can be noted that a growing number of governments and opinion leaders in politics and in the media in Western countries are recognizing the Germans' claim to self-determination. This is a positive sign after the unpleasant statements that were made last fall. If we first establish a treaty-based community and gradually develop confederative structures, this does not affect the membership in different security systems.

However, once the preconditions for a German federation, a German federal state, are created, this question will arise. A thorough analysis must be carried out as to what this means for the European security system. It must be examined whether special security regulations for the territory of the Warsaw Pact will have to be

discussed with the Soviet Union and those living in this territory if the German and European division are finally overcome. However, we also have long-term decisive interests in the existence of the Atlantic Alliance and an appropriate presence of the United States in Europe, both in terms of security policy and in terms of foreign policy and the economy.

[Schell] Your coalition partner recently questioned the Bundeswehr concept that was unanimously adopted by the cabinet in December. The number of 400,000 soldiers as a lower limit for the Bundeswehr does not seem to meet with the approval of your partner.

[Stoltenberg] The new Bundeswehr concept is the result of 6 months of intensive and careful work and discussions in the Defense Ministry. Of course, the consent of the cabinet and the Bundestag was required because we need broad support for the concept. For this reason, discussions were held several times in November/December within the coalition. The Federal Security Council and the cabinet adopted the concept unanimously, and the Bundestag adopted it with the votes of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] and Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP]. The planned changes in the structures are very far-reaching. We will not be able to complete their implementation before 1996. Discussions on the future structure of the Bundeswehr administration, which includes a staff of nearly 200,000, or the Bundeswehr strength in a state of defense are beginning now.

[Schell] Why did the FDP suddenly change its mind?

[Stoltenberg] The FDP is free to prepare its election program for the coming election period. It should consider carefully whether this field is suited for trying to acquire a strong image as a party or whether this is a controversy that is limited to the coalition. One thing is absolutely clear: The Bundeswehr concept will not be altered during the election period. It is not negotiable. In reality, the Bundeswehr concept anticipates the first round of talks that has not been concluded yet. We have unanimously agreed on a very important formulation in the cabinet: "In connection with the long-term development of East-West relations and the results of the desired follow-up talks after the conclusion of the first round of talks in Vienna, a decision has to be made as to whether the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr can be further reduced."

Thus, we want to await the outcome of this further round of talks and then decide what consequences this will entail for the Bundeswehr concept. We will stick to this decision.

[Schell] Do you see possibilities of eliminating this disagreement with the FDP?

[Stoltenberg] We are really open for every further positive change in Europe. There are no taboos. However, security issues are vital for our people. One cannot adopt one thing in December and demand the opposite in

January. A party that does such a thing must seriously ask itself whether it is still predictable. I am confident that we will ultimately succeed in removing the disagreement with the FDP. As a matter of fact, the solo attempt which was primarily initiated by colleague Moellemann has also drawn very critical reactions within the FDP. I have noted that renowned members of the FDP Bundestag group have adopted positions in recent interviews on armament and Bundeswehr issues that are completely different from Mr Moellemann's view. We can only master the great domestic challenges of this year—also in terms of arguments—if we jointly advocate a basic CDU/CSU-FDP position on central security and disarmament issues, as has been practiced since 1982.

Genscher Calls for CFE Agreement This Year

AU2501131490 Cologne Deutschlandfunk
Network in German 1200 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Untitled report by Dieter Kopp]

[Text] Vienna—The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact states who are negotiating in Vienna on conventional disarmament intend to reach an initial result before this fall. The negotiations on conventional stability are under a self-imposed time pressure. Federal Foreign Minister Genscher called upon the negotiating partners to hurry up. Dieter Kopp in Vienna has some details.

[Kopp] When the negotiations at the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and security, CDE, reached a deadlock years ago, Foreign Ministers Genscher and Dumas attracted attention with a joint initiative.

Today, together with their Italian counterpart De Michelis, they were trying to give an impetus to the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. All three foreign ministers presented an optimistic picture to the participating delegations at Vienna's Hofburg. Less than 11 months after the resumption of the talks on conventional stability, Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that never before had so much been achieved at arms control negotiations in such a short time. It is important now to conclude the negotiations in the next few months; the dramatic developments in recent weeks made a substantive result even more urgent, said Genscher. The peoples of Europe and North America were waiting for the conclusion of a conventional disarmament agreement before the end of 1990, stressed Genscher.

He expressed the hope that agreement would also be reached on strategic and chemical weapons. According to Genscher, the architecture of a dynamically changing Europe must be based on a reliable all-European stability. We need a stability partnership for all of Europe—politically, economically, and in terms of security policy, Genscher added. This stability partnership required new thinking on all sides; however, it was essential for the European process of self-awareness and renewal to develop without problems.

French Foreign Minister Dumas also urged a speedy result to the negotiations in Vienna, which could be signed according to schedule at a CSCE special summit in October or November. In his statement, Dumas recalled how inflexible the military blocs had been 1 year ago. At that time, the division of the continent and the German people had been a reality.

Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis stressed the importance of revolutionary changes in central and Eastern Europe, and said that as a result, it had become even more important to achieve successes in the area of conventional disarmament. To get on more quickly, he recommended convoking a meeting of foreign ministers from the 23 participating states this spring.

Belgian Plan To Withdraw Troops Viewed

AU260111290 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 26 Jan 90 p 4

[Editorial by J.J.: "Belgian Solo Attempts"]

[Text] According to the Belgian defense minister, Belgium wants to withdraw its troops—25,000 men—from the FRG where they cover a 60-km wide zone. The planned solo attempt comes as a surprise—the announcement has apparently not been discussed with any of the alliance partners—but there are good reasons for it. Belgian Defense Minister Coenighe wants to make things hot for NATO, which, in his view, does not react fast enough to changes in the East.

His arguments seem plausible at first sight. "Can we continue to deploy Belgian troops along the German-German border if the citizens of the two states cross this border without any problems and even discuss reunification in public," he asked. It is also true that analyses concerning the threat from the East has revealed a decline everywhere in the West. Gorbachev does not want to continue the arms race but reduces weapons, and in view of the disintegrating Warsaw Pact, an attack scenario becomes increasingly unlikely.

On the other hand, both alliances have chosen the Vienna disarmament forum to discuss this. It is important to preserve the advantages of the old system that has prevented war in Europe for 45 years in a future Europe where stability will be ensured with increasingly fewer weapons. A unilateral withdrawal may quickly reduce one's defense burden, but multilateral disarmament that is stipulated in treaties and carefully monitored is much better. The epochal changes in Europe have so far been initiated by a single man—Gorbachev. For this reason, Europe should build a new joint security system that will outlast any man, including Gorbachev. This is not possible in a solo attempt.

Genscher Links Disarmament, German Unity

AU2601133190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1200 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher assumes that negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe can begin in 1991. They would have to include short-range nuclear weapons and the so-called nuclear artillery, said Genscher in his first GDR radio interview. The minister had stated earlier that these weapons must be totally abolished, because they could only reach targets in countries that were ready to carry out reforms. Genscher stressed in the interview that the acceleration of disarmament could have a positive effect on intra-German developments. He added that Bonn's goal of achieving German unity could be reached more easily if and when the disarmament process makes substantial progress.

Defense Official on U.S. Troop Withdrawal

LD2701171390 Hamburg DPA in German 1625 GMT
27 Jan 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to WELT AM SONNTAG, the United States is to withdraw 15,000 of the 230,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Federal Republic. Affected by the reduction are U.S. garrisons in Neu-Ulm, Schwaebisch Gmuend, Sembach, Heilbronn, and Pirmasens. The background to this is the agreement on scrapping nuclear medium-range systems up to a range of 5,000 km.

A Bonn Defense Ministry spokesman said that the project is a "national American affair" in connection with the Vienna disarmament negotiations. It is a long-term measure. The United States will inform the federal government "in good time" about its decisions.

Plan To Withdraw 15,000 U.S. Troops Reported

AU2901144090 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 28 Jan 90 pp 1,2

[Report by M.G./A.P.]

[Excerpt] According to information received by WELT AM SONNTAG, the United States is planning the early withdrawal from the FRG of American troops in the order of a division. According to our information, the corresponding announcement is to be made shortly, maybe even on 29 January.

According to this planned announcement some 15,000 men of the total 230,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in the FRG are to be withdrawn. Affected by the reduction are the U.S. garrisons in Neu-Ulm, Schwaebisch Gmuend, Sembach, Heilbronn, and Pirmasens.

The troop withdrawal can be attributed to the INF Treaty on the scrapping of nuclear medium-range systems up to a range of 5,000 km: After these systems are gone it is no longer necessary to maintain the crew, it was stated.

However, of the named locations only Neu-Ulm, Schwaebisch-Gmünd, and Heilbronn have so far been specified as INF locations. The number of crew was stated only at 2,000.

According to the INF Treaty, the West must scrap 572 INF systems, including 108 Pershing II missiles (excluding the FRG) and 464 warheads for cruise missiles (including 96 on 24 launchers in the FRG). Sixty percent of the overall arsenals have been destroyed to date.

On 27 January, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner flatly rejected unilateral troop withdrawals from the FRG by NATO allies. "I am strictly against unilateral reductions as proposed by Belgium, before the conclusion of the Vienna Agreement (on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe)," Woerner said in an interview with the Netherlands paper HET PAROOL.

Woerner said that if the Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme were to withdraw soldiers this would not be without far-reaching consequences. "It would increase the risk of other states following suit. The combination of troops of different nations is a clear deterring factor," the former defense minister of the Christian Democratic Union said. [passage omitted]

Genscher on Unification, Disarmament

AU2901153290 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG
in German 28 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Andreas Wrede and Friedemann Weckbach-Mara; date and place not given]

[Text] [BILD AM SONNTAG] The population of the GDR obviously also wants the two German states to unite as soon as possible: What will become of NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

[Genscher] This impatience is understandable. After having been patronized for many decades, the people in the GDR want freedom, democracy, and good money for good work. We know that we cannot bring about unification alone, but that it must be embedded in the European development. In this respect it becomes apparent how important the East Treaties and the CSCE process are, a process that is increasingly proving to be a stable framework for the development in Europe. The alliances will become more political, and confrontation will give way to a relationship that is based on cooperation, which will defuse many critical questions.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Within a unified Germany, is the current GDR to become part of NATO, as demanded by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU]?

[Genscher] No, this would thwart our efforts to achieve unity. Those who want to extend the NATO border to the Oder and Neisse Rivers close the door to a united Germany. Yet our continued membership in NATO is undisputed.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] So what is then to become of the military alliances?

[Genscher] They will become elements of cooperative security structures for the whole Europe. In this context we must not ignore the security interests of the USSR: after all, we do not want to destabilize Europe but instead to achieve more security through a stability-based partnership. We do not want to exploit the problems of the reform process in the East. The people in the GDR need a perspective in their old home country. The rapid introduction of economic and monetary union is absolutely necessary. Now we must show our national solidarity and generously support the construction work in the GDR.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Even with millions from Bonn?

[Genscher] It will cost us money, yet at the end of the day it will be cheaper than the division and the mass emigration from the GDR. German unity cannot be had for free—neither financially nor politically. Each citizen should participate in the new development so that we create unity from below. Why should BILD AM SONNTAG not appear in the GDR? I propose a German national foundation which preserves the historical building stock in the GDR and promotes cultural life there with private donations, donations from industry, and subsidies from the state.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Should Berlin become the seat of this foundation?

[Genscher] Yes, Berlin is the city in which and for which the hearts of the Germans beat. The indivisible German nation must have its heart in the right place—and this is Berlin. There are no arguments against but only arguments in favor of Berlin becoming once again the capital of Germany.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Would you establish the Foreign Ministry there?

[Genscher] I would like to

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Is what happens in the USSR not also important for German unity?

[Genscher] Of course it is. Therefore, those who take peace and stability in Europe seriously, and those who take German unity seriously, ought to talk less in public about how safe Gorbachev's position is, but think of what they can do to make his job easier—even through

economic cooperation. Besides, I also believe that Gorbachev has as much authority in the USSR as ever.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Will Moscow give several republics independence?

[Genscher] The USSR leadership is concerned about granting the individual nationalities more independence, but also about keeping them together in the state as a whole.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] How do you conceive Western help for Gorbachev's policy?

[Genscher] The partnership of stability, which I demand, has a political, a security-political, and an economic dimension. Those who continue to stick to the old hostile images, and those who delay the disarmament process are also keeping the gate locked that leads to Germany unity. The East is ready to reduce its superiority in all spheres. Oddly enough, there are still people in the West who consider equal strength at a lower level to be dangerous. Now we must press for disarmament.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] What are the necessary steps?

[Genscher] Even this year we must make sure that:

- both superpowers agree on reducing their strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent;
- chemical weapons are universally banned;
- the first conventional disarmament agreement is concluded in Vienna, and talks on the second one are initiated immediately;
- nuclear short-range missiles and nuclear artillery warheads are included in the talks, because they are no longer appropriate for our time.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Does this mean that the Bundeswehr will also be reduced?

[Genscher] The federal government has stated that, as a result of a second disarmament agreement in Vienna, a further reduction of the Bundeswehr to under 400,000 men is possible.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] However, Defense Minister Stoltenberg has criticized the Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP] for this statement?

[Genscher] Those who criticize the FDP resolutions in this respect are obviously not familiar with the resolutions of the federal government.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] When will the second Vienna Disarmament Agreement be concluded?

[Genscher] We want to and will conclude it next year.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Do you even expect the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German territory?

[Genscher] I do not perceive the complete withdrawal in the foreseeable future, because we need the United States to ensure stability in Europe.

CDU/CSU on GDR'S NATO Membership

LD3001133790 Hamburg DPA in German 1300 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] has rejected the view of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that NATO membership of the GDR, as part of a united Germany, was not possible. Since the Western alliance had hitherto acted as a stabilizing factor it was only logical that a growing together of the two German states would be possible only "on the firm ground" of the Federal Republic's NATO membership, Michaela Geiger (CSU), foreign affairs spokesman of the Union Lower House group, said in Bonn today.

She referred to the Berlin statement by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker of last December. Nobody should doubt that Bonn would remain a reliable NATO member. However, the alliances would be faced with entirely new tasks which made an umbrella of overlapping interests conceivable, Frau Geiger said. For the transitional period it was conceivable that "no NATO troops" would be "deployed" on GDR territory. "It could even be possible that for a certain time of the transition period a limited contingent of Soviet troops could remain in the GDR."

The option of a neutral Germany was totally out of the question. Such a state would be unpredictable for all the neighbors, the Union politician stressed.

USSR Favors European Troop Withdrawal in 5 Years

AU3001145690 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Jan 90 p 2

[Untitled report by Jan Reifenberg]

[Excerpt] Vienna, 29 January—The USSR is ready to withdraw its troops that are stationed in Eastern Europe within 5 years after the effective date of the second phase of the CFE agreement, under the condition that all U.S. and NATO troops that are deployed in Western Europe be withdrawn in the same period of time. This was stated by the Soviet chief delegate at the Vienna talks, Grinevskiy, with the firm intention to slow down the process of unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSSR, which are based on bilateral agreements as demanded by Budapest and Prague. Apparently, Moscow wants to ensure that the reduction of forces between the Atlantic and the Urals takes place in an orderly framework of the CFE agreement; therefore it is also necessary to prevent the German question from "getting out of hand." Hungary and the CSSR would like the Soviet troops to withdraw by 1992 at the latest. The Soviet proposal would imply a fundamental change of the overall picture of security policy and strategy in Europe up to 1995. It is aimed to attain this objective in stages and through a vote among the 23 partners in the CFE talks instead of bilateral steps. Grinevskiy was quite

frank when he said that, at least in the short run, the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe provides an element of stability, because it weakens the concern of a precipitous German reunification. The Soviet chief delegate considers the reunification of the two German states to be "inevitable," anyway; the question is only when it takes place, he said.

The Soviet proposal might also be regarded as a first response to proposals that were made by Foreign Ministers Genscher, Dumas, and De Michelis last week. They want to adapt the speed of the Vienna talks to the political developments in Eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

FINLAND

Defense Forces Buy Rocket Launchers From France

LD3001221290 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1600 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The Defense Forces will buy heavy nonreusable rocket launchers from the French Matra company. The value of the deal is about 150 million Finnish marks. The deal also includes training weapons. The procurement is a continuation of a 1986 order. This procurement continues the modernization of close combat defense weaponry. The aim is to improve the antitank defense capability of the light infantry brigades. The seller has promised to reciprocate and buy from Finland.

FRANCE

Disarmament Inspector Corps Establishment

90WC0031A Paris LE MONDE in French
13 Jan 90 p 10

[Excerpt] France plans to set up a corps of disarmament inspectors whose task it will be to make on-the-spot verifications of arrangements which nations involved in the Vienna negotiations might make as the result of future agreements on reductions of conventional arsenals in Europe. This announcement was made on Thursday, 11 January, by General Maurice Schmitt, Armed Forces chief of staff, after he confirmed his participation (LE MONDE, 11 January) in a seminar on defense doctrine to be held in Vienna next week by military leaders of countries belonging to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

According to General Schmitt, the corps, which he estimates will be made up of some 200 experts, will include inspectors responsible for on-the-spot observation and verification of disarmament measures applied in foreign countries and aides sent to France by those same nations to perform similar inspection tasks for their side. An interministerial group will coordinate their activities, collate data gathered, and take note of possible violations.

Reserve General Roger Pessidou, charge de mission to the minister of defense, is to submit a report to Jean-Pierre Chevenement in February on the organization of the disarmament inspector corps. The new institution should mainly be made up of military men, engineers, and linguists, while the coordinating unit will chiefly involve defense, foreign affairs, and interior personnel. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Foreign Policy Expert Brundtland on Disarmament

90EN0144A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
15 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Arne Olav Brundtland, researcher at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute: "Norway Benefits From Detente"]

[Text] Claims that security is currently deteriorating in the north while improving on the Continent elicit a two-part request:

1. Will those who think that Norway runs the risk of an isolated attack by the Soviet Union in an international situation marked by detente, disarmament, and cooperation please come forward with their analysis.
2. Will those who find it in Norway's interest to become bilaterally involved in bringing about the Soviet Union's unilateral naval disarmament in the north likewise present their detailed argument.

Indeed, the fact is that the Soviet Union has clearly chosen to keep a high naval profile in the north while the country demonstrates great willingness to disarm in Central Europe. But in this connection Norwegian authorities and commentators should not lose themselves in local military details if it is an opinion on security policy they are offering.

Norwegian Territory

During the entire postwar period, agreement has reigned that Norway's security problem springs from its geostrategic location. If war should erupt between East and West in Europe, the assumption has been that Norwegian territory could be affected at a very early stage. This is the main reason for Norway's membership in NATO. Because we could not count on being spared, we chose to contribute to joint Western deterrence through NATO teamwork, and we have thereby secured agreements concerning support in crisis and war.

Norway has never given serious thought to assembling a national defense that alone would counterbalance the Soviet military force which theoretically could be launched against us. It is only in NATO that we have been able to find such a counterbalance. We have generally kept the military component of this counterbalance at arm's length, out of sight, and only occasionally

allowed it onto Norwegian territory for brief maneuvers in order to show that the alliance will be ready militarily if the situation requires it. In this way, both the necessary deterrence and the necessary reassurance have been well attended to. A precondition for this policy has been a meaningful Norwegian defense.

Detente

If we continue to assume that Norway is threatened only by a major war, then a relaxation of tensions between NATO and the Soviet Union emerges as an unqualified advantage for our country, regardless of where on the map the disarmament occurs. In today's situation it is essential to note that the important European NATO allies, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, do not disagree on the policy of detente. Both the United States and West Germany, which are our two most important "reference powers" when it comes to security policy, conduct a vigorous policy of detente. So does Gorbachev. This is unquestionably to our advantage.

Naval forces are omitted from the disarmament mandate which forms the foundation of the Vienna talks. This is mostly because of the United States' reluctance to limit freedom of the seas. The American Navy is the strongest in the world. Taken altogether, NATO's naval forces are clearly superior to the Warsaw Pact's. The significant reductions of American military power which are in the offing will chiefly affect land forces, and only to a slight degree the U.S. Navy. The United States will continue to keep a sharp lookout for Soviet naval expansion and will maintain its interest in Norway, because Norwegian territory is so important to the naval strategy picture.

But the forms may differ somewhat. If it turns out at a later time that the United States agrees to naval disarmament, it must come as a result of further relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Norwegian interests would also be served in such a case. It is virtually impossible to imagine that under predictable political conditions the superpowers will divide the world between them into spheres of interest and that Norway will be placed in the Soviet Union's.

No Soloing

The previous government made it a point to link Norway to the prevalent disarmament policy. It made a concerted effort to prevent Norway's being placed in a distinct zone up north. The government emphasized that disarmament should cover Europe not just from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains but also from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean, and this emphasis received wide support. It is a European policy that circles which consider themselves pro-European should not reject.

The previous government tinkered with the idea of naval armaments inspection. It ran into rough American opposition, and changed course.

We can believe, of course, that the Soviet Union should begin to disarm unilaterally at sea as well. But a persistent attempt by Norway alone to involve the Soviet Union in a dialogue on naval disarmament can become a two-edged sword. If naval disarmament entails a certain form of reciprocity, then Norway is spread fairly thin. We have nothing to give nationally, and for the time being our naval allies are reluctant.

END OF

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